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POLICING THE GOOD GUYS: REGULATION OF
THE CHARITABLE SECTOR THROUGH A
FEDERAL CHARITY OVERSIGHT BOARD
Terri Lynn Helge *
Recently, public confidence in the charitable sector has eroded due
to a barrage of media reports on scandals and abuses. The principal
parties charged with regulation of the charitable sector, the Internal
Revenue Service and state attorneys general, are saddled with bureau-
cratic constraints that make it difficult to enforce the laws governing the
fiduciary responsibilities of charity managers. Substantial reform in the
regulation of charitable organizations is necessary to curb the reported
abuses that have undermined confidence in the charitable sector.
Some advocate expanding private regulation of the charitable sec-
tor to improve enforcement of the fiduciary responsibilities of charitable
managers. While some of these private regulatory alternatives have had
success in isolated situations, none are satisfactory in providing compre-
hensive and effective oversight of the charitable sector. Overall, the pol-
icies underlying oversight of charitable organizations support
maintaining primary responsibility for their regulation in a centralized
authority. However, the financial, political, institutional, and agency
constraints imposed on the Internal Revenue Service and state attorneys
general make them unlikely to implement enough internal reform to be
an ongoing, effective enforcement presence in the charitable sector.
This Article advocates the creation of a new, federal, quasi-public
agency that would be the principal regulator of the charitable sector.
The new agency would be a self-funded, independent, and proactive reg-
ulator that would serve the dual purposes of curbing the abuses that have
eroded public confidence in the sector and educating charity managers
of their obligation to be responsible stewards of charitable resources.
The proposed agency would be primarily responsible for enforcing fed-
eral tax laws aimed at influencing fiduciary behavior of charity manag-
ers and preserving charitable assets for public benefit. Its formation,
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therefore, would separate oversight of charity governance from the tax
collection function, thus harmonizing the United States with other coun-
tries that have established independent charity oversight agencies.
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INTRODUCTION
"We have the wrong paradigm. We think of ourselves as the an-
gelic sector; we can do no wrong. I
The importance of the charitable sector for our collective economic
and societal well-being cannot be overstated. 2 The charitable sector em-
ploys more of the American workforce than the auto and financial indus-
tries combined,3 and collectively accounts for over $2 trillion in wealth. 4
In addition, the charitable sector provides vital services that private for-
profit organizations, and the government, are unable or unwilling to pro-
vide. A recent commentary on the financial plight of the charitable sec-
tor noted that "[i]f the [American] nonprofit sector were a country, it
would have the seventh largest economy in the world. We cannot afford
for it to go the way of Iceland, whose financial system collapsed."'5
Yet, government officials pay relatively little attention to the regula-
tion of the individuals responsible for managing charitable organizations.
As a result, there has been an increase in the reports of abuses in the
charitable sector.6 These reports are not limited to local or unknown
1 Debra E. Blum, Bequests, Celebrities, Foundation, and the Economy: a Conference
Notebook From National Research Meeting, CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 23, 2008,
http://philanthropy.com/news/updates/indexlphp?id=6368 (quoting David Horton Smith,
founder of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action).
2 Cf. Mark Sidel, The Nonprofit Sector and the New State Activism, 100 MICH. L. REV.
1312, 1313 (2002) (book review) [hereinafter Sidel, New State Activism] (stating that the char-
itable sector is "'integral to the national economy and a valued part of [our] social fabric ....
[It] embodies the philanthropic goodness, conviviality, cultural excitement, and democratic
spirit of the American people ... [and] has provided a valued social location in which groups
can operate without pecuniary obsessions and with measures of success that are not necessarily
related to financial profitability."' (quoting NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREE-
DOM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 2 (2001))).
3 BRUCE REED ET AL., QUIET CRISIS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR 3 (2009), www.civicenterprises.net/pdfs/quietcrisis.pdf.
4 Paul Arnsberger et al., A History of the Tax-Exempt Sector: An SOI Perspective, STA-
TISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 110 (Winter 2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soiltehistory.pdf;
Molly F. Sherlock & Jane G. Gravelle, An Overview of the Nonprofit and Charitable Sector,
Congressional Research Service Report No. R40919 (Nov. 18, 2009), at 11.
5 REED, supra note 3, at 3.
6 The lack of effective enforcement of applicable laws in the charitable sector creates an
environment ripe for abuse. See, e.g., MARION R. FREMONT-SMrrH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 471 (2004) [hereinafter
FREMorN-SmrriH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGAIUZATIONS] ("[F]iduciaries bent on reaping
private benefit or careless in their management will not alter their behavior if they believe
2009]
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charitable organizations, but have also exposed large national organiza-
tions such as the United Way,7 the Smithsonian Institute, 8 and the Amer-
ican Red Cross. 9 The types of reported abuses range from criminal
embezzlement and fraud to civil wrongdoings such as breach of fiduciary
duty, failure to carry out the mission of the organization, and negligent
mismanagement of assets.' 0 Since 1995, the reported abuses have re-
sulted in the depletion of over $1.2 billion in charitable funds." Of this
government is not carrying out its regulatory function."); id. at 11 ("Some of [the] organiza-
tions were formed by individuals who intended to and did use them for private benefit, result-
ing in diversion of substantial sums."). But see James J. Fishman, Wrong Way Corrigan and
Recent Developments in the Nonprofit Landscape: A Need for New Legal Approaches, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 572-74 (2008) [hereinafter Fishman, Wrong Way Corrigan] (alleging
that the increased sense of fraud and abuse in the charitable sector may be the result of in-
creased transparency in an electronic age as opposed to actual increase in incidents of
wrongdoing).
7 See United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1373-76 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that the
former head of the United Way was fired in 1992 and later convicted of fraud for using over
$600,000 of United Way's funds to finance a lavish lifestyle for himself and his companion);
Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes,
Problems and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 633-35 (1998) (describing in detail the
United Way controversy).
8 See Jacqueline Trescott & James V. Grimaldi, Smithsonian's Small Quits in Wake of
Inquiry, WASH. PosT, Mar. 27, 2007, at Al (chronicling excessive salary, large expense al-
lowances, and lavish trips on the Smithsonian's dime for its former chief officer).
9 See Johnny Rex Buckles, When Charitable Gifts Soar Above Twin Towers: A Federal
Income Tax Solution to the Problem of Publicly Solicited Surplus Donations Raised for a
Designated Charitable Purpose, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1827, 1828 (2003) (noting that the
American Red Cross faced a public outcry when it attempted to redirect "surplus" contribu-
tions for the aid of victims of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to a fund to relieve
victims of future terrorist attacks); Stephanie Strom, Senators Press Red Cross for a Full
Accounting, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2005, at A17 (describing congressional inquiry into Ameri-
can Red Cross governance practices after widespread public criticism of the agency's slow
response in providing aid to Hurricane Katrina victims).
10 See generally Marion R. Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoings by Officers
and Directors of Charities: A Survey of Press Reports 1995-2002, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV.
25, 25 (2003) [hereinafter Fremont-Smith Study] (summarizing press accounts from
1995-2002 of alleged criminal and civil wrongdoings by charity managers who have primary
fiduciary responsibility to their respective charitable organizations). This study chronicled 152
reported incidents of wrongdoing by charity fiduciaries in the charitable sector, noting that 104
involved criminal activity and 54 involved civil wrongdoing. See id. at 25. All but two of the
criminal cases involved stealing money from the charity or diverting charitable funds for their
personal benefit. See id. at 28. Additionally, the study reported on how the prohibited activity
initially came to light, accounting for approximately half of the incidents of wrongdoing. See
id. at 29, 31. None of these cases came to light as a result of investigation by state attorneys
general or audit by the IRS. Rather, insiders or investigative journalists were the first to un-
cover a substantial majority of these incidents. See id. at 31. Other incidents of prohibited
activity were uncovered by other government agencies conducting audits of the organization
for their own purposes. See id.
I I The total amount involved was reported at $1,279,039,532, with $106,202,000 attrib-
uted to civil wrongdoings, which represented the amount recovered from civil wrongdoings.
See Fremont-Smith Study, supra note 10, at 27-31. The total amount of depletion in charita-
ble assets attributed to civil wrongdoings could not be determined. See id. Approximately
$1.1 billion of the depletion in charitable assets is attributed to four Ponzi-type schemes
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amount, only half has been recovered through enforcement actions. 12
Sensationalized media reports of wrongdoings in the charitable sector
create the impression that the abuses are pervasive. 13 Moreover, when a
popular charitable leader commits misconduct, "the shockwave can top-
ple the charity and ripple throughout the [charitable] sector."1 4 The ex-
tent of the wrongdoing is difficult to determine, in part because there is
little policing of charitable activities nationwide. 15
In response to the reported abuses in the charitable sector, the Sen-
ate Finance Committee sought to reform the federal tax laws applicable
targeted at the charitable sector during this time period-Foundation for New Era Philan-
thropy, Baptist Foundation of Arizona, Greater Ministries International, and Mid-America
Foundation. Id. at 25-26, 28. A report in the Chronicle of Philanthropy asserts that the
Fremont-Smith Study significantly underestimates the scope of abuses in the charitable sector.
See Brad Wolverton, Study: Charity Fraud Exceeds $1 Billion, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY,
Nov. 27, 2003, at 26.
12 Fremont-Smith Study, supra note 10, at 27-29.
13 See Goldschmid, supra note 7, at 633 (asserting that reports of self-dealing and duty of
loyalty violations undermine the trust and goodwill necessary for the charitable sector to
thrive); Joel Fleishman, Accountability: To Whom and For What Purposes, Address at the
Waldemar A. Nielsen Issues in Philanthropy Seminar Series, Georgetown University (Oct. 4,
2002), available at http://cpnl.georgetown.edu/doc-pool/Nielsen02O2Fleishman.pdf. Profes-
sor Fleishman warns:
Let me also make clear that no one I know believes that nonprofit malfeasance is
widespread. It clearly is not! But every time there is a high profile instance of fraud
or serious mismanagement, the fragile tissue of public trust in nonprofits frays a bit,
and remember that it is that public trust in nonprofits on which the generous tax
benefits enacted by Congress and State legislatures ultimately rest. Let the public
trust erode substantially, and it will not be long before some lawmakers, whipped up
by the investigative journalists, begin to wage a crusade to slap the nonprofit sector
with punitive fines or perhaps even a heavy-handed accountability-enforcement
mechanism.
Make no mistake about it. The tissue of public trust is not only fraying, but it is
beginning to tear a bit. According to Independent Sector's most recent poll, only
64% of Americans believe nonprofit organizations act honestly and ethically in us-
ing funds donated by others. That leaves 36% of Americans who believe differently,
and remember that the essence of the charitable nonprofits is altruism-benefiting
others, so more than a third of Americans doubt the bona fides of the nonprofit
sector.
Id. at 2. In addition, recent Senate Finance Committee hearings on federal regulation of the
charitable sector, state reform initiatives, and attempts at private enforcement of the charitable
sector suggest considerable wrongdoing in the sector. See Ronald Chester, Improving En-
forcement Mechanisms in the Charitable Sector: Can Increased Disclosure of Information Be
Utilized Effectively?, 40 NEW ENo. L. REv. 447, 453-55 (2006) [hereinafter Chester, Improv-
ing Enforcement Mechanisms].
14 Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Non-
profit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y. ScH. L. REv. 457, 467-68 (1996) [here-
inafter Brody, Agents Without Principals]; see also Fremont-Smith Study, supra note 10, at 25
(discussing the effects of charitable misconduct).
15 See Ronald Chester, Grantor Standing to Enforce Charitable Transfers Under Section
405(c) of the Uniform Trust Code and Related Law: How Important Is It and How Extensive
Should It Be?, 37 REa.. PROP. PROB. TR. J. 611, 628 (2002) [hereinafter Chester, Grantor
Standing].
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to charitable organizations. In June 2004, the staff of the Senate Finance
Committee issued a bipartisan white paper proposing legislative action to
reform the charitable sector.' 6 Subsequently, the Senate Finance Com-
mittee held hearings' 7 and solicited input from the Independent Sector, a
coalition of various nonprofit groups, regarding the reform needed in the
charitable sector.18 The Independent Sector's Panel on the Nonprofit
Sector issued a final report of its recommendations for reform in June
2005.19
The Senate Finance Committee debated several proposed reforms
for the charitable sector, and this debate culminated in the enactment of
the Pension Protection Act of 2006 on August 17, 2006.20 The Pension
Protection Act, however, falls short of actually reforming the charitable
sector as a whole because it merely imposes more stringent requirements
on a targeted subset of the charitable sector.2' In effect, the Pension
Protection Act compounds the complexity of the existing set of rules that
govern charitable organizations. Since most charitable organizations are
managed by uncompensated volunteers,22 many of whom are unfamiliar
with the complexities of the federal tax laws governing charitable organi-
16 See Staff of the Senate Finance Committee, Tax Exempt Governance Proposals: Staff
Discussion Draft (June 2004), available at http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/2004HearingF.
htm/hearings2004.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
17 See, e.g., Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to
Good People, Hearing before the Sen. Comm. On Finance, 108th Cong. (June 22, 2004),
available at http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing062204.htm.
18 See Letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley and Senator Max Baucus to Dana Aviv,
President of the Independent Sector, dated Sept. 22, 2004 (reprinted in PANEL ON T1E NON-
PROFIT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITA-
BLE ORGANIZATIONS: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 110 (2005),
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/Report/final/PanelFinalReport.pdf).
19 See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 18.
20 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.).
21 See Ellen P. Aprill, What Critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley Can Teach About Regulation of
Nonprofit Governance, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 765, 777-78 (2008) (noting that the Pension
Protection Act provisions prohibiting loans to insiders of charitable organizations were unnec-
essary and ineffective); Fishman, Wrong Way Corrigan, supra note 6, at 587-89; Terry W.
Knoepfle, The Pension Protection Act of 2006: A Misguided Attack on Donor-Advised Funds
and Supporting Organizations, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 221, 223, 256-63 (2009) (arguing that the
new restrictions imposed on donor advised funds and supporting organizations are unnecessary
because the reports of abuses that prompted the new restrictions could have been adequately
addressed through enforcement of prior law).
22 Katherine O'Regan and Sharon M. Oster, Does The Structure and Composition of The
Board Matter?; The Case of Non-Profit Organizations, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 215
(2005). Typically, charitable directors spend less time than their for-profit counterparts in per-
forming their directorial duties. See id. at 212, which states:
In this sample, the mean percentage of board meetings attended [by nonprofit direc-
tors] was 71%; this is low relative to the corporate setting in which any director of a
public company who attends less than 75% of board meetings must be reported in
the annual report to shareholders. Similarly, the estimate by board members of an
average 42 hours per year spent on board activity is low relative to a recent survey
[Vol. 19:1
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zations, 23 these new rules will serve as a trap for the unwary. This in
turn will increase the risk of noncompliance by charitable organizations.
While reform of the federal tax laws governing charitable organiza-
tions may be necessary, first, the systemic problem of lack of regulatory
oversight of the charitable sector needs to be fixed. 24 By all accounts,
oversight of the charitable sector as a whole is minimal; regulation by
state officials is nonexistent in a majority of jurisdictions, and regulation
by the IRS is cursory at best.25 The barrage of media reports on scandals
and abuses in the charitable sector, combined with the perception of lax
regulation, has eroded public confidence in the charitable sector.2 6 Pub-
lic confidence in the sector's integrity is essential to its survival since it
suggesting that outside corporate directors spend an average of 157 hours per year
on board matters.
23 Cf James J. Fishman, Standards of Conduct for Directors of Nonprofit Corporations,
7 PACE L. REv. 389, 396 (1986) [hereinafter Fishman, Standards of Conduct] (observing that
nonprofit board members typically are selected based on a variety of reasons having very little
to do with their responsibilities as directors, such as their ability to fundraise, their social or
political connections, and their notoriety).
24 Cf Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law: The Disclosure Focus of Recent
Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 584 (2005) (empha-
sizing that charity managers who knowingly breach their fiduciary duties are unlikely to im-
prove their behaviors due to increased sanction if "the likelihood of detection of [the] abuse
and enforcement of [the] fiduciary duty is (or is perceived to be) quite low.").
25 See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 2;
Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforce-
ment, 79 IND. L. J. 937, 939 (2004) [hereinafter Brody, Parochialism] (observing that "as a
practical matter, few state attorneys general have the funding and inclination to engage in
aggressive charity enforcement"); Chester, Improving Enforcement Mechanisms, supra note
13, at 452 (noting the "increasingly obvious.., need for better policing methods for charities"
given the ineffectiveness of the state attorneys general); Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Man-
agement of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 623
(1999) (surmising that "[tihe worst abuses receive attention, but many problems probably go
undetected or unaddressed"); Henry Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129
U. PA. L. REv. 497, 601 (1981) (observing that "in most states there has been little effort to
exercise even the substantial powers that the attorney general already has"); Reiser, supra note
24, at 598-606 (noting the "significant resource and structural issues unique to the nonprofit
context" that make enforcement difficult); Peter Swords, Nonprofit Accountability: The Sec-
tor's Response to Government Regulation, 25 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 413, 413 (1999) (stat-
ing that the state attorneys general "tend to allocate their scarce regulatory resources to other
more politically potent portions of their domains" (internal quotations omitted)); accord
Fremont-Smith Study, supra note 10, at 33 (after surveying press accounts of wrongdoings in
the charitable sector over a seven-year time period with noticeably minimal roles played by the
state attorneys general and IRS in the enforcement actions, the authors concluded: "Given the
apparent rate of success of the prosecutors, it is likely that enhanced enforcement programs
would increase the amount of funds recovered and could well have a positive deterrent
effect.").
26 See Paul C. Light, How Americans View Charities: A Report on Charitable Confi-
dence, 2008, The Brookings Institution Issues in Governance Studies 1, April 2008, http://
www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/04 nonprofits-light/04-nonprofits-light.
pdf (noting that public confidence in charities remains at contemporary lows due at least in
part to the media reports of charitable scandals).
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relies heavily on gratuitous contributions of cash, property, and ser-
vices. 27 Substantial reform in the regulation of charitable organizations
is thus necessary to curb the reported abuses that have undermined public
confidence in the charitable sector.
To restore public confidence in the charitable sector, there must be
responsible oversight of the sector,28 that is, vigorous enforcement of the
federal tax laws applicable to charitable organizations that govern fiduci-
ary behavior. Currently, the principal parties responsible for regulating
the charitable sector, the Internal Revenue Service and the state attorneys
general, are saddled with bureaucratic constraints that make it difficult to
enforce the laws governing the fiduciary responsibilities of charity man-
agers. The inherent financial, institutional, political, and agency con-
straints imposed on these governmental agencies make them unlikely to
implement enough internal reform to constitute an ongoing, effective en-
forcement presence in the charitable sector.
Therefore, to enhance effective and efficient oversight of the chari-
table sector, it is necessary to establish a new organization that will en-
force the federal tax laws applicable to charitable organizations.
Specifically, this Article proposes the creation of a federal quasi-public
agency to serve as the principal regulator of the charitable sector. The
agency would be self-funded, independent, and proactive. It would serve
the dual purposes of curbing the abuses that have eroded public confi-
dence in the sector and educating charitable managers of their obligations
to be responsible stewards of charitable resources. The proposed agency
would be primarily responsible for enforcing federal tax laws aimed at
influencing fiduciary behavior of charity managers and preserving chari-
table assets for public benefit. Its formation, therefore, would separate
oversight of charity governance from the tax collection function, thus
harmonizing the United States with other countries that have established
independent charity oversight agencies.
Part I.A of this Article develops the historical and policy reasons for
vesting the regulation of the charitable sector almost exclusively in gov-
ernmental agencies such as the IRS and the state attorneys general. Part
I.B discusses the modern limitations on these governmental agencies'
abilities to effectively regulate the charitable sector. Part II of this Arti-
cle discusses the alternative forms of private regulation of the charitable
sector that have been explored in practice and in scholarship. While
some of these private enforcement alternatives have had success in iso-
lated situations, none are satisfactory in providing comprehensive and
27 See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 472
("The nonprofit sector exists and thrives because the public believes in its integrity.").
28 See Gary, supra note 25, at 595 (arguing that restoration of public confidence requires
adequate enforcement of fiduciary duties of charity managers).
[Vol. 19:1
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effective oversight of the charitable sector. Overall, the policies underly-
ing oversight of charitable organizations support maintaining centralized
regulation of the charitable sector.
Part III.A of this Article constructs alternative quasi-public regula-
tory models by analogy to existing administrative processes in other
fields, and evaluates their effectiveness in regulating their targeted areas.
The formation of an alternative federal quasi-public regulatory body
would successfully address the limitations on pure governmental regula-
tion of the charitable sector. Accordingly, Part III.B develops the critical
aspects of the proposed quasi-public regulatory body that would be re-
sponsible for regulating the federal tax laws governing charitable
organizations.
I. HISTORICAL AND POLICY REASONS FOR VESTING REGULATION OF
THE CHARITABLE SECTOR IN GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES
To understand the issues surrounding the oversight of the charitable
sector, it is necessary to first describe the fiduciary standards applicable
to charity managers. These fiduciary standards are the duty of care, the
duty of loyalty, and the duty of obedience. 29 These standards vary some-
what depending on whether the charity is formed as a nonprofit corpora-
tion or a trust. 30 The nonprofit corporation is the predominant form of
charitable organization in the United States.3' Accordingly, this Article
will focus primarily on the fiduciary duties owed by directors and of-
ficers to a nonprofit corporation.
The duty of care requires a charity director to discharge his respon-
sibilities in good faith, with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in
a like position would exercise under similar circumstances, and in a man-
ner the director reasonably believes is in the best interests of the organi-
29 See Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400,
1424-75 (1998) [hereinafter Brody, Limits]. Some commentators argue that the duty of obedi-
ence is not a separate duty but rather an aspect of the duty of care. See, e.g., FREMONT-SMITH,
GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 225-26; Brody, Limits, supra, at
1475. Others argue for the necessity of a separately articulated duty of obedience. See, e.g.,
Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. CORP. Law 43 (2008);
Melanie DiPietro, Duty of Obedience: A Medieval Explanation for Modern Nonprofit Govern-
ance Accountability, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 99, 102 (2007); Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatiza-
tion of Nonprofit Governance: Transferring Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
894, 918-27 (2007). For purposes of discussion, the duty of obedience will be treated as
distinct from the duty of care.
30 See generally Brody, Limits, supra note 29, at 1415-29 (discussing the differences
between trust and corporate forms of charitable organizations, and noting that although the
trust standards of fiduciary duty are generally stricter than the corporate standards, the modem
trend is towards convergence).
31 See Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What's Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80
Cm.-KENT L. REV. 641, 641 n.l (2005) [hereinafter Brody, Charity Governance].
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zation.32 Likewise, the degree of skill required is that of the ordinary
prudent person, that is, the basic directorial attributes of common sense,
practical wisdom, and informed judgment.33 The duty of care also pre-
supposes that a director is acting without a disabling conflict of inter-
est.34 If a director faithfully discharges the duty of care, the director is
not liable for harm to the charity resulting from the director's decisions. 35
A director can fail to discharge the duty of care in two ways: by
failing to supervise or by failing to make an informed decision. 36 Ade-
quate supervision means that the director actively participates in the
charity's governance, such as by regularly attending board meetings, 37
reviewing minutes and other materials disseminated to board members,38
meeting periodically with senior management, 39 periodically reviewing
the charity's financial statements and annual information returns (IRS
Form 990),4o and asking questions of outside experts such as accountants
and attorneys when appropriate. 41 Thus, a director who sits back and
does nothing cannot claim lack of responsibility for a poor decision made
by co-directors. 42 To make an informed decision, a director must be ade-
quately informed about the material aspects of a proposed transaction
before approving it.43
The duty of care thus relates to the decision-making process.44 If a
director acts in good faith and satisfies the requisite standard of care, a
court generally will not review the action, even if it proves disastrous to
the charity.4 5 Thus, compliance with the duty of care protects a director
32 See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. Acr § 8.30 (3d ed. 2008); Fishman, Standards
of Conduct, supra note 23, at 399.
33 See Brody, Limits, supra note 29, at 1423-29.
34 See Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat. Train. Sch. for Deacon. & M., 381 F. Supp. 1003,
1014 (D.D.C. 1974); Brody, Limits, supra note 29, at 1423-29.
35 The main difference between the trust standard of care and the corporate standard of
care is that in the former a trustee may be liable for breaches resulting from mere negligence
while the latter requires a minimum of gross negligence. See Brody, Limits, supra note 29, at
1421-28; Fishman, Standards of Conduct, supra note 23, at 402; cf Gallick v. Bait. & Ohio.
R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119 n.6 (1963) ("'[I]t is said that negligence is the failure to observe
ordinary care, and ordinary care is that degree of care which people of ordinary prudence and
sagacity use under the same or similar circumstances. What would ordinarily prudent persons
have done under like circumstances?' ") (quoting, with approval, jury instructions from trial
court).
36 See Fishman, Standards of Conduct, supra note 23, at 391-92.
37 See id. at 399-400.
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id.; see also FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra
note 6, at 316.
41 See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(f)(2) (3d ed. 2008).
42 See Brody, Limits, supra note 29, at 1458.
43 See Fishman, Standards of Conduct, supra note 23, at 400-01.
44 Sugin, supra note 29, at 913.
45 See Brody, Limits, supra note 29, at 1443-44; Sugin, supra note 29, at 915.
[Vol. 19:1
POLICING THE GOOD Guys
from liability for decisions that, with the benefit of hindsight, turn out to
be wrong.46 Often, a charity manager's wrongdoing that results in the
loss of charitable assets is not solely attributable to a breach of the duty
of care.4 7 Such a breach, however, results in inadequate board govern-
ance, which in turn creates an environment that makes embezzlement,
misappropriation of charitable funds, and self-dealing possible. 48
The duty of loyalty requires the charity director to place the inter-
ests of the organization ahead of his own personal interests. 49 In the
corporate setting, a conflict-of-interest transaction is not flatly prohib-
ited, 50 but should be carefully scrutinized.5 1 Before engaging in a con-
flict-of-interest transaction with a charitable organization, the director
should disclose all material facts relating to his personal interest in the
transaction to the board of directors, and a majority of disinterested di-
rectors should approve the transaction only after concluding that it is fair
and reasonable to the charity. 52
The duty of obedience requires a director to adhere to the governing
documents of the organization and to faithfully adhere to its mission. 53
As explained by Daniel Kurtz: "A director is charged with carrying out
the purposes of the organization, as expressed in the legal documents
creating and defining its mission .... [D]iversification of charitable re-
sources to other goals, no matter how laudable, [is] not legally
justifiable. '54
A. Rationales for Exclusive Government Enforcement of the
Charitable Sector
1. State Attorneys General
Historically, regulation of the charitable sector has been vested al-
most exclusively in government agencies. 55 Government enforcement of
46 See Fishman, Standards of Conduct, supra note 23, at 399.
47 See id. at 395.
48 See Brody, Limits, supra note 29, at 1441.
49 Fishman, Standards of Conduct, supra note 23, at 423.
50 Under the trust standard of the duty of loyalty, the charitable trustee is prohibited from
engaging in any act of self-dealing with the trust, no matter how fair or reasonable the transac-
tion may be to the charity. See Brody, Limits, supra note 29, at 1419-20; Fishman, Standards
of Conduct, supra note 23, at 432-34.
51 See Stem v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat. Train. Sch. for Deacon. & M., 381 F. Supp. 1003,
1014 (D.D.C. 1974).
52 See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.60 (3d ed. 2008); Fishman, Standards of
Conduct, supra note 23, at 423.
53 BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 135-36 (9th ed.
2007).
54 DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: A GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 85 (1988).
55 For a historical account of the regulation of the charitable sector in England and the
United States, see David Villar Patton, The Queen, the Attorney General, and the Modern
Charitable Fiduciary: A Historical Perspective on Charitable Enforcement Reform, I I U.
20091
12 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
charities is rooted in the English common law power of parens patriae,
which imposes on the representative of the sovereign the exclusive duty
to enforce charitable trusts. 56 This principle was adopted in the United
States with respect to charitable trusts and corporations, 57 and the power
to regulate charitable organizations is vested in the state attorneys gen-
eral.5 8 Over the past century, the attorney general's role as the "exclu-
sive party" responsible for regulating the sector has eroded to that of
FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 131 (2000). Mr. Patton, then-Assistant Attorney General, Office of
the Ohio Attorney General, observed:
When courts and commentators consider charitable enforcement reform, common
law traditions and exclusivity of attorney general enforcement stand as obstacles to
hinder innovation and experimentation .... When history is examined, however, it
is apparent that the law of charitable enforcement has been fluid and malleable in
responding to the needs and vagaries of society over time. In short, the traditional
common law role of the attorney general is not so fixed and formidable as to pre-
clude charitable enforcement reform.
Id. at 132.
56 The attorney general enforces charitable trusts because of the trust's benefits to the
general public. Such an "amorphous mass of individuals" could not enforce a charitable trust
in the manner that a "beneficiary of a private trust motivated by natural self interest" would.
FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 301. Accordingly,
the power to enforce charitable trusts was vested in the Crown, as parens patriae, or father of
his country. Id. The attorney general, as the Crown's representative, had the power to super-
vise the actions of charitable trustees, and to bring action for any breach of trust by a charity
manager in a court of equity. This enforcement power of the attorney general extended to all
assets held for charitable purposes, regardless of the legal form-corporation, trust, or associa-
tion-in which such assets were held. Id.
57 See Mary Grace Blasko, Curt S. Crossley, and David Lloyd, Standing to Sue in the
Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 40-41 (1993) (" '[T]he state, as parens patriae, su-
perintends the management of all public charities and trusts, and in these matters acts through
her attorney general."' (quoting People ex rel. Ellert v. Cogswell, 45 P. 270, 271 (Cal. 1896)));
Brody, Parochialism, supra note 25, at 938 (noting that the administration of trust and corpo-
rate charities varies slightly from state to state).
58 See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 411 (3d ed.
2001). In some states, the authority of the attorney general to enforce the charitable sector is
governed by statute. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 9505 (West 2005); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12598(a) (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-125 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. §53-
12-115 (1997); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-1401(5) (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 194
(West 2002 & Supp. 2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 8 (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 14.254 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501B.41 (West 1996); N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.1(f) (McKinney 2006); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFrr CORP. LAW § 112 (McKin-
ney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-52(c) (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-04-02 (2003); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 109.24 (West 2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1719.12 (West 1994); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 55-9-5 (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-51-701 (2002); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 701.10(3) (West 2001). In the absence of such statutory authority, the attorney general holds
the power to enforce the charitable sector as a common-law incident of the office. See
FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 305-06.
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being a "necessary" or "indispensible party," 59 or merely a party who
must be put "on notice."60
Since the attorney general's authority to enforce the fiduciary duties
of charity managers is virtually exclusive, the effectiveness of state regu-
lation of the charitable sector depends almost entirely on the manner in
which the attorney general performs his enforcement function. 61 The
state attorney general has the power to redress breaches of fiduciary duty,
misappropriation of charitable funds, mismanagement of the charitable
organization, and fraud in the solicitation of charitable funds.62 The at-
torney general does not, however, have the right to manage a charity:
[P]roper state enforcement action over fiduciary deci-
sion-making reduces to a single rule: The role of the at-
torney general and the courts is to guard against charity
fiduciaries' wrongdoing, and not to interfere in decision-
making carried out in good faith .. .. To this end, an
attorney general is vested with the authority to seek to
correct breaches of fiduciary duty that have not other-
wise been remedied by the board. However, the attorney
general is not a "super" member of the board. 63
While the enforcement power of the state attorney general has been
rooted in the common law for centuries, 64 it was only after World War II
59 Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 43-44. "Simply put, the attorney general need no
longer be a plaintiff, but must at least be offered the opportunity to be heard." Id. at 44.
60 In some jurisdictions, the attorney general does not need to be made a party so long as
the attorney general is given notice of the case and an option to intervene. See id.
61 Currently, state regulation of charity fiduciary laws varies greatly from "a virtual ced-
ing of nonprofit monitoring to the Internal Revenue Service" to "aggressively exercis[ing]
[state] powers to monitor, oversee and regulate the nonprofit sector." Sidel, New State Activ-
ism, supra note 2, at 1312.
62 See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 1.70(b) (3d ed. 2008); FREMONT-SMITH,
GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATONS, supra note 6, at 53-55, 305-11, 372-73; Brody,
Parochialism, supra note 25, at 947. The state attorney general's enforcement powers are
extensive:
The range of court actions that an attorney general may request a court to take to
enforce fiduciary duties is as broad as the powers of the court to devise remedies for
breach of fiduciary duties. He may request accountings, removal of trustees, disso-
lution of corporations, forced transfer of corporate property, or a combination of
these. He may ask the court to force charitable fiduciaries to restore losses caused
by breach of duty and to return profits made in the course of administering the trust.
He may seek to enjoin trustees from further wrongdoing or from continuing certain
specific actions. Furthermore, transactions involving a breach of the duty of loyalty
may be voided at the option of the attorney general unless he decides it is in the
public interest to affirm them. The attorney general ... may bring actions requesting
modification or deviation from the terms of a trust or cy pres application of the
funds.
FREMONT-SMTTI, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 309.
63 Brody, Parochialism, supra note 25, at 1034.
64 See FREMONT-SMrrH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 301.
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that some states gave the attorney general power to obtain information as
to a charitable organization's existence and administration. 65 This move-
ment was prompted by the perception that the state attorney general did
not have enough information regarding the existence and operation of the
charitable organizations within its jurisdiction to adequately determine
whether any violations or neglect had occurred. 66 The State of New
Hampshire initiated the movement in 1943 by enacting a statute that au-
thorized the attorney general to require charitable organizations to file
reports and other information about the organization's existence and ac-
tivities with the attorney general's office. 67 Currently, many states re-
quire that charitable organizations register their existence,68 and file
annual state information reports with the attorney general. 69 Many states
also require charitable organizations to provide copies of their annual
federal information returns, 70 annual audited financial statements, 71 or
some combination of the foregoing to the state attorney general. 72
Despite the implementation of disclosure requirements by states,
over the past fifty years, state regulation of the charitable sector has fo-
cused on the regulation of charitable solicitation activities. 73 Regulation
of wrongdoings by charity managers is a secondary concern. 74 For ex-
ample, in 1970, ten states required registration and annual reports from
charities that did not engage in solicitation activities. 75 By 2003, this
number had grown only to eleven. 76 Of these eleven jurisdictions, most
exempt schools and hospitals-a significant segment of the charitable
65 Id. at 54, 311-12.
66 See Comment, Supervision of Charitable Trusts, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 118, 124-28
(1953).
67 See 1943 N.H. LAws 259, 261 (providing for the authority of the attorney general to
prepare and maintain a register of public trusts, and requiring trustees of public trusts to annu-
ally file a report with the attorney general). At the same time, federal regulation of the charita-
ble sector was expanding, but there was little coordination between federal and state
enforcement efforts. See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra
note 6, at 54.
68 See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at
476-95, app., tbl. 1, col. 5.
69 See id. at 476-95, app., tbl. 1, col. 7.
70 See id. at 496-511, app., tbl. 1, col. 15.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 476-511, app., tbl. 1.
73 See id. at 55.
74 See Fremont-Smith Study, supra note 10, at 25 (noting that very few states police
charity managers with respect to compliance with their duties of loyalty and care). As a result
of this study, the authors concluded: "[I]t would appear that there is more that could be done to
correct abuses [of the duties of loyalty and care], particularly if more attorneys general were
interested in, willing, and possessed of sufficient funds to bring fiduciaries to court." Id. at 32.
75 FREMONT-SMrH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 55.
76 Id.
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sector77 -from the filing requirement.78 Private foundations, though re-
quired by federal law to submit copies of their federal annual information
return to their respective state attorneys general, 79 make up less than ten
percent of the charitable sector.80 Therefore, the forty jurisdictions that
do not require annual reporting from non-soliciting charities do not re-
ceive any information, and thus cannot discern breaches of fiduciary du-
ties from a substantial majority of charitable organizations.
The primary rationale for vesting regulation of the charitable sector
in the government is the public nature of charitable organizations. 81
Charitable funds are held for the public benefit. 82 In order to preserve
these public funds, the state attorney general, as representative of the
people of the state, has exclusive power of enforcement. 83
A concomitant reason for government enforcement of the charitable
sector is that private persons do not have a vested interest in a charity. 84
77 In 2005, educational institutions and hospitals formed approximately 20% of the num-
ber of registered public charities; but as a percentage of revenues and expenditures in the
charitable sector, educational institutions and hospitals represented approximately 70% of reg-
istered public charity resources. See Amy Blackwood et al., The Nonprofit Sector in Brief 4,
tbl. 2 (2008), http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/kbfilesn797/Almanac2008publicCharities.pdf; ac-
cord Sherlock & Gravelle, supra note 4, at 9 (noting that hospitals comprise less than one
percent of the charitable sector but account for 41% of the sector's revenues and 29% of its
assets while higher-education organizations which comprise less than one-half of one percent
of the charitable sector account for eleven percent of the sector's revenues and 21% of its
assets).
78 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12583 (West 2005) (exempting schools and hospitals);
N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.4(b)(4)-(5) (McKinney 2006) (exempting schools
and hospitals); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 109.31 (LexisNexis 2007) (exempting schools).
79 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-3(c) (1985).
80 See Paul Amsberger et al., supra note 4, at 111-14. IRS records showed approxi-
mately 933,000 active public charities existed in 2004. Id. at 11. Not all public charities are
included in this count because some charities, like churches, do not need to apply for recogni-
tion of tax-exempt status with the IRS. Id. The same year, approximately 77,000 private
foundations filed Form 990-PF, the annual information return that all private foundations are
required to file. See id. at 114. Therefore, of the approximately 1,010,000 registered charita-
ble organizations in 2004, 77,000, or 7.6%, were private foundations. As of July 2009, there
were approximately 987,500 registered public charities and 116,000 registered private founda-
tions, resulting in private foundations comprising approximately 10.5% of registered charitable
organizations. See Sherlock & Gravelle, supra note 4, at 3, tbl.l; accord Hansmann, supra
note 25, at 603 (noting that most charities are not private foundations).
81 BOGERT, supra note 58, § 411; accord James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Ac-
countability, 62 Mo. L. REV. 218, 258-59 (2003) [hereinafter Fishman, Charitable Accounta-
bility] (observing that state attorney general standing to enforce fiduciary duties of charity
managers stems from the public benefit charities provide).
82 See Fishman, Charitable Accountability, supra note 81, at 255-56; Kenneth L. Karst,
The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARv. L. REV.
433, 433 (1960) ("The man on the street and the enlightened foundation president have this
much in common: Both know that charitable funds are public funds.").
83 See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 43-47 (describing the authority of the attorney
general to regulate the proper operation of charitable organizations).
84 See Sarkeys v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 40, Cleveland County, 592 P.2d 529, 534 (Okla.
1979); Karst, supra note 82, at 436-37.
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Donors part with their property when they give it to a charity, and thus
have no further interest in it.85 Beneficiaries of a charity are not ascer-
tainable by nature.86 Often, no individual can show that he will benefit
from the charitable organization, and thus he has no interest in the char-
ity's assets.87 Ultimately, it is the general public that benefits from chari-
table programs and services, and not merely individual recipients of
charitable aid.88 Accordingly, vesting enforcement power in a single au-
thority, such as the state attorney general, is preferable to granting stand-
ing to countless, shifting, and indeterminate members of the general
public. 89
In addition, there is concern that if government is not the principal
regulator of the charitable sector, charitable organizations could be em-
broiled in vexatious litigation; they would be constantly harassed by suits
brought by parties with no stake in the charity.90 Regardless of whether
such suits would be widespread if typically allowed, courts use the mere
possibility of their occurrence to deny standing to private citizens. 91
Finally, government regulation protects the charity's resources and
ensures that its dollars are spent on the charity's philanthropic purpose. 9 2
Conceptually, a charity operates for the public benefit and therefore must
be protected from harassment and loss. 93 Defending litigation by private
parties may result in the dissipation of a charity's funds.94 Thus, impos-
ing limits on private party standing and vesting enforcement power in the
85 See Karst, supra note 82, at 446.
86 See Sarkeys, 592 P.2d at 534.
87 See Karst, supra note 82, at 436-37 ("[I]n the typical case, no one knows who a
beneficiary will be until the charity confers a benefit on him, and after such benefit is con-
ferred he has no right to expect further benefits, and thus no remaining interest in the charity's
funds.").
88 BOGERT, supra note 58, § 411.
89 Id.
90 See, e.g., Sarkeys v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 40, Cleveland County, 592 P.2d 529, 534
(Okla. 1979) ("If a third party were permitted to sue as a matter of right, the charity could be
subjected to frequent, unreasonable and vexatious litigation, the court dockets could become
clogged, and the trust assets could be wasted in unnecessary attorney fees."); cf. Hansmann,
supra note 25, at 609 ("[I]t makes sense to deny standing to [donors] only if the consequence
would be large numbers of spite suits, strike suits, or suits filed through sheer idiocy-which
are presumably what the courts and commentators have in mind when they raise the specter of
"harassing" litigation-or of suits that, though based on a real grievance, are feebly litigated
and thus do more harm than good. Yet it appears extraordinarily unlikely that suits of this
nature would ever become a sufficiently significant problem to outweigh the benefits of enlist-
ing [donors] into the enforcement effort.").
91 BOGERT, supra note 58, § 414. But cf. Chester, Improving Enforcement Mechanisms,
supra note 13, at 476 (alleging that the frivolous lawsuit is largely a myth and that private
parties bringing suits are motivated by altruism and the desire to curb egregious abuses in the
charitable sector).
92 See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 42.
93 Id.
94 See id. at 41-42.
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state attorney general is necessary. 95 A single party, the state attorney
general, is in a better position to consolidate redundant actions, eliminate
actions for minor infractions, and correct serious breaches of fiduciary
duties.96 The state attorney general's gate-keeping function assures that
a charity's resources are conserved for its charitable mission.97
2. Internal Revenue Service
The IRS's power to regulate the charitable sector stems from the tax
exemption afforded to charitable organizations in the Internal Revenue
Code. 98 As a condition of receiving tax exemption, charitable organiza-
tions agree to abide by the rules contained in the Internal Revenue Code,
which restrict such organizations' ability to engage in activities, such as
political advocacy, 99 commercial business activity, °° and certain activi-
ties that constitute breaches of fiduciary duty under the applicable state
law.' 01 For example, private foundations are prohibited from engaging
in self-dealing with foundation "insiders."' 102 The Internal Revenue
Code penalizes insiders who engage in prohibited self-dealing transac-
tions and foundation managers who knowingly approve such transac-
tions. 10 3 Under state law, a self-dealing transaction may result in a
95 See id.
96 See id.
97 Id. at 42.
98 See I.R.C. § 501(a) (2006) (providing for exemption from federal income tax for char-
itable organizations described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code); FREMONr-
SmrrH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 53-54. The regulation of the
charitable sector was exclusively done by the states until the enactment of the federal tax laws
applicable to charitable organizations beginning in the early 20th century. See FREMONT-
SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 53-54. IRS enforcement of
fiduciary behavior by charity managers did not gain significance until the passage of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 613. See FREMONT-SMrrH, GOVERNING
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 54. Prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform
Act of 1969, the sole sanction available to the IRS to correct behavior by charity managers was
revocation of the charity's tax-exempt status, "a sanction that in some circumstances was
meaningless and in all cases did not prevent wrongdoers from continuing to manage the char-
ity." Id. The reforms implemented in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 represent
a landmark in the history of the government regulation of charity, containing strict
limitations that went to the heart of foundation administration. Of even wider import
for the entire charitable sector was the fact that the act changed the sanctions for
noncompliance, imposing meaningful penalties in the form of excise taxes not only
on the charities themselves, but on their fiduciaries, and in the case of the self-
dealing provisions, on the persons who profited from the self-dealing rather than on
the foundations themselves, thereby preserving charitable assets for future public
benefit.
Id. at 79.
99 See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 4912, 4955.
100 See id. §§ 511-14.
101 See infra notes 380-86 and accompanying text.
102 See I.R.C. § 4941.
103 See id.
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breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty owed by an insider to a charitable
organization,10 4 and such breach is enforceable by the state attorney
general.
The IRS has authority to grant federal tax exemption, enforce its
rules governing exempt charitable organizations, and revoke the federal
tax exemption of charitable organizations that abuse its rules. 0 5 Nota-
bly, the IRS, unlike the attorney general, does not have the authority to
remove directors and officers for breach of fiduciary duty or to enjoin a
charitable organization from taking action that may result in improper
use of charitable assets. 10 6 However, The IRS uses the threat of revoca-
tion of tax-exempt status to compel charitable organizations to make in-
ternal governance changes such as replacing managers or implementing
policies to curb breaches of fiduciary duties and other abuses. 10 7
The IRS's increasing involvement in charity governance 0 8 is evi-
dent in its redesign of the federal annual information return required of
tax-exempt charitable organizations (Form 990). t°9 A charitable organi-
104 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
105 See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at
459-66.
106 The Senate Finance Committee whitepaper proposed reforming federal tax law to
grant the IRS authority to remove a charitable director or officer who engaged in prohibited
self-dealing, conflict of interest transactions, or excess benefit transactions. See Staff of the
Senate Finance Committee, supra note 16, at 16. Additionally, the whitepaper proposed vest-
ing the United States Tax Court with equity powers to ensure that charitable assets are pre-
served for philanthropic activities, including the power to enjoin activities. See id. at 19.
Neither of these proposals were included in the Pension Protection Act and were not consid-
ered by Congress.
107 See Evelyn Brody, A Taxing Time for the Bishop Estate: What is the I.R.S. Role in
Charity Governance?, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 537, 543-45 (1999) [hereinafter Brody, Bishop
Estate]. The threat of revocation of tax-exempt status is a powerful tool: "[Flew charities,
small or large, can afford such a high stakes gamble by challenging the IRS over their very
claims to exemption. Until the case is resolved in court, donations could dry up, tax-exempt
bond covenants could be breached, and local governments might challenge property tax ex-
emption." Id. at 545.
108 See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at
459-66; Brody, Limits, supra note 29, at 1414; Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit Interjurisdiction-
ality, 80 CHI.-KETr L. REV. 613, 618 (2005) (noting that the once distinct lines of state en-
forcement of fiduciary behavior and federal enforcement of tax laws have been blurred with
increasing authority delegated to the IRS to monitor and enforce breaches of fiduciary duties
among charity managers). But see James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The I.R.S. 's Non-
profit Corporate Governance Initiative, 29 VA TAX REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1494932 [hereinafter Fishman, Stealth
Preemption] (arguing that the IRS's increasing probe into charity governance is a "stealth
preemption" of traditional state regulation of nonprofit corporate law).
109 See I.R.S. Instructions for Form 990 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/i990.pdf. Private foundations are required to file Form 990-PF. FREMONT-SMITH, GOV-
ERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 409. All other charitable organizations
are required to file Form 990 or Form 990-EZ. Id. Churches and charitable organizations that
normally receive less than $25,000 in annual gross receipts are exempt from filing Form 990
or Form 990-EZ. Id. at 410. Charitable organizations that are exempt from filing and are not
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zation's Form 990 must be made available for public inspection. 110
Form 990 plays a "pivotal role" in financial disclosure by charitable or-
ganizations: "Not only is it the primary source of information for the
Internal Revenue Service, but it is used as the basic annual report for
state charities offices and as the basic data source for research on the
sector, and also serves as the primary source of information for potential
donors ... ." II Due to its shortcomings in providing adequate informa-
tion for effective monitoring of charitable organizations, Form 990 was
redesigned in 2008 to require disclosure of substantially more informa-
tion regarding a charitable organization's governance practices." 12
The development of the IRS as federal regulator of the fiduciary
duties of managers of charitable organizations was fortuitous. 113 The In-
ternal Revenue Code provisions regulating charities were originally
aimed at preventing the abuse of tax exemption in the charitable sec-
tor.114 With the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which radi-
cally altered the requirements for tax exemption for private
foundations, 115 including authorizing the IRS to police certain behaviors
considered to be breaches of state law fiduciary duties, the enforcement
landscape of the IRS with respect to the charitable sector forever
changed. 16
What occurred was in fact the transformation of a part of
the IRS from a tax-collecting agency to one with broad
power to control fiduciary behavior. By including in the
[Internal Revenue Code] standards of behavior for fidu-
ciaries developed under the common law to assure 1oy-
churches, however, are required to report their existence to the IRS annually using Form 990-
N. Notification Requirement for Tax-Exempt Entities Not Currently Required To File, 74 Fed.
Reg. 140, 36395 (July 23, 2009) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
1 10 I.R.C. §§ 6033, 6104 (West Supp. 2009).
I 1 1 FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 411.
112 I.R.S. Background Paper: Summary of Form 990 Redesign Process (August 19, 2008),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/summaryform_990_redesign-process.pdf; see
also Fishman, Stealth Preemption, supra note 108, at 22-33 (describing the revisions to Form
990 which address corporate governance issues).
113 See FREMONT-SMrrH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at
377-78 ("The fact that the federal role has evolved within the tax policing system is a matter
of historical accident rather than a conscious assignment of responsibility to the tax authori-
ties .... The history of federal regulation ... illustrates a lack of deliberation in the develop-
ment of the Service as regulator .. "); Brody, Limits, supra note 29, at 1439 ("De facto, and
against its core competency (and likely preference), the [IRS] comes to operate, at least in part,
as a uniform, super-regulatory board."); Fishman, Wrong Way Corrigan, supra note 6, at 581
("The complex system of federal charity regulation has not developed with a particular logic or
plan, but largely in response to the perceived abuse of charitable status.").
114 See S. REP. No. 81-2375 § VIII(A)(I) (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3053,
3081.
115 FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 79.
116 See id. at 114.
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alty and prevent recklessness in the handling of
charitable assets, Congress imposed on the Service a set
of goals that would never have been considered a part of
the taxing function as recently as 1950.117
With the enactment of the intermediate sanction regime in 1996,
applicable to public charities, the IRS's authority to regulate behaviors of
charitable managers was finally expanded to the vast majority of charita-
ble organizations. 118
B. Modem Limitations on Government Regulation of the Charitable
Sector
While the policies supporting government regulation of the charita-
ble sector are strong, there are many limitations on the government's
ability to effectively carry out this role. These limitations include finan-
cial, institutional, political, and agency constraints.
1. Financial Constraints
Government entities lack adequate funding and qualified personnel
to enforce existing laws. 19 Very few states attempt to ensure that chari-
table fiduciaries obey their duties of loyalty and care. 120 In a majority of
states, staffing levels dedicated to oversight of the charitable sector are
117 Id.
118 See id. at 459-60.
119 See Gary, supra note 25, at 593. Professor Gary explains that:
While the powers of the attorney general are substantial, the extent of the supervi-
sion of the attorney general is limited.... In some states, several assistant attorneys
general form a charitable division of the attorney general's office.... In other states,
however, one assistant attorney general supervises the nonprofit sector as only one
part of his or her assignment. Hawaii has reported 0.5 attorneys working with chari-
ties, and many states do not list any attorneys specifically assigned to charitable
matters.
Those working in . . . New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts . . . report that
inquiries or complaints from dissenting board members, employees, beneficiaries or
other members of the public, including the press, are much more likely to trigger
investigations than reviews of the annual reports conducted in the attorney general's
office. In determining which cases to pursue, the attorneys consider the amount
involved, the size of the organization, the impact on the public, and the egregious-
ness of the conduct. The worst abuses receive attention, but many problems proba-
bly go undetected or unaddressed.
Id. at 622-24; see also FREMONT-SMITH, GoVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note
6, at 445-46; Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 939, 947; Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation
Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 GAL. REv. 1113, 1123,
1128-30 (2007).
120 See Gary, supra note 25, at 596 (explaining that although some state and federal laws
on charitable management do exist, the lack of oversight caused by unidentified beneficiaries
often leaves control of the charitable organization to one or a few persons, who are able to
"seek private benefit at the expense of the nonprofit").
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minimal and have remained relatively static for over forty years. 12 1 A
consequence of inadequate staffing at the state level is the lack of "bu-
reaucratic expertise," which could otherwise be utilized to influence leg-
islative reform needed to improve accountability in the sector.
122
Although some charities are required to file annual disclosure reports
with the attorney general, these reports are not the source of most investi-
gations. 123  Instead, whistleblower complaints and media reports of
wrongdoing are more likely to trigger investigations.124 Even in states
that successfully regulate charitable organizations, the state attorneys
general cannot possibly investigate all the complaints received. 25 This
severe lack of government resources results in the prosecution of only
the most egregious of abuses. 126
The police role has by default fallen on the IRS, 1 2 7 which, until
recently, has had few tools to correct misbehavior. 128 Even with the ex-
121 In 1977, only eight states had one or more full-time attorneys regulating charitable
organizations, thirty-one states had one or two part-time attorneys, and eleven states had no
attorneys assigned to regulation of the charitable sector at all. Blasko et al., supra note 57, at
48. Thirty years later, approximately three-fourths of the states had one or fewer full-time
equivalent attorneys dedicated to the oversight of the charitable sector, and the number of
states having no attorneys assigned to the oversight of the charitable sector had grown to
seventeen. Jenkins, supra note 119, at 1128.
122 Id. at 1129-30.
123 Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of A Private Foundation's Governance and Self-Inter-
ested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L. J. 1093, 1185 (2001); accord
Fishman, Charitable Accountability, supra note 81, at 263 (observing that most information
filed with the state attorneys general do not get reviewed by anyone).
124 Crimm, supra note 123, at 1185.
125 See Gary, supra note 25, at 624 (noting that enforcement of the charitable sector by
the state attorneys general has been sporadic).
126 Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 39. In all fairness, when criticizing the level of attor-
ney general resources dedicated to the enforcement of the charitable sector, one should ask:
"In comparison to what?" Areas in which the attorney general spends more resources may
need more attention, such as consumer protection and capital markets. If attorney general
offices spent more resources on oversight of the charitable sector at the expense of oversight of
capital markets, more serious reputational harm may result from allowing abuses in capital
markets to go unchecked. See Atkinson, supra note 29, at 683.
127 See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 450,
stating:
[I]n actuality it is the federal government and, specifically, the Internal Revenue
Service that regulates . . . the nonprofit sector today . . . . The importance of the
federal regulatory scheme cannot be overemphasized. One has only to consider that
in two-thirds of the states regulation of charities is minimal or nonexistent, and even
in the eleven jurisdictions with active enforcement programs, the federal rules set an
important minimum standard for compliance.
128 Prior to the enactment of the intermediate sanction regime to penalize certain self-
dealing transactions between public charities and their insiders, the only tool at the IRS's
disposal to combat alleged violations on the prohibition of private inurement was the revoca-
tion of the organization's exempt status. See Gary, supra note 25, at 629-30. This tool was
rarely used, and even if it was, the IRS had no authority to impose sanctions on the insider who
improperly benefitted at the charity's expense or to require the insider to reimburse the private
inurement received to the charity. See id. at 630.
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pansion of the enforcement tools available to the IRS, the IRS has woe-
fully failed to keep pace with the tremendous growth of the charitable
sector. Thus, while the number of registered charitable organizations1 29
exploded from 220,074 in 1974130 to 1,186,915 in 2007,131 the number
of tax-exempt organization returns that have been audited by the IRS
substantially decreased over the same time period.1 32 Additionally, de-
129 "Charitable organizations" are organizations that are exempt from federal income tax
under Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code by virtue of being described in Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 501(a) (2006). Organizations described in
Section 501(c)(3) include those that are
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or ani-
mals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual ....
Id. § 501(c)(3). Under state law, a charitable organization may be formed as a trust, a non-
profit corporation, an unincorporated association, or a nonprofit limited liability company.
.See, e.g., Gary, supra note 25, at 609. While the organizational form may impact the enforce-
ment remedies for breach of fiduciary duty and other misappropriation of charitable assets
under state law, id., the various organizational forms which a charity may undertake are
largely a distinction without a difference for federal tax law purposes. Rather, federal tax law
further subdivides charitable organizations into "public charities" and private foundations. See
I.R.C. § 509(a); Gary, supra note 25, at 631. Public charities include those organizations that
are classified as such simply because of the nature of their activities, such as churches, schools,
hospitals, and certain medical research organizations, and those organizations that receive
more than one-third of their annual support from the general public, either in the form of chari-
table donations or program service revenues. See I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1)-(2),
170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iv). Public charities also include those charitable organizations that are or-
ganized and operated to support one or more public charities described in the preceding sen-
tence. See id. § 509(a)(3). An example of a supporting organization is an endowment
foundation formed as a separate entity to hold investment funds and receive donations that are
used to provide programs, services, and other forms of support to a school or hospital. See id.
§ 170(b)(1)(A)(iv). A private foundation is any charitable organization that cannot be classi-
fied as a public charity, and is typically formed and controlled by an individual or family. See
id. § 509(a).
Charitable organizations, other than private foundations, receiving less than $5,000 in
gross revenues each year are not required to register as charitable organizations with the IRS.
See id. § 508(c)(1)(B). In addition, churches, conventions or associations of churches, and
certain other religious organizations are not required to register as charitable organizations
with the IRS. See id. § 508(c)(1)(A); IRS DATA BOOK 2007, at 54 n.l. It is estimated that
about half of the nation's approximately 350,000 religious organizations that are exempt from
the registration requirement choose to do so anyway. See Blackwood et al., supra note 77, at
1. If unregistered religious organizations were included in the count, it is estimated that the
charitable sector is currently comprised of approximately 1.4 million charitable organizations.
130 Marcus S. Owens, Charity Oversight: An Alternative Approach, (The Hauser Ctr. for
Nonprofit Orgs., Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 33.4, 2006), at 4.
131 IRS DATA BOOK 2007, at 54 tbl.25.
132 In 1970, the IRS examined 8,500 "tax-exempt organization returns." Owens, supra
note 130, at 3. These returns included the annual information return required of all reporting
charitable organizations (Form 990, Form 990-EZ, and Form 990-PF), certain returns of split-
interest trusts and trusts with charitable accumulations (Forms 5227 and 1041-A), and returns
reporting taxable income and tax from certain political activities (Form 1120-POL). See id. at
5 (citing IRS Data Book 2005, at 33 tbl.14). In 2008, this number had decreased by almost
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spite the vast growth in the charitable sector over the past 35 years, the
staffing of the IRS exempt organizations division has remained relatively
static. 133
The IRS has recently made considerable effort to increase its regula-
tory presence in the charitable sector, but consistent and comprehensive
regulation of the charitable sector is not attainable with the IRS's current
level of resources. 134 Congress has yet to provide any indication that it:
intends to increase appropriations for IRS oversight of the charitable sec-
tor in the foreseeable future. 135 In 1969, a two percent excise tax on theb
net investment income of private foundations was implemented on the
basis that it would serve as an "audit fee" that would fund the increased
cost of supervision of the charitable sector by the IRS. 136 The net invest-
two-thirds to 2,946. IRS DATA BOOK, 2008, at 33 tbl.13. As a percentage of all tax-exempt
organizations returns filed, the audit rate is currently 0.33% (2,946 returns examined out of
888,412 returns filed). See id. Similarly, in a study conducted by the General Accounting
Office of IRS audits of returns of tax-exempt organizations between 1996 and 2001, the Gen-
eral Accounting Office noted that the number of annual returns filed by tax-exempt organiza-
tions increased by twenty-five percent over this time period but the number of audits of tax-
exempt organizations' returns decreased by fifteen percent. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IM-
PROVEMENTS IN PUBLIC, IRS, AND STATE OVERSIGHT OF CHARITIES 21 (2002). The General
Accounting Office believed that IRS restructuring to a "market segment" approach would cor-
rect this problem. See id. at 23. The IRS restructuring, however, has not kept up with the pace
of growth in the sector. Since 2001, the last year in the General Accounting Office Study, the
number of tax-exempt organizations returns filed has increased from 783,582 to 888,412 in
2008 (or by 13%) while the number of audits of tax-exempt returns has increased only slightly
from 2,894 to 2,946 (or by 2%) over the same time period. Compare IRS DATA BOOK 2008, at
33 tbl.13, with IRS DATA BOOK 2002, at 26 tbl.14.
133 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS
OF PROPOSALS RELATING TO RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON RESTRUC-
TURING THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ON EXECUTIVE BRANCH GOVERNANCE AND CON-
GRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT (Comm. Print 1997) at 60-61. Similar observations were made again
in 2000 and 2002. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., REPORT OF INVES-
TIGATIONS OF ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HANDLING OF rAX-
EXEMPT ORGANIZATION MATTERS (ComM. Print 2000) at 120-21; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, IMPROVEMENTS IN PUBLIC, IRS, AND STATE OVERSIGHT OF CHARITIES 23 (2002).
134 See Owens, supra note 130, at 6 ("IRS staffing and the other resources dedicated to
[charitable] organization oversight have fallen or remained stagnant, and there is no evidence
that historic levels have been adequate to ensure that significant abuses can be addressed in a
timely manner."). Professor Karst made a similar observation in 1960: "[T]he simple task of
checking over the returns of exempt organizations is staggering, and regular comprehensive
investigation of the activities of such organizations is beyond the Service's wildest dreams
under present (and foreseeable) conditions of staffing." Karst, supra note 82, at 442.
135 See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 378
(noting that previous efforts to increase federal regulation of the charitable sector have been
thwarted because Congress would not provide additional appropriations to enhance regulatory
programs).
136 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 (Comm. Print 1970) at 29 (justifying the new tax on the basis
that private foundations "share some of the burden of paying the cost of government, espe-
cially for more extensive and vigorous enforcement of the tax laws relating to exempt
organizations").
2009]
24 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
ment income excise tax, however, has never been dedicated to funding
IRS regulation of charitable organizations.' 37 Since its enactment, the
amount of net investment income excise tax has far exceeded the annual
budget of the exempt organizations division of the IRS, at times by as
much as five to ten times the division's annual budget.138 Congress has
considered, but ultimately rejected, proposals to require that the net in-
vestment income excise tax be dedicated to the supervision of the chari-
table sector. 139 Even if resources for the IRS exempt organizations
division were increased, the IRS is still unlikely to be an effective regula-
tor of the charitable sector due to other constraints facing the agency.140
2. Institutional Constraints
A second limitation on government regulation of the charitable sec-
tor is the disparity between the procedures necessary to effectively en-
force charitable laws and the procedures necessary to conduct the
principal responsibilities of the state attorneys general and the IRS.
Within both of these government regulatory bodies, oversight of the
charitable sector is only a subset of broader responsibilities. ' 4 1 Regula-
tion of the charitable sector is a small subset of the state attorney gen-
eral's larger role as a consumer protector. In their role as consumer
protectors, state attorneys general view their "biggest problem" in the
charitable sector as deceptive charitable solicitations. 142 The allocation
of state attorneys general's resources in the oversight of the charitable
sector primarily, if not exclusively, to regulation of charitable solicitation
supports this view. 143 The procedures and resources necessary to detect
fraud in solicitation activities do not necessarily enable the state attor-
neys general to detect breaches of fiduciary duties by charity managers,
because often, the regulation of charitable solicitation practices focuses
on the conduct of paid solicitors who have no control over the manage-
ment of the charitable organization.144 Additionally, because many char-
137 See H.R. Rep. No. 105-599, at 210 (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 288,
305; Owens, supra note 130, at 6.
138 See infra note 494.
139 See CARE Act of 2003, S. 476, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003); Charitable Giving Act
of 2003, H.R. 7, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (2003); see also FREMONT-SMrrH, GOVERNING NON-
PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 446 (noting that Congress has routinely resisted dedi-
cating the excise tax on private foundation net investment income to funding the regulation of
the charitable sector, instead preferring to retain control over such funds as part of its general
appropriations power).
140 See Owens, supra note 130, at 10.
141 Silber, supra note 108, at 633.
142 Brody, Parochialism, supra note 25, at 947.
143 See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 443.
144 See id. at 443, 445.
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ities do not solicit funds from the public, their operations go virtually
unchecked by the state attorneys general. 145
A similar bureaucratic problem exists with IRS oversight of the
charitable sector. The IRS's primary responsibility is the collection of
federal taxes, including income tax, estate and gift taxes, employment
tax, and excise tax.146 Although there is a specialized division within the
IRS147 that is responsible for regulating the tax laws that affect charitable
organizations (the exempt organizations division), this division still
shares the same procedures and administrative framework as the IRS as a
whole.' 48 Since charitable organizations are generally exempt from fed-
eral income tax, 149 procedures designed to ensure the fair collection of
tax will have no effect on them.15 0 The Internal Revenue Code attempts
to regulate the charitable sector through a series of excise taxes designed
to discourage unwanted behaviors.'51 Regulation of fiduciary behavior
is completely different from regulation of income tax collection. 152
Thus, many have called into question the wisdom of placing governance-
oriented regulation under the responsibility of a revenue-oriented
agency. ' 53
145 See id. at 444.
146 See Hansmann, supra note 25, at 604.
147 With the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ER-
ISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26,
29, and 42 U.S.C.), Congress established the Employee Plans/Exempt Organizations Division
(EP/EO) of the IRS, which regulates all tax-exempt entities, including pension plans, charita-
ble organizations, and other nonprofit organizations which are exempt from federal income
taxation under Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. See FREMONT-SMITH, GOV-
ERNtNG NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 465. The personnel in the EP/EO divi-
sion were trained to handle the special concerns of tax-exempt entities. See id. at 465-66. In
1999, the EPEO division assumed responsibility for oversight of the tax exemption afforded
to government entities. See id. at 465. As a result, a new Tax-Exempt/Government Entity
Division (TE/GE) was created. See id. at 389, 465. TE/GE currently has responsibility for
enforcement of the federal tax laws applicable to charitable organizations. See id. at 466.
148 See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at
389-90.
149 See I.R.C. §§ 501(a), 501(c)(3) (2006); FREMONT-SMiTH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT OR-
GANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 58.
150 See Owens, supra note 130, at 7-9 (noting that the IRS systems and procedures are
designed to support its primary role-tax collector-and are ill-adapted to address disclosure
based information returns-the primary return required of charitable organizations).
151 See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at
280-83.
152 See Hansmann, supra note 25, at 604-05 (observing that use of the excise tax system
to compel behavior of fiduciaries is an "unusual exception to the normal system of penalties
that is used to secure compliance with virtually all other provisions of the tax code").
153 See, e.g., Marion Fremont-Smith, Trends in Accountability and Regulation of Non-
profits, in THE FuTURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 75, 86 (Virginia A. Hodgkinson et al. eds.,
1989):
[T]he [IRS] is not the most appropriate agency to regulate the [charitable] sector. It
lacks the more refined tools for compelling compliance available to state equity
courts. It is not well placed to police disclosure provisions. Even if granted equity-
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Even within the exempt organizations division of the IRS, the pri-
mary purpose for examining the returns of exempt organizations is to
determine payment of employment tax and unrelated business income
tax (analogous to the corporate income tax) rather than to detect misuse
of charitable assets and other wrongdoings by charity managers.1 54 In
2002, the IRS restructured the exempt organizations division to imple-
ment a "market segment" approach. 155 At this time, the Service believed
that by dividing exempt organizations into market segments (such as
healthcare and education) and treating each segment separately, exempt
organizations personnel could better profile and address areas of non-
compliant behavior in each segment and thereby increase the efficiency
of charitable sector regulation. 156 Since the market segment approach
was implemented, however, the examination of tax-exempt organiza-
tions' returns, where noncompliant behaviors by charity managers could
potentially be detected, has increased by a mere two percent. 157 In con-
trast, the examinations of "related taxable returns," where exempt organi-
zations report traditional tax items such as employment tax and unrelated
business income tax, have more than doubled from 2,384158 to 4,915159
(or by 106%) over the same time period. 160
The internal structure of the IRS is also an impediment to the effec-
tive regulation of the charitable sector, as evidenced by its personnel con-
straints. As a government agency, the IRS is constrained to the
government pay scale for compensation of IRS personnel. 161 As a result,
the IRS is often unable to offer competitive compensation packages to
attract quality accountants, attorneys, and other professionals with spe-
type powers, its staff is neither by training nor by inclination situated to enforcement
that is not designed to raise revenue.
154 See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 419,
455.
155 See id. at 414.
156 See id.
157 See supra note 132.
158 IRS DATA BOOK 2002, at 26 tbl.15.
159 IRS DATA BOOK 2008, at 33 tbl.13.
160 Compare IRS DATA BOOK 2002, at 26 tbl. 15 with IRS DATA BOOK 2008, at 33 tbl. 13.
The theme of emphasizing traditional tax items over detection of abuse by charity managers is
also exemplified by a recent study of IRS Coordinated Examination Program (CEP) audit
cases. See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 419.
The CEP is designed to audit organizations having "more than $50 million of assets and gross
receipts, a number of controlled or related entities, and that possess national stature." Id. at
417. Between 1991 and 2001, the IRS closed 202 CEP audit cases and uncovered very few
instances of abuse substantial enough to warrant revocation. Id. at 419. Rather, the deficien-
cies assessed were primarily related to employment tax underreporting and misreporting of
allocations for purposes of the unrelated business income tax. See id.
161 See Owens, supra note 130, at 7.
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cialized expertise for the exempt organizations division. 162 Additionally,
recruitment of personnel within the IRS to serve increased need for en-
forcement is hindered by its internal structure. For example, when the
IRS experienced a shortage of personnel to review the ever increasing
influx of exemption applications, the IRS shifted personnel from the au-
dit division to determinations.' 63 Recruitment of personnel for the trans-
fer was difficult partly because of the IRS's internal policies on
promotions-the promotion potential is lower for personnel in the deter-
minations division than it is for personnel in the audit division. 164 Fur-
thermore, the transferred personnel lacked experience in exempt
organizations matters. 165 The transfer of personnel had a negative im-
pact on the perception of the IRS as an effective regulator.166 According
to the then-director of the IRS exempt organizations division, the shift of
IRS personnel "gave rise to a perception that the Service is not out there
looking, which impedes voluntary compliance. ' ' 167 The difficulty the
IRS encountered in shifting its personnel to be responsive to the shifting
needs for oversight of the charitable sector is "illustrative of the difficul-
ties inevitably encountered in effecting major changes within a large bu-
reaucracy, particularly for a branch with specialized functions and goals
that do not fit easily within the framework of a large entity."' 168
Furthermore, some regulators appear confused about their role in
the oversight of the charitable sector. For example, in Arizona, where
charity regulation is nonexistent, a chief counsel of the Consumer Protec-
tion and Advocacy Section in the Arizona Attorney General's office
claimed: "We don't regulate charities in Arizona .... I'm not aware of
any state law or regulation covering corporate governance of nonprof-
its."' 169 If the persons charged with regulating the charitable sector are
unaware that they have that authority, the current structure for oversight
of the charitable sector is fundamentally flawed.
3. Political Constraints
A third limitation on government's ability to effectively regulate the
charitable sector is the perceived political favoritism in the selective en-
forcement of charitable laws. Political slant is embedded in the institu-
162 See Owens, supra note 130, at 7 (noting that in 2006, the maximum annual compensa-
tion of the highest level of career employee in the IRS was approximately $145,000-the same
average annual compensation offered to first or second year associates at large law firms).
163 See Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 6, at 392.
164 See id.
165 See id. at 392-93.
166 See id. at 393.
167 Carolyn Wright Lafon and Christine J. Harris, EO Division Faces Challenges Two
Years into Reorganization, 35 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 16, 16 (2002).
168 FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 393.
169 Harvey Lipman, A Risky Mix for Charity, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY 29 (May 16, 2002).
2009]
28 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
tional nature of the enforcement agencies at both the state and federal
levels. ' 70
When it comes to the attorney general's regulation of the charitable
sector, all politics is local. In the vast majority of jurisdictions, the state
attorney general is an elected official or political appointee. 171 Thus, po-
litical forces and local concerns are likely to influence the state attorney
general.' 72 For instance, in cases where charitable organizations of na-
tional interests decided to relocate to another jurisdiction, the local attor-
neys general opposed the relocation, elevating local interests over
national or public at large interests. 73
Recently, the Pennsylvania Attorney General's involvement in an
investment decision made by the trustees of the Milton Hershey School
Trust (Trust)-a charitable trust benefitting the Milton Hershey School
for Needy Children (the School) in Hershey Pennsylvania-illustrates
that the state attorney general is not immune to the influence of local
politics on decisions to intervene in charity matters. In 2002, the trustees
voted to sell the Trust's controlling interest in the Hershey Company, in
a takeover bid by a competitor, in order to diversify the Trust's invest-
ment portfolio. 174 Initially, the Pennsylvania Attorney General's office
seemed to support the trustees' decision to sell the Hershey Company
170 Silber, supra, note 108, at 634.
171 See Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corpo-
rate Control: Evidence From Hershey's Kiss-Off, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 751 (2008)
("[T]he typical state attorney general is an elected political official for whom the supervision
of charitable organizations has little political payoff."); Silber, supra note 108, at 634; National
Association of Attorneys Generals, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.naag.org/how-
does onebecome an-attorney-general.php (last visited Nov. 2, 2009). The National Associ-
ation of Attorneys General reports that the attorney general is elected in forty-three jurisdic-
tions and is appointed by the governor in five states. National Association of Attorneys
General, supra.
172 See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at
446-47 (noting a trend of increasing politicization in state regulation of charities by the attor-
ney general since the 1990s). Professor Evelyn Brody states that "[p]olitical cynics believe
that 'A.G.' stands not for 'attorney general' but for 'aspiring governor.'" Brody, Parochial-
ism, supra note 25, at 946. Professor Manne observes that the state attorney general is "a
highly political office, and the government's agenda with respect to enforcement of charity
obligations is unlikely to include detached matters of efficiency, and may reflect a political
ideology inimical to the aims of certain nonprofit organizations." Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency
Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 227, 251 (1999).
173 See Brody, Parochialism, supra note 25, at 968.
174 See Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 171, at 752-55. The trustees' decision to diversify the
Trust's portfolio was consistent with fulfilling their duty of care. By all accounts, the Trust's
portfolio lacked diversification and was heavily invested in Hershey Company stock, subject-
ing the Trust's portfolio to uncompensated risk that could be easily avoided by diversification.
See id. at 772-75. Typically, state trust law would require a trustee to diversify the trust's
portfolio under the prudent investor standard. Pennsylvania law, however, exempted the Trust
from the general requirement that charitable trusts diversify their portfolio. See Mark Sidel,
The Struggle for Hershey: Community Accountability and the Law in Modem American Phi-
lanthropy, 650 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003) [hereinafter Sidel, Struggle for Hershey].
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stock.175 But the Pennsylvania Attorney General, who was running for
governor at the time, was concerned about the effect such a sale would
have on the local community given its close ties to the Hershey Com-
pany. 176 Therefore, he sought to enjoin the sale asserting that it would
lead to lay-offs and plant closings that would harm the central Penn-
sylvania community.1 77 The Pennsylvania Attorney General's changed
stance came about after his opponent in the gubernatorial race publicly
denounced the proposed sale, and local opposition to the proposed sale
grew, including requests made by the School's alumni association for the
Attorney General to remove the trustees for fiscal waste. 178 When the
Attorney General obtained a preliminary injunction barring the proposed
sale, the trustees abandoned their plans to sell the Hershey Company
stock. 179 A few months later, the Pennsylvania Attorney General lost the
election to his opponent who openly opposed the sale from the begin-
ning.' 80 The Hershey Trust case illustrates that when the political stakes
are high, the state attorney general may be willing to put aside what is
best for the charity in favor of what is politically salient.
State attorneys general are inherently political. They direct their of-
fice to "ignore cases that are politically dangerous" and to pursue matters
that are "politically irresistible" even though such matters may implicate
mere business decisions of charity managers. 181 State attorneys general
are reluctant "to move in an aggressive and timely fashion when to do so
might be politically difficult-despite abundant grounds for concerns
about damage to the public interest." 18 2 In 2001, for example, the media
reported that a key employee who resigned from Citizen Education Fund,
a charitable organization located in Illinois and led by Reverend Jesse
Jackson, received a generous severance package. 18 3 The reports also dis-
closed that the departing employee had recently given birth, out of wed-
175 See id. at 768-69; Sidel, Struggle for Hershey, supra note 174, at 13. A few months
prior to the announcement of the proposed sale, staff from the Pennsylvania Attorney Gen-
eral's office met with the trustees and encouraged them to diversify the Trust's investment
portfolio, which at that time was heavily invested in Hershey Company stock. See Klick &
Sitkoff, supra note 171, at 768, 772.
176 See Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 171, at 755.
177 See id. at 755-56, 771.
178 See id. at 770; Sidel, Struggle for Hershey, supra note 174, at 14-15.
179 See Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 171, at 798.
180 See id. at 770.
181 Brody, Parochialism, supra note 25, at 947-48.
182 Silber, supra note 108, at 617; see also Crimm supra note 123, at 1194 ("[l]f investi-
gations were undertaken, the attorneys general would make powerful enemies; if punishment
followed, attorneys general would make vindictive enemies of the richest and most influential
people and organizations in the state; and if attorneys general were successful in ending
abuses, the 'wells of charity' would dry up, and the attorneys general who might suffer
politically.").
183 See Silber, supra note 108, at 613.
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lock, to Reverend Jackson's child. 184  The organization's annual
information return, however, did not disclose as required the employee's
salary and severance benefits. 85 After a brief investigation, the Illinois
Attorney General gave Citizen Education Fund a mere "slap on the
wrist," allowed the organization to amend its state disclosure report, and
then closed the investigation. 86 A vocal conservative critic of Reverend
Jackson, Bill O'Reilly, alleged that the Democratic Illinois Attorney
General, who at the time was running for governor, allowed his political
aspirations to influence the investigation of Citizen Education Fund. 187
Many have also criticized the IRS for susceptibility to political in-
fluence. The Commissioner of the IRS is a political appointee. 188 Crit-
ics allege that the IRS exercises its wide discretion to inappropriately
target charitable organizations that expressed views contrary to those of
the then-current administration. In 2003, for example, the IRS, under the
administration of President George W. Bush, reinstated the tax-exempt
status of two charitable organizations with close ties to former Republi-
can House Speaker Newt Gingrich.' 89 These exemptions had earlier
been revoked by the IRS under the Clinton administration in 1996 and
2000 on the grounds that the organizations improperly benefitted the Re-
publican Party. 190 The IRS denied allegations that political influence
caused its reconsideration of the tax-exempt status of these organiza-
tions; yet the IRS refused to release any documents relating to its
decision. 191
The Service was, yet again, accused of political influence when, in
2005, it began investigating All Saints Church in Pasadena, California. 192
The Service alleged that a guest preacher's sermon violated the absolute
prohibition on political candidate advocacy by charities. 193 The sermon,
184 See id.
185 See id.
186 See id. The activities of Citizen Education Fund also called into question its tax-
exempt status as a charitable organization under federal law. See id. at 614 ("The American
Conservative Union ... formally requested that the IRS launch proceedings that could have
led to the revocation of [Citizen Education Fund's] exempt status, but the IRS declined to
pursue the matter.").
187 See id. at 613.
188 Id. at 634.
189 See Christine J. Harris, Talk with IRS Reps Offers More Insight into Review of Ging-
rich Groups, 2003 TAx NoTEs TODAY 118-4 (June 19, 2003).
190 See id.
191 See id.
192 See Rebecca Trounson, IRS Ends Church Probe but Stirs New Questions, Los ANGE-
LES TIMES, Sept. 24, 2007, at A I.
193 Id.; see Letter from the IRS to All Saints Church (June 9, 2005), http://aschu.convio.
net/pdf/IRS%2OLetter%20to%20All%20Saints.pdf. See generally Johnny Rex Buckles, Not
Even a Peep? The Regulation of Political Campaign Activity by Charities through Federal
Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 1071, 1071-78 (2007) (discussing the prohibition on political cam-
paign activity on charities and noting the investigation of All Saints Church).
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given two days before the 2004 Presidential election, was titled "If Jesus
Debated Senator Kerry and President Bush."' 194 The sermon seemed to
advocate that Senator Kerry was the better candidate and that parishio-
ners should cast their votes on election day for Senator Kerry, though at
no point did the guest preacher explicitly tell the parishioners to vote for
Senator Kerry. 195 About one year after the 2004 election, in which Presi-
dent Bush was re-elected, the IRS launched a lengthy investigation into
All Saints Church's possible violation of the political campaign prohibi-
tion.196 The IRS closed the investigation in September 2007.197 While
the IRS found that All Saints Church had engaged in impermissible polit-
ical campaign activity, the IRS did not impose any excise taxes and did
not revoke the church's tax-exempt status. 198 All Saints Church alleged
that it was the target of the investigation in the first place because of the
views expressed during the sermon, which condemned certain actions of
the Bush administration. 199 The church requested that the Department of
Justice examine whether improper political influence compelled the IRS
to investigate its activities, and the church demanded an apology from
the IRS. 200
4. Agency Constraints
Finally, the government's lack of personal stake in the outcome of
the enforcement action results in ineffective regulation of the charitable
sector. These agency constraints are especially problematic when the be-
havior sought to be regulated is the fiduciary duties of charity managers:
[T]he Anglo-American judicial system relies on an indi-
vidual's self-interest to assure compliance with the law.
The existence of ascertained individuals who will look
after their own interests is a basic component of all fidu-
ciary relationships. The laws are so framed that reliance
194 See Rev. Dr. George F. Regas, Rector Emeritus, Sermon at All Saints Church: If Jesus
Debated Senator Kerry and President Bush (Oct. 31, 2004), http://aschu.convio.net/archives/
sermons/( 10-31-04)%20If%2oJesus%20Debated.pdf.
195 See Trounson, supra note 192, at Al.
196 See id.; Letter from the IRS to All Saints Church (June 9, 2005), http://aschu.convio.
net/pdf/IRS%2OLetter%20to%20All%2OSaints.pdf.
197 See Trounson, supra note 192, at Al.
198 See id.
199 See Rev. J. Edwin Bacon, Jr., Sermon at All Saints Church: Called to Freedom at 2-3
(Sept. 23, 2007), http://www.allsaints-pas.org/site/DocServer/Keeping-theMainThing-the
MainThing.pdf?doclD=256 I.
200 Letter from Marcus S. Owens, Attorney for All Saints Church to Mr. J. Russell
George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (Sept. 21, 2007), http://www.all
saints-pas.org/site/DocServer/Letter toTreasury-InspectorGeneral_092107.pdf?doclD=
2543; Letter from Marcus S. Owens, Attorney for All Saint's Church to Linda E. Stiff, Acting
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service at 1 (Sept. 21, 2007), http://www.allsaints-pas.org/
site/DocServer/Letter toIRSCommissioner_092107.pdf?doclD=2542.
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is placed on the beneficiaries of a private trust or on the
shareholders of a business corporation to call into action
the enforcement machinery of the courts.20 1
The case study of the Pennsylvania Attorney General's interference
with the investment decision of the trustees of the Milton Hershey
School Trust 20 2 illustrates an inherent problem: where an agency receives
no incentive for ensuring that charitable assets are managed and main-
tained for the public good, it may easily overlook this mandate when the
interests of its constituents conflict with the best interests of the charity.
The Pennsylvania Attorney General expanded its regulatory role to "ex-
ploring the negative effects of charitable and philanthropic activity on
communities and the public that go well beyond safeguarding trustee fi-
delity to fiduciary duty and the interests of the beneficiaries that regula-
tors are traditionally required to safeguard. '2 0 3 In this case, what was
best for the charity gave way to what was best for the regulator and the
regulator's constituents. Professors Klick and Sitkoff observed that the
personal and community conflicts of interest made "monitoring by the
state attorneys general . . . inadequate to ensure that resources held by
tax-exempt and therefore publicly-subsidized charitable trusts [were]
deployed in efficient pursuit of a bona fide charitable purpose for the
public good. ' '2°4
From the standpoint of financial resources, political capital, and
other economic concerns, there is little incentive for the state attorneys
general or the IRS to increase the budgetary resources dedicated to the
oversight of the charitable sector. For example, as a tax collection
agency, the IRS may focus its increased enforcement efforts on taxpayers
suspected of evading federal income taxes. In return for the increased
financial resources dedicated to this enforcement area, the IRS may reap
the benefit of additional tax revenues. In addition, if successful, Con-
gress may look favorably on this enforcement area and grant additional
budgetary appropriations in the next fiscal year. For example, if the IRS
collected an additional $50 million in tax revenues after increasing en-
forcement resources by $5 million, think about what the IRS could do
with another $25 million in financial resources. This kind of "return on
budgetary capital" would not occur if increased budgetary resources
were dedicated to the enhanced monitoring of the charitable sector. 20 5
201 FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 304.
202 See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
203 Sidel, Struggle for Hershey, supra note 174, at 2-3.
204 Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 171, at 817-18.
205 See Hansmann, supra note 25, at 604. Professor Hansmann explains that strict en-
forcement of the nondistribution constraint would not produce more tax revenue; "it will sim-
ply ensure that less of a nonprofit's income goes to its managers and more goes to the purposes
for which the patrons have contributed their funds." Id.; cf. Joel L. Fleishman, Public Trust in
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Even though the IRS may assess excise taxes for wrongdoings by charity
managers, the amount of excise taxes imposed on charitable organiza-
tions and their managers is significantly less than one percent of the total
amount of tax revenues collected by the IRS each year. 20 6 Besides, the
IRS may reduce or waive excise taxes imposed on charitable managers in
order to encourage reformation of the charity's internal policies.20 7 The
state attorneys general are in an even worse position to economically
justify increased enforcement in the charitable sector because state law
often does not authorize state attorneys general to impose fines on char-
ity managers who breach their fiduciary duties unless the breach rises to
the level of criminal activity.20 8 Any money the attorney general recov-
ers from the breach of fiduciary duty is paid directly to the injured chari-
table organization. Furthermore, as political agents, the state attorneys
general do not have strong incentive to increase enforcement efforts be-
cause active supervision has little political payoff outside of isolated inci-
dents.20 9 Thus, the charitable sector needs supervision by agents with
better incentives.210
Not-for-Profit Organizations and the Need for Regulatory Reform, in PHILANTHROPY AND THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR IN A CHANGING AMERICA 172, 188 (Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas Ehr-
lich eds., Indiana University Press 1999) [hereinafter Fleishman, Public Trust] (noting that, as
a tax collecting agency, "it is not surprising that the IRS would find it expedient to pay less
attention to the tax-exempt organizations, which by definition, do not pay taxes, than to those
entities from which taxes are collected").
206 In 2007, the IRS collected approximately $5.5 million in excise taxes imposed on
charitable organizations and their managers, excluding the excise tax on private foundation net
investment income. See I.R.S., "Excise Taxes Reported by Charities, Private Foundations,
and Split-Interest Trusts on Form 4720, Calendar Year 2007, available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-soi/07pf00et.xls. The same year, the IRS collected total tax revenues of approximately
$2.7 trillion. IRS DATA BOOK 2008, at 3 tbl.1. Thus, in comparison to total tax collections,
the excise taxes aimed at influencing fiduciary behavior of charity managers and preserving
charitable assets are negligible.
207 See, e.g., FREMoNT-SMIm, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at
261 -(4 (reporting that in the high-profile investigation of malfeasance and collusion by former
trustees of a Hawaiian charitable trust that operated the Kamehameha Schools (the Bishop
Estate Trust), the IRS initially asserted $65 million in taxes; but the IRS agreed to settle for
approximately $9 million in a settlement agreement that required the replacement of the five
corrupt trustees and payment by the removed trustees of an excise tax of $40,000 each). As a
general matter, the IRS is authorized to abate the excise taxes imposed on charity managers,
other than the first-tier self-dealing excise tax imposed on the self-dealer, if the violation was
due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect and the violation was corrected in a timely
matter. See I.R.C. § 4962 (West Supp. 2009).
208 See supra note 62 and accompanying text describing the enforcement powers of the
state attorney general.
209 See Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 171, at 749.
210 See id. at 818-19.
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C. Summary
The fundamental policy reasons for vesting regulation of the chari-
table sector in the government remain strong.21' Charities are organized
and operated for the public benefit. Placing exclusive standing in the
government satisfies the dual concerns of maintaining an enforcement
mechanism to address malfeasance and protecting charitable resources
from harassment and interference. 21 2 Professor Fleishman emphasizes
the need for continued government regulation of the charitable sector:
[W]ithout government monitoring and enforcement of
laws proscribing fraud and self-dealing, among other ob-
jectionable behavior that damages us all, the good guys
will observe the rules, the bad guys will flout them with
impunity, and, if enough bad guys get away with it, the
arena of private action will be vitally undermined. 21 3
There is almost universal agreement that the state attorneys general
fall short in fulfilling their responsibility to regulate the charitable sector
now, and they are not expected to improve in the foreseeable future. 214
There have been similar concerns expressed about the IRS. 215 Due to the
inherent financial, institutional, political, and agency constraints imposed
on these governmental agencies, the internal reform necessary to make
the state attorneys general and the IRS an ongoing and effective enforce-
ment presence in the charitable sector is unlikely to occur.
Any reform of government regulation of the charitable sector is fur-
ther hindered by the "halo effect. '216 The "halo effect" stems from the
notion that charitable status is a sign of trustworthiness bestowing a
"halo" on the organization, regardless of merit.2 17 Essentially, the cur-
rent government regulators resist implementing internal reform because
of the common conception that the charitable sector exists to "do good"
and that the people who serve in the sector, often without pay, have only
the best intentions. 218 The idea is that these selfless, high-profile, and
211 See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 40 ("The common law rule of standing ... contin-
ues to have strong theoretical foundations.").
212 See id. at 42.
213 Fleishman, Public Trust, supra note 205, at 177.
214 See supra note 25.
215 See, e.g., Fleishman, Public Trust, supra note 205, at 185; Owens, supra note 130, at
4-10.
216 See Crimm supra note 123, at 1096-97 (noting that the "halo" perception of the chari-
table sector provides an indication that charities are "providers of good," "trustworthy institu-
tions," "altruistic, compassionate or caring in nature," "benevolent," and "beyond reproach").
217 See Brody, Agents Without Principals, supra note 14, at 460.
218 See FREMONT-SMrrTH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 2 ("In
part, [the] failure to provide meaningful regulation has been justified on the grounds that,
because [charitable organizations] are formed to 'do good,' the people who run [charitable
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important members of the community should not be bothered by the
threat of lawsuit and liability. 219 Thus, vigorous oversight of these "do-
gooders" is unnecessary when other evils exist within the jurisdiction of
the government regulator. 220 As long as this perception of the charitable
sector exists, comprehensive reform by existing government agencies is
unlikely.
There must be serious consideration of alternatives to the current
government regulation if the charitable sector is to remain successful.22'
Professor Fleishman aptly makes this point:
For the long-run good of the sector, we cannot continue
to rely on an inadequately staffed and insufficiently
powerful IRS, the vagaries of inadequately staffed and
usually not-very-interested offices of the state attorneys
general which, in any event, have difficulty in policing a
sector which routinely crosses state and national bounda-
ries many times a day, the limited scope and vision of
voluntary watchdog agencies, . . . and the investigatory,
inflammatory press.222
Continuing the status quo will harm not only the charitable organi-
zations that comprise the sector, but also the public, which ultimately
benefits from the vibrant existence of the charitable sector.
II. PRIVATE REGULATION OF THE CHARITABLE SECTOR
Traditionally, a member of the general public has no standing to
enforce a charitable gift or mismanagement of charitable assets, even
though such an individual may be a donor or beneficiary of the charitable
organization. 223 This is due to the fact that private individuals are not
organizations] will likewise 'do good'; they will not profit at the organization's expense nor be
reckless in their management of its assets.").
219 See Chester, Improving Enforcement Mechanisms, supra note 13, at 466-70.
220 Cf. id. at 450 (noting that comprehensive regulation of the charitable sector by the
state attorneys general and the IRS has not been "politically possible" due at least in part to the
widely-held belief that charitable managers are selflessly "doing good").
221 Cf. Patton, supra note 55, at 134-44 (noting that since the fourteenth century, situs
and methods for enforcement of the law of charity have been reevaluated and reassigned nu-
merous times in response to claims of corruption and ineffectiveness of the then-current en-
forcement mechanism).
222 Fleishman, Public Trust, supra note 205, at 185.
223 See, e.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518,
645-46 (1819) (denying standing to both students of Dartmouth College and its donors for
alleged breach of fiduciary duties by the trustees of the college); Grant v. Trinity Health-
Michigan, 390 F. Supp. 2d 643 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (holding than a suit for enforcement against
a charitable hospital by beneficiaries-uninsured patients who claimed that the hospital
charged uninsured patients substantially higher rates than insured patients-could not be main-
tained); Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997) (hold-
ing that a suit for enforcement of a charitable trust could not be maintained by a donor of the
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natural direct stakeholders in the financial management of the charitable
organization. 224 As a fundamental matter, a charitable organization is
confined by a "nondistribution constraint" 225-the prohibition on the dis-
tribution of the net earnings of the charitable organization to any mem-
ber, director, trustee, or officer of the organization. Accordingly, unlike
their for-profit counterparts, charitable organizations lack "watchdog"
shareholders who have a financial incentive to monitor the actions of
their directors and trustees. 226
Lax enforcement of the charitable sector by state attorneys general
has led courts to reevaluate the traditional rule denying standing to pri-
vate individuals, and forced them to consider increasing the circum-
stances under which private individuals are allowed to bring enforcement
actions against charitable organizations.2 27 In particular, courts have
granted standing to private parties when convinced that such parties have
sufficient "interest" in the outcome of the proceeding to warrant their
involvement, thus negating the traditional justification for limited stand-
ing-preventing vexatious litigation by disinterested parties. 228
A. Members of a Charitable Organization
When a charitable organization is formed as a membership non-
profit corporation, members of the corporation may have standing to
charitable trust); Weaver v. Wood, 680 N.E.2d 918 (Mass. 1997) (holding that membership in
a charitable organization by itself is not sufficient to convey standing to enforce claims of
mismanagement of the organization); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt.
d (1959) ("The mere fact that as members of the public they benefit from the enforcement of
the trust is not a sufficient ground to entitle them to sue, since a suit on their behalf can be
maintained by the Attorney General.").
224 Cf. Manne, supra note 172, at 227-28 (observing that unlike for-profit companies
where self-enforcement mechanisms are in place to help supplement government regulation,
"in the nonprofit world, owners are not well-defined; their voting rights are questionable or
nonexistent; charitable goals are ambiguous, or at least difficult to quantify; no significant
second-order markets operate; and the residual claimants are either unable to monitor effec-
tively or unwilling to do so").
225 Professor Hansmann describes the so-called "nondistribution constraint" as follows:
A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred from distribut-
ing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as mem-
bers, officers, directors and trustees. By "net earnings" I mean here pure profits-
that is, earnings in excess of the amount needed to pay for services rendered to the
organization; in general, a nonprofit is free to pay reasonable compensation to any
person for labor or capital that he provides, whether or not that person exercises
some control over the organization. It should be noted that a nonprofit organization
is not barred from earning a profit .... It is only the distribution of profits that is
prohibited.
Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838-39 (1980).
226 See Fishman, Standards of Conduct, supra note 23, at 408-09.
227 See Chester, Grantor Standing, supra note 15, at 611; Hansmann, supra note 25, at
607-08.
228 See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 52.
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bring suit against the directors of the corporation for breach of fiduciary
duty with respect to the management of the corporation. 229 The mem-
bers' suit is in the nature of a derivative action because it is brought to
enforce the fiduciary duties the charity directors owe to the organization
itself rather than to the individuals bringing the suit.23° Some jurisdic-
tions statutorily grant standing to members of a nonprofit corporation,
231
while others recognize such standing through case law. 232 The jurisdic-
tions that grant standing to members of a charitable corporation recog-
nize that these members have an interest distinct from that of the general
public.233 In several jurisdictions, however, standing for members of a
nonprofit corporation to enforce breach of fiduciary duties by the direc-
tors has been denied on the grounds that breach of fiduciary duties in-
volves the public interest and not a member's private interest in the
corporation.2 34
Conversely, the law has historically recognized the right of share-
holders of for-profit corporations to bring derivative actions to enforce
the fiduciary duties of the corporation's directors and officers. A share-
holder's ownership interest in a for-profit corporation not only grounds
the shareholder's standing for the derivative action, but typically carries
voting rights-proportional to the shareholder's ownership interest-in
the election of the directors of the corporation. 235 Accordingly, "share-
holder derivative suits may be viewed as a last-ditch exercise of corpo-
rate power by those in whose hands that power ultimately lies, and for
those who will ultimately benefit from the suit."2 36
In the for-profit context, shareholder derivative suits "are brought to
redress injury sustained by, or to enforce a duty owed to, the corpora-
tion" by its managers, such as wasted corporate assets, gross mismanage-
ment, self-dealing, excessive compensation, and usurped corporate
229 See Deborah A. DeMott, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 2.12 (2003).
230 See id. §§ 2.2, 2.12.
231 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5710 (West 2005); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW
§ 623(a) (McKinney 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-3-741 (2003); ILL. COMP. STAT. § 17.80
(2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.2491-2493 (West 2004); see also REVISED MODEL NON-
PROFIT CORP. ACT § 13.02 (3d ed. 2008) (allowing for derivative suits for breaches of fiduci-
ary duties by members having five percent of the vote or fifty in number, whichever is less).
232 See, e.g., Leeds v. Harrisonon, 72 A.2d 371 (N.J. Ch. 1950). The common law gener-
ally does not permit member derivative actions without board participation. See, e.g., Basich
v. Board of Persons, 493 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Voelker v. St. Louis Mercantile
Library Ass'n, 359 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. 1962).
233 See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 54-55.
234 See, e.g., Weaver v. Wood, 680 N.E.2d 918 (Mass. 1997); Lopez v. Medford Cmty.
Ctr., 424 N.E.2d 229 (Mass. 1981); Voelker v. Saint Louis Mercantile Library Ass'n, 359
S.W.2d 689 (Mo. 1962); Nacol v. State, 792 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
235 Atkinson, supra note 29, at 671.
236 Id.
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opportunity.2 37 The derivative suit serves two purposes: deterring mis-
conduct by corporate managers and compensating for corporate loss. 238
Additionally, it provides an important supplement to government regula-
tion of mismanagement by corporate fiduciaries. 239 The damages re-
ceived from the suit are paid to the corporation rather than to the
individual shareholders who instituted the suit.240  The shareholders,
however, maintain an interest in the outcome of the derivative action,
because, as financial stakeholders in the equity of the corporation, share-
holders suffer indirect injury created by injury to the corporation. 24'
Thus, they enjoy a corresponding indirect financial benefit when recov-
ery is paid to the corporation, as that payment increases the residual
worth of the corporation and the value of the corporation's stock.242
Derivative suits in the charitable sector are distinctly different from
derivative suits in the for-profit sector. 243 Charities, unlike their for-
profit counterparts, do not have shareholders with a proprietary interest
in the corporation's residual net worth. 244 In order to be organized as a
nonprofit corporation and recognized as exempt from federal income tax,
the charity is prohibited from distributing dividends or other forms of
"net earnings" to its members or other insiders.245 Thus, while some
charities have members who elect the directors of the charity, these
members do not realize any benefit from an increase in the charity's net
worth that results from a derivative action brought by the members.2 46
While member standing to regulate a charitable organization may
initially seem like a plausible solution to the enforcement problem, there
are severe limitations to its effectiveness. Most charitable organizations
are not formed as membership nonprofit corporations. 247 Accordingly,
this enforcement mechanism will not apply to the majority of charitable
organizations. Even for those charities formed as membership corpora-
tions, voting power is not linked to any economic contribution to the
237 See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 53.
238 See id.
239 See Chester, Improving Enforcement Mechanisms, supra note 13, at 468 ("[T]he de-
rivative action may offer the only effective remedy in those circumstances in which a control
group has the ability to engage in self-dealing transactions with the corporation.").
240 Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 53.
241 See id.
242 See Atkinson, supra note 29, at 671.
243 See Brody, Limits, supra note 29, at 1430 (noting that "the nonprofit structure cannot
be equated with the business corporation in which shareholders having a direct financial inter-
est ultimately decide the fate of the board").
244 See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 54.
245 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); REv. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.40(a) (3d ed.
2008).
246 See Atkinson, supra note 29, at 671.
247 See Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The Constitutional Bounds of the Right
of Association, 35 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 821, 860 (2002); Manne, supra note 172, at 250.
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charity. Typically, each member receives one vote without a require-
ment that the member contribute to the equity of the corporation. There-
fore, unlike the for-profit world, where voting power is proportional to
contribution, allocation of control in the charitable sector is much less
standardized.248 Furthermore, in cases where charitable organizations
are formed as membership nonprofit corporations, often there is substan-
tial overlap between the membership and the composition of the board of
directors, making it unlikely members will bring suit against the board
for breaches of fiduciary duty. 24 9
In addition, there is a strong financial disincentive for member de-
rivative actions in the charitable sector. Members bear the costs of litiga-
tion for their derivative suit. 250 The financial disincentive is
compounded by the requirement that members receive no pecuniary in-
terest if the suit is successful. Both state law2 51 and federal tax law252
prohibit a charitable nonprofit corporation from distributing profits of the
corporation to its members. Accordingly, any recovery received from a
successful outcome inures solely to the benefit of the charitable corpora-
tion without any corresponding financial benefit to the members of the
charitable corporation. Absent a strong moral motivation to institute the
suit, members are financially discouraged from enforcing the fiduciary
duties of the directors of the charitable organization through private suit.
B. Directors or Trustees of the Charitable Organization
Directors of a charitable nonprofit corporation, like members, also
have standing to bring suit against co-directors for breach of fiduciary
duty. 253 Likewise, trustees of a charitable trust have standing to bring
suit against co-trustees for breach of fiduciary duty.2 5 4 Since these indi-
viduals bring suit in a representative, rather than an individual, capacity,
they have an interest distinct from that of the general public.2 55 Courts
have granted standing for co-managers to redress breaches of fiduciary
248 See Atkinson, supra note 29, at 671-72.
249 See Crimm, supra note 123, at 1182.
250 Cf FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at
233-34 (noting that even in states permitting member derivative suits, there is an absence of
an active plaintiffs bar that would profit from bringing such suits).
251 See, e.g., REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACr § 6.40(a) (3d ed. 2008).
252 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
253 See FREMONT-SMrrH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 334;
see also Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 936-37 (Cal.
1964); Gilbert v. McLeod Infirmary, 64 S.E.2d 524, 528-29 (S.C. 1951).
254 See Karst, supra note 82, at 443-44; see also Eunich v. Korean Found., Inc., 176
N.E.2d 692, 698-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200 cmt. e
(1959)) ("If there are several trustees, one or more of them can maintain a suit against another
to compel him to perform his duties under the trust ... .
255 See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 55.
20091
40 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
duties by their counterparts because "[t]he charity's own representative
has at least as much interest in preserving charitable funds as does the
Attorney General. ' 256 Granting standing to a director or trustee, how-
ever, raises a "circularity problem. ' 257 To allow suit by a disappointed
director or trustee thwarts the general principle that the organization is
governed by a majority of its trustees or directors. 258 Therefore, in grant-
ing standing, courts must be careful to distinguish true claims of fiduci-
ary wrongdoing from grievances for differences of opinion.
Reliance on co-manager enforcement of fiduciary duties fails on
other fronts. Enforcement by co-directors and co-trustees of a non-profit
corporation involve the same limitations as enforcement by members.259
Any recovery received from the successful outcome of the suit would
inure solely to the benefit of the charitable organization. 260 Although the
costs of litigation in suits instituted by a director or trustee may occasion-
ally be paid from the charitable organization's funds, the director or trus-
tee receives no financial benefit from the successful outcome of the suit.
Furthermore, if the malfeasance occurs at the director or trustee level,
and there was collusion among the directors or trustees to commit the
malfeasance, it is unlikely that the directors or trustees will be reliable
enforcement mechanisms. 261 Additionally, a director or trustee may be
ignorant about the wrongdoing or the law permitting the director or trus-
tee to bring suit, or may be intimidated by stronger co-managers or a
coalition of co-managers. 262
C. Special Interest Doctrine
Some courts have granted standing to private individuals to bring
suit against charitable organizations under the special interest doctrine.2 63
According to the special interest doctrine, a private individual, with inter-
ests distinct from those of the average donor, beneficiary, or the general
256 Holt, 394 P.2d 936 (quoting Karst, supra note 82, at 444).
257 Brody, Limits, supra note 29, at 1433.
258 See id.
259 See Crimm, supra note 123, at 1182.
260 See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
261 See Karst, supra note 82, at 445 ("[T]here remains the possibility that all the charities
fiduciaries will agree on a breach of duty. The public still needs outside watchdogs."). See
generally Samuel P. King & Randall W. Roth, BROKEN TRUST: GREED, MISMANAGEMENT &
POLITICAL MANIPULATION AT AMERICA'S LARGEST CHARITABLE TRUST (Univ. of Haw. Press
2006) (chronicling the extensive self-dealing and other collusive mismanagement of charitable
assets of the Bishop Estate Trust between 1997 and 1999 by its trustees).
262 See Crimm supra note 123, at 1182.
263 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959); Blasko et al., supra note 57, at
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public, has standing to bring an enforcement action.264 The doctrine is
used to expand standing to those individuals who exhibit a "particular-
ized and justified involvement" in the success of the charity's mission.265
"Correctly applied, the special interest exception creates enforcement op-
portunities for private parties, and enables them to act as private attor-
neys general, while still avoiding the most important policy pitfalls
associated with lax standing rules." 266
In determining whether to grant standing to a private party under the
special interest doctrine, courts have considered five factors.2 67 First,
courts consider the nature of the acts complained of and the remedy
sought.268 When the plaintiff complains of extraordinary acts that "per-
vert" the stated charitable mission of the organization and does not seek
to personally benefit from the outcome of the suit, the plaintiff enjoys a
better chance of obtaining standing. 269 Second, courts consider the pres-
ence of fraud or misconduct on the part of the charitable organization or
its managers.2 70 Courts are more willing to grant standing to private in-
dividuals when they can demonstrate that charity managers committed
fraud or abused their fiduciary responsibility. 271 Third, courts consider
whether the state attorney general is available to enforce the alleged
breach, and even if available, the attorney general's likely effective-
ness. 272 The nature and level of the attorney general's involvement in
the case can significantly influence the court's decision to grant or deny
standing to the private party. 273 Fourth, courts consider the nature of the
benefitted class and its relationship to the charitable organization. 274 In
particular, the private individual seeking suit must show not only that he
is a beneficiary of the charitable organization, but also that he has a di-
rect interest, distinct from that of the general public and other benefi-
ciaries. 275 Finally, courts may consider case-specific objective factors,
264 See Weaver v. Wood, 680 N.E.2d 918, 923 (Mass. 1997); Associated Students v. Or.
Inv. Council, 728 P.2d 30, 32 (Or. Ct. App. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391
(1959).
265 Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 60-61.
266 Id. at 61.
267 See id.
268 Id.
269 See id. at 61-63.
270 Id. at 61.
271 See id. at 64.
272 See id. at 67.
273 See id. at 67-68 ("The Massachusetts Attorney General's office, for instance, has a
division dedicated to charities enforcement, and the Massachusetts courts, presumably not by
coincidence, have a long history of denying private plaintiff standing in favor of exclusive
official enforcement.").
274 Id. at 61.
275 See id. at 70.
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and the social desirability of allowing the private party to bring sUit.276
Specifically, courts are more willing to grant standing under the special
interest doctrine when there appears to be an egregious wrong that would
otherwise go uncorrected. 277
In any given situation, whether standing would be granted to a pri-
vate individual under the special interest doctrine is unclear; the determi-
nation is both jurisdiction and court specific. Because courts enjoy
substantial discretion in applying the above enumerated factors, a court
that wants to reach a decision that is seemingly inconsistent with prece-
dent can use the factors as justification. 278
1. Private Suits by Donors
In the typical case, a donor seeks standing to enforce restrictions
placed on the use of a charitable trust.279 Ordinarily, the donor is granted
standing only where the donor specifically reserves the right to enforce
the restriction in the donation instrument.28° Most donations, however,
are not documented by an enforceable gift instrument because if a donor
reserves the right to retake his donation if it is not used for its intended
purpose, no deduction will be allowed for the charitable gift for tax law
purposes. 28' Thus, since donors typically do not retain any interest in
their property after they contribute it to a charitable organization,282
courts deny them standing to sue the fiduciaries of the organization. 28 3
Recently, some courts have extended standing to donors who failed
to execute an enforceable gift instrument that would allow them to en-
force their restrictions. 284 One notable case of the extension of donor
276 See id. at 74.
277 Id. at 75.
278 See id. at 78-81 (identifying three hypothetical situations in which the special interest
doctrine might be analyzed in contemporary times, noting in the second example how standing
under the special interest doctrine may be denied under a traditional approach but granted
under a more flexible approach).
279 See Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum of
Charitable Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REv. 1183 (2007) [hereinafter Brody, Dead Hand]
(examining the evolution of donor standing to enforce donor-imposed restrictions on charitable
gifts).
280 The common law rule has long been that the donor does not have standing to enforce
the terms of the charitable gift unless he retains an interest in the donated property. See
Herzog Found. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 998 (Conn. 1997); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. e (1959).
281 See Brody, Dead Hand, supra note 279, at 1214.
282 See id. at 1209-10; Chester, Grantor Standing, supra note 15, at 614-15.
283 See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 41.
284 E.g., L.B. Research & Educ. Found. v. UCLA Found., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 710, 716 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2005); Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 436-38 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2001). But see Prentis Family Found. v. Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Inst., 698
N.W.2d 900, 913-14 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
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standing is Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center.285 In that
case, Brink Smithers, a recovering alcoholic, pledged $10 million to St.
Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center (Hospital) to establish the Smithers
Alcoholism Center as a home-like facility separate and apart from the
Hospital setting.2 86 The Hospital purchased the facility location with the
first $1 million installment of the gift in 1973,287 and Mr. Smithers
funded $5 million of the gift until 1978 when his relationship with the
Hospital became strained and he accordingly told the Hospital that he
would make no further payments on the gift.288 The Hospital and Mr.
Smithers reconciled in the early 1980s, with the Hospital agreeing to
strictly adhere to the terms of the original gift.289 They memorialized the
terms of the gift in a letter dated October 24, 1983.290 Under the terms of
the letter, the final installment of the gift was to be used as an endow-
ment fund exclusively for the Smithers Alcoholism Center.
29
'
Shortly after Mr. Smithers' death in 1994, the Hospital announced
that it was moving the alcohol treatment facility into the Hospital and
selling the separate facility.292 In addition, the Hospital cancelled a gala
ball intended to raise money for the Smithers Alcoholism Center and at
which Mr. Smithers' wife was to be presented an award in Mr. Smithers'
honor. 293 Mrs. Smithers learned that the Hospital had used monies from
the endowment fund for its general operations, and she demanded that
the Hospital provide an accounting of the endowment fund.
294
After an investigation by the New York Attorney General prompted
by Mrs. Smithers, the Hospital returned $5 million to the endowment
fund, without lost income, and agreed to transfer the proceeds from the
sale of the facility to the endowment fund.29 5 The Hospital also agreed
to use the endowment fund, as previously promised, exclusively for the
Smithers Alcoholism Center.296
285 Smithers, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
286 Id. at 427. The Smithers Alcoholism Center is the predecessor to the Betty Ford
Clinic style of alcohol and drug rehabilitation centers.
287 See id. at 427.
288 See id.
289 See id. at 427-28.
290 See Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2001).
291 Id.
292 Id. at 428-29.
293 See id.
294 Id. at 429 ("The Hospital at first resisted disclosing its financial records, but Mrs.
Smithers persisted, and in May 1995 the Hospital disclosed that it had been misappropriating
monies from the Endowment Fund since before Mr. Smithers's death, transferring such monies
to its general fund where they were used for purposes unrelated to the Smithers Center.").
295 See id. at 429-31.
296 Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001).
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The sole issue in the Smithers case was whether Mrs. Smithers, as
personal representative of Mr. Smithers' estate, had standing to enforce
the terms of Mr. Smithers' charitable gift to the Hospital.297 The court
held that standing for Mrs. Smithers was appropriate in this case. 298 Spe-
cifically, the court noted that the attorney general and the donor had con-
current standing to enforce the terms of the charitable gift because the
donor is more likely than the attorney general to be vigilant in enforcing
his intent.299 Also, the court was sympathetic to Mrs. Smithers because
of the deficiencies in the attorney general's supervision and the fact that
her motivation was not for pecuniary gain, but to vindicate her husband's
vision. 30 0
The Smithers case illustrates that donors have a more vested interest
than the attorney general in ensuring that the terms of a charitable gift are
carried out. Without Mrs. Smithers' diligence, the attorney general
would not have pursued the Hospital's misappropriation of funds and
failure to comply with the express terms of the charitable gift. 301 Donors
like Mrs. Smithers have a personal interest in seeing that their charitable
donations are used for their intended purposes, and thus have a strong
incentive to ensure that the charitable donee is not misappropriating
funds. 30 2
The modern trend to grant donors standing to enforce the specific
terms of their gifts, 30 3 however, has not expanded to permit donors to
297 Id. at 431.
298 See id. at 436.
299 See id. at 435-36.
300 See id. at 434-35.
301 See id. at 434. In reviewing the chronology of the attorney general's investigation of
the allegations of the Hospital's misuse of the Smithers endowment fund, the court noted:
Indeed, it was Mrs. Smithers's accountants who discovered and informed the Attor-
ney General of the Hospital's misdirection of Gift funds, and it was only after Mrs.
Smithers brought her suit that the Attorney General acted to prevent the Hospital
from diverting the entire proceeds of the sale of the building away from the Gift fund
into its general fund. The Attorney General, following his initial investigation of the
Hospital's administration of the Gift, acquiesced in the Hospital's sale of the build-
ing, its diversion of the appreciation realized on the sale, and its relocation of the
rehabilitation unit. . . . Absent Mrs. Smithers's vigilance, the Attorney General
would have resolved the matter between himself and the Hospital in that manner and
without seeking permission of any court.
Id. at 434.
302 Cf. Karst, supra note 82, at 446-47 (claiming that a main reason to grant standing to a
charity's founders and substantial donors to the charity is their deep commitment to the mis-
sion of the organization).
303 See generally Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Standing to Enforce Trusts: Renewing and Ex-
panding Professor Gaubatz's 1984 Discussion of Settlor Enforcement, 62 U. MIAMI L. REv.
713, 725-27 (2007) (advocating increased donor standing to enforce the terms of charitable
gifts); Reid Kress Weisbord, Reservations About Donor Standing: Should the Law Allow
Charitable Donors to Reserve the Right to Enforce a Gift Restriction? 42 REAL PROP., PROB.
& TR. J. 2 (Feb. 2007) (same).
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bring suit to redress alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, fraud, and other
misappropriation of charitable funds that do not relate to the donor's
gift.30 4 This limitation makes sense as the donor's gift is not an equity
contribution to the charity whereby the donor expects to retain a vested
interest.30 5 Thus, the modem trend only furthers enforcement of the
charity manager's duty of obedience, which requires that the donated
funds be used in accordance with the donor's intent. It does not provide
additional enforcement support for the vast majority of wrongdoings re-
ported in the charitable sector.30 6
2. Private Suits by Charitable Beneficiaries
Generally, no private individual has standing to bring an enforce-
ment action against a charitable organization merely because the individ-
ual is within the class of persons who may benefit from the charity. 30 7
Allowing enforcement suits by charitable beneficiaries poses an inherent
problem-to be a charity, the organization must be formed to serve a
charitable class, which by definition is an unascertainable group of bene-
ficiaries.30 8 Hence beneficiaries are a fluctuating class of persons, and
no individual beneficiary has a vested interest in a charitable
corporation. 309
Suits by charitable beneficiaries are permitted only in the most unu-
sual of circumstances. To maintain standing, the beneficiary must be "a
member of a small identifiable class" and "have a direct and defined
interest, distinct from that of the general public. '310 Simply showing that
the individual is among the class of persons who may benefit from the
charity, or even that the individual is currently receiving or has in the
304 Cf Halbach, supra note 303, at 717-21 (noting that the special interest doctrine is
dependent upon the type of action pursued, and a beneficiary who may be granted standing to
enjoin a charity from diverting funds from its stated purpose may not be granted standing to
remedy alleged mismanagement generally or breach of fiduciary duty).
305 See Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate Govern-
ance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CAT. U. L. REv. 701, 711
(2008) ("[U]nlike shareholders, charitable nonprofit donors make a gift and generally expect
no return of or on their investment . .. . [T]he primary expected return is in the form of an
existing tax deduction and that return generally exists regardless of lackluster nonprofit corpo-
rate governance.").
306 Cf Fremont-Smith Study, supra note 10 (surveying press reports of wrongdoings by
charity managers over a seven-year period, and noting that the reported incidents primarily
involved either criminal activity such as theft of charitable funds for personal wrongdoings, or
civil wrongdoings involving breaches of the duties of loyalty and care, such as self-dealing,
failure to carry out the charity's mission, and mismanagement of charitable funds, or a combi-
nation of both).
307 See Robert Schalkenbach Found. v. Lincoln Found., Inc., 91 P.3d 1019, 1025-27
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. c (1959).
308 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200 cmt. b (1959).
309 See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 71-74.
310 Id. at 70.
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past received benefits from the charity is insufficient, by itself, to justify
standing. 311
In Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School, patients of
Sibley Hospital were certified as a class without objection and allowed to
bring suit against the directors of the hospital for breach of the duties of
loyalty and care. 312 In a later, unrelated case, the court of appeals criti-
cized the granting of standing to the patients of Sibley Hospital:
Judge Green's memorandum opinion reflects that he had
considerable difficulty with his colleague's decision in
the Stern case, both as to the question to whom the direc-
tors' duties were owed, and the related if not identical
issue of who had standing to enforce them. He treats the
Stern decision as constituting "novel precedent" and rep-
resenting the "outer limits" of the imposition of liability
on directors of non-profit corporations .... 313
The court further searched for the rationale behind granting standing
to patients of the hospital to enforce breach of fiduciary duties by the
directors in light of the attorney general's inaction in this case: "[A]s
plausible an explanation as we can devise[,] it was considered that some-
one ought to be able to enforce the [directors'] duties in litigation, and if
the patients could not, there was no one else. '3 14 In the vast majority of
cases since the Sibley Hospital case, patients have routinely been denied
standing to challenge the management decisions of the hospital's
managers. 31 5
In the case of beneficiary standing, because any recovery received
inures solely to the benefit of the charitable organization, there is no
certainty that the plaintiff in the suit will ultimately benefit. 31 6 Further,
because the beneficiary bringing the suit has neither vested interest in the
charity nor guarantee that he will become or continue to be a beneficiary
311 See id. at 71 ("'[E]ven when a class of potential beneficiaries is small and distinct
enough that its members appear to have an interest distinguishable from the public's,' ... the
'special interest' doctrine [ ] require[s] that the complaining plaintiffs also show an immediate
threat of injury." (quoting Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1990))).
312 See Sterp v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch., 367 F. Supp. 536 (D.D.C. 1973).
313 Christiansen v. Nat'l Sav. & Trust Co., 683 F.2d 520, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
314 Id. at 528.
315 See, e.g., Grant v. Trinity-Health Michigan, 390 F. Supp. 2d 643, 652-53 (S.D. Mich.
2005); Sabeta v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1235-36 (S.D. Fla.
2005); Amato v. UPMC, 371 F. Supp. 2d 752, 757 (W.D. Pa. 2005); Lorens v. Catholic Health
Partners, 356 F. Supp. 2d 827, 834 (N.D. Ohio 2005); Burton v. William Beaumont Hosp., 347
F. Supp. 2d 486, 494 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
316 Cf Atkinson, supra note 29, at 693 ("[Plrivate parties ... trying to keep charitable
fiduciaries within the legal bounds of benefitting the public ... are providing a typical public
good. Such goods include external benefits, benefits that the citizen suing pays for but that
others enjoy ....").
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in the future, he must be motivated by altruism rather than the thought of
personal gain. 317
Furthermore, the interests of a particular beneficiary bringing suit
may not be representative of, and may even differ significantly from, the
collective interest of all current or potential beneficiaries. 318 Even in
those cases where the interests of the beneficiaries bringing suit do not
differ from the collective interests of all beneficiaries, individual benefi-
ciaries are ill equipped to adequately judge whether a charitable organi-
zation as a whole is fulfilling its mission. 31 9
D. Relator Actions
An individual who cannot maintain standing under the special inter-
est doctrine is left with the sole remedy of reporting the wrongdoing and
attempting to persuade the attorney general to bring suit.320 In some
cases, the attorney general could grant the individual standing to proceed
with the suit by appointing him a "relator. ' 321 California codified the
procedure for obtaining relator status through regulation. 322
If the attorney general grants relator status, the relator generally
takes an active part in the proceeding and is responsible for court costs
and other expenses of litigation. 323 This requirement effectively allows
the attorney general to use private resources to pursue the claim, increas-
ing the attorney general's enforcement resources. 324 The attorney gen-
eral, however, retains control of the action and can withdraw, dismiss, or
compromise it at any time, or take over its prosecution. 325 Furthermore,
a relator cannot maintain a suit if the attorney general declines to pro-
317 See id; cf. Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 434 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2001) ("Without possibility of pecuniary gain for himself or herself, only a [donor]
with a genuine interest in enforcing the terms of a gift will trouble to investigate and bring this
type of action.").
318 Atkinson, supra note 29, at 693.
319 See Brody, Agents Without Principals, supra note 14, at 523.
320 See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 43.
321 See id. at 49 (explaining that "[a] relator is a party who is allowed to proceed in the
name of the people or the attorney general when the power to sue otherwise resides wholly in
that official"); see also Brown v. Memorial Nat'l Home Found., 162 Cal. App. 2d 513, 538
(Cal. App. 1959) (defining a relator as "[a] party in interest who is permitted to institute a
proceeding in the name of the People or the attorney general when the right to sue resides
solely in that official").
322 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11 §§ 1-2 (West 2005). There are no reported cases in
which a relator has brought suit against a charitable organization under this provision.
323 See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 49.
324 See Atkinson, supra note 29, at 684.
325 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. a (1959); FREMONT-SMrrH, Gov-
ERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 325; Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 49.
2009]
48 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
ceed. 326 Thus, the use of relator status is entirely within the discretion of
the state attorney general.
Several commentators speculate that the requirement for the relator
to personally bear all expenses of litigation with no potential for personal
benefit from a successful outcome of the suit effectively precludes an
individual from pursuing the action.327 Since the attorney general ulti-
mately maintains control of the suit, another hindrance to the relator ac-
tion is that the suit is not free from political conflicts of interest. 328
Accordingly, the same ills that burden attorney general enforcement in-
fect relator enforcement: the decision whether to grant relator status may
be politically motivated, and the limited resources of the attorney gen-
eral's office makes investigation of the relator's complaint and supervi-
sion of the suit difficult.329
E. Visitor Programs
At common law, the founder of a charitable organization was given
a power of visitation, which enabled the founder, or another appointed by
the founder, to redress abuses and neglect by the charitable organiza-
tion.330 The idea of visitation is explained in Allen v. McKean as
follows:
Every founder of [a charitable] corporation, (that is the
fundator perficiens, or person, who originally gives to it
funds and revenues), and [each of] his heirs, have (sic) a
right to visit, inquire into, and correct all irregularities
and abuses, which may arise in the course of the admin-
istration of its funds, unless he has conferred (as he has
the right to do) the power upon some other person. This
power is commonly known by the name of the [visito-
rial] power, and it is a necessary incident to all [charita-
ble] corporations; for, these corporations being
326 See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 50 (referencing People ex rel. Vivisection Investi-
gation League v. Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 20 A.D.2d 762 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1964)).
327 See, e.g., James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an
Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 674 (1985) [hereinafter Fishman, Agenda for Re-
form]. Professor Fishman proffers a solution to this problem in the establishment of a fund
under the supervision of the state attorney general that would compensate attorneys who re-
present relators in suits to enforce fiduciary duties of charity managers. Id.
328 See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 48.
329 See id. at 48-50.
330 See Phillips v. Bury, 91 Eng. Rep. 900, 903 (1694) ("[I]f the founder has not ap-
pointed any visitor, then the law appoints the founder and his heirs to be visitors .... Pa-
tronage and visitation both arise from the founder; and the office of the visitor by the common
law is to judge according to the statutes of the [charitable organization], to expel and deprive
upon just occasions, and to hear appeals .... ").
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composed of individuals, subject to human frailties, are
liable, as well as private persons, to deviate from the end
of their institution; and therefore ought to be liable to
some supervision and control. But what is the nature
and extent of this [visitorial] power? Is it a power to
revoke the gift, to change its uses, to devest (sic) the
rights of the parties entitled to the bounty? Certainly
not. It is a mere power to control and arrest abuses, and
to enforce a due observance of the statutes of the
charity. 331
One justification for the visitorial power is that charitable organiza-
tions, unlike for-profit organizations, lack owners who are available to
hold the organization's directors and officers accountable. 332 Thus, the
power of visitation serves as a substitute; it allows the founder to monitor
the charity's affairs in a manner similar to the way shareholders monitor
the affairs of the corporations in which they are owners. 333
There are several problems with the common law visitorial power.
First, the indefinite and expansive scope of visitorial powers called into
question who had ultimate authority over management of the charitable
funds-the fiduciaries, with their ostensibly granted management author-
ity, or the visitor.334 Second, the visitorial power was automatic and
therefore may have been contrary to the founder's intent to vest full au-
thority with the charity managers. 335 Finally, the power of visitation was
hereditary, which means that the founder's heirs also had the power of
visitation unless otherwise provided by the donor.336 Vesting visitorial
powers in the founder's heirs proved problematic for effective oversight
331 Allen v. McKean, 1 F. Cas. 489, 497 (C.C.D. Me. 1833) (No. 229); accord FREMONT-
SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 338 (describing the power of
visitation as follows:
[Alt one time the distinction was made between the fundatio incipiens, the granting
of the charter by the state, and the fundators perficiens, the donation of funds by
individuals. The fundators perficiens were given the right to enforce the faithful
execution of the charity. They were permitted not only to prescribe rules for the
management and administration of the trust at the time of donation, but to specify
methods for the governance and control of trustees, for the inspection of their pro-
ceedings, and for the correction of abuses. Similarly, where an individual founded
and gave property to a charitable corporation, he was allowed to reserve or confer on
others the power of visitation.).
332 See, e.g., State ex. rel. Pittman v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570, 578 (1869).
333 See Chester, Improving Enforcement Mechanisms, supra note 13, at 473.
334 Atkinson, supra note 29, at 695; accord Karst, supra note 82, at 446 (alleging that the
power of visitation undermines one's responsibility as a charity manager). But see Chester,
Improving Enforcement Mechanisms, supra note 13, at 473 (arguing that the courts provided a
check on the visitor if the visitor "overstepped the bounds of the office" by unduly interfering
with the management decisions appropriately reserved to the charity's board of directors).
335 Atkinson, supra note 29, at 695.
336 Id
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of the charity because the heirs could lose interest, pass away, or at the
other extreme, be overly meddlesome in the managerial affairs of the
charity.337
Today, the power of visitation has largely fallen out of use. 338
While Professor Chester advocates the resurgence of the power of visita-
tion,3 39 Professor Karst would give it a "swift statutorial burial" on the
basis that it did not permit the directors to direct.340
F. Monitoring by a Private Organization through Voluntary
Contractual Relationships
Professor Manne advocates the creation of private for-profit moni-
toring companies that would oversee both the financial and charitable
aspects of a charitable organization's operations pursuant to a contract
between the monitoring company and the charitable organization. 341
Standing for supervision by the monitoring company would lie through
the enforcement of a breach of contract between the monitoring company
and the charitable organization; the contract would specifically grant the
monitoring company the right to sue to rectify perceived breaches of fi-
duciary duties by charity managers or failure to carry out the charity's
mission.342 Professor Manne argues that a profit motive would incen-
tivize the monitoring agency to diligently monitor the charity and con-
cerns about reputation in the public eye would incentivize charities to
engage private monitoring companies. 343
While Professor Manne's proposal is interesting, he recognizes that
there are several impediments that make this proposal unlikely to serve
as a comprehensive solution to the ineffectiveness of current government
oversight of the charitable sector.344 First, because the effectiveness of
the monitoring company to enforce the fiduciary duties of charity manag-
ers is based in private contract and not public law, a new "market" for
external regulators of charitable organizations would need to be created,
337 Id.
338 See Wier v. Howard Hughes Med. Inst., 407 A.2d 1051, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1979); Brody,
Dead Hand, supra note 279, at 1203-05. But see N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-
1.3(a) (McKinney 2006) (allowing for administrative control by those "founding, endowing
and maintaining" certain charitable organizations); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (providing that
"[tihe settler of a charitable trust, among others, may maintain a proceeding to enforce the
trust").
339 See Chester, Improving Enforcement Mechanisms, supra note 13, at 476.
340 See Karst, supra note 82, at 446.
341 See Manne, supra note 172, at 253-55.
342 Id. at 253.
343 See id. at 253-55.
344 See id. at 254-64 (enumerating potential impediments to the effectiveness of his
proposal).
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and the results are unpredictable. 345 Second, the risk of collusion be-
tween the monitoring company and the charity exists, which would un-
dermine public confidence in the effectiveness of the private monitoring
companies. 346 A notable example of the catastrophic results of collusion
between a private entity and an independent monitor in the for-profit
sector is Enron's collusion with its independent auditor, Arthur Ander-
sen, LLP, in the presentation of Enron's financial statements. 347 Ulti-
mately this collusion resulted in the collapse of Enron,348 the demise of
89-year old accounting giant Arthur Andersen, LLP,3 4 9 and the erosion
of public confidence in the effective regulation of capital markets.350
Without effective oversight of the independent monitors, therefore, the
risk of collusion goes unchecked. Professor Manne's proposal does not
suggest a mechanism to oversee the private monitoring companies,351 but
even if an oversight system were put in place, the question remains: Who
would be best suited to oversee the private monitoring companies? As
the current government regulators of the charitable sector have proven to
be inadequate regulators, 352 it is doubtful that these government regula-
tors would be effective regulators of the proposed private monitoring
companies. Third, because engaging a private monitoring company to
oversee a charity's operations would be costly to implement, 353 smaller
345 See id. at 254-61 (identifying potential concerns of a new market for private external
regulators such as the long-term nature of the contract and corresponding barriers to early
termination of the relationship, reluctance of voluntary directors and officers to serve a charity
because of increased potential for being sued, the inefficiency of the market for charitable
contributions, and the belief that the status quo is good enough).
346 Id. at 261-62.
347 See generally Neal F. Newman, Enron and the Special Purpose Entity. Use or Abuse?
The Real Problem - The Real Focus, 13 LAW. & Bus. REV. Am. 97, 97-118 (2007) (describ-
ing how Enron used special purposes entities and the accounting rules to its advantage to
falsely paint a picture of financial health). Professor Newman concludes that collusion be-
tween Enron and its independent auditor and others explains the false financial reporting:
[Tihe overarching point to appreciate is that Enron's mis-accounting had nothing to
do with ambiguities in the accounting literature and everything to do with the com-
plicit and coordinated efforts of Enron and those involved with its financial reporting
process to achieve the accounting results that were a departure from the true eco-
nomic substance of the underlying transactions that Enron's financial reporting pur-
ported to reflect.
Id. at 118.
348 See id. at 97, 112.
349 See David Stout, Conviction of Arthur Andersen is voided, N.Y. TIMES (online ed.),
June 1, 2005; David Barboza, Enron's Many Strands: Founding Families; Where Pain of
Arthur Andersen Is Personal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002, at C6.
350 See Newman, supra note 347, at 97.
351 Professor Manne briefly remarks: "In such instance there may be a continued role for
the attorneys general (and even the Department of Justice)." Manne, supra note 172, at 261.
But he does not elaborate any further on what role these agencies might take in oversight of
the private monitoring companies.
352 See supra notes 119-222 and accompanying text.
353 See Manne, supra note 172, at 263.
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and newer charities may find implementing private monitoring agencies
to be cost-prohibitive. 354 Finally, Professor Manne's proposal is not a
universal solution because charitable organizations would need to volun-
tarily seek out these contractual monitoring relationships. Therefore,
many may choose not to because of cost constraints, 355 and others may
choose not to because they simply do not want another oversight body
looking over their shoulders. 356
G. Private Regulation Has Limited Effectiveness
Even though standing is denied in the large majority of cases where
a private individual seeks to bring suit against a charitable organization,
in the cases where standing is granted, the primary factor in granting
standing is the lack of effective enforcement by the state attorney general
or other government official.3 57 It is widely recognized that attorneys
general rarely pursue their enforcement rights with the same zeal as pri-
vate parties.358 This should not, however, be the sole justification for
extending standing to private parties.
While some of the private regulation alternatives have had success
in isolated situations, none are satisfactory in providing comprehensive
and effective oversight of the charitable sector. Any increase in private
standing is unlikely to result in enough private action to be a serious
complement to government enforcement. Initially, there is a problem in
ensuring sufficient personal benefit from the successful outcome of the
suit brought by a private individual to justify the individual's litigation
expenses. 35 9 Because the successful outcome exclusively benefits the
charity and the general public, a "free-rider" problem exists in private
actions to enforce charity managers' fiduciary duties. As Professor At-
kinson explains, private enforcement is itself a public good-benefits
that the individual bringing suit pays for but others enjoy for free-and
therefore brings about a free-rider problem with the result that the public
good is supplied by private individuals at only sub-optimal levels. 360
Due to diversity among charities, some private enforcement mecha-
nisms will not be applicable to all charities, and the roles those private
354 See id. at 263-64.
355 See id.
356 See id. at 255.
357 See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at
331-33.
358 Brody, Limits, supra note 29, at 1431.
359 Cf. Jaclyn A. Cherry, Update: The Current State of Nonprofit Director Liability, 37
DUQ. L. REv. 557, 571 (1999) (noting that because damages flow back to the charitable organ-
ization itself, there is little incentive for private individuals to maintain enforcement suit, even
if private standing is expanded).
360 Atkinson, supra note 29, at 693.
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parties play with respect to particular charities will vary greatly as
well.361 Because the determination of standing is an inherently factual
inquiry, there is inconsistency in the application of the standing doctrine
to private parties from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Furthermore, the ex-
tending of standing to private parties within the same jurisdiction lacks
uniformity, even in cases with virtually identical facts. 362
Professor Brody questions whether expansion of the standing doc-
trine to private parties would result in more effective regulation of the
charitable sector:
The public appears uneducated about the fiscal needs of
charities, as many people express surprise that nonprofit
managers are paid at all and reveal ignorance of chari-
ties' productive demands . . . . A public that does not
understand cost constraints cannot perform effective
oversight. A public whose oversight focuses on the
wrong considerations induces charities to adopt ineffi-
cient and ineffective behaviors. 363
Furthermore, expansion of private standing will encourage disgrun-
tled persons (whether members, donors, or beneficiaries) to use the threat
of suit to attempt to force charity managers to take courses of action that
may be considered beneficial by the disgruntled person, but do not reflect
the best interests of the general public.364 To avoid this inherent conflict
of interest, it is better to leave enforcement authority in the hands of
government officials who represent the interests of the general public and
who have no individual interest that would color their enforcement
action.
III. MOVING TOWARD A NEW GOVERNMENT REGULATORY MODEL
Even with its flaws, government regulation of the charitable sector
is preferable to private regulation. However, the current government reg-
ulators of the charitable sector face financial, institutional, political, and
agency constraints that severely hinder their regulatory efforts. In the
foreseeable future, the IRS and state attorneys general are unlikely to
implement enough internal reform to adequately address these con-
straints and become an ongoing, effective enforcement presence in the
361 Id. at 662-63.
362 See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 64-67 (comparing ostensibly similar fact patterns
in a given jurisdiction, and noting that standing was denied to private parties where there was
no allegation of fraud and granted in the cases in which fraud was alleged).
363 Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L. REv. 433,
502 (1996).
364 See FREMONT-SMIT, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 449;
Chester, Improving Enforcement Mechanisms, supra note 13, at 458.
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charitable sector. Therefore, to enhance effective and efficient oversight
of the charitable sector, a new enforcement agency is necessary.
As an initial matter, one must consider whether a new enforcement
agency should be created at the state or federal level. Traditionally, en-
forcement of the fiduciary duties of charity managers was within the pur-
view of state enforcement. 365 Transferring the authority to regulate
charities to the federal level may create concerns similar to those ex-
pressed after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, namely
encroachment of state rights. 366 Although there has been extensive criti-
cism of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its resulting "federalization of cor-
porate governance," 367 these criticisms are not equally applicable to
federal regulation of the charitable sector. This is partly due to weak-
nesses in state regulation of the charitable sector and the lack of private
monitoring mechanisms comparable to those available for public
companies.368
In 1960, Professor Karst proposed that each state create an indepen-
dent state board to regulate charitable organizations in the state's juris-
diction.369 The proposed board would:
(1) replace the attorney general in his supervisory capac-
ity, by (a) maintaining a registry of all charities operat-
ing in the state, (b) collecting and evaluating periodic
reports to be required of all charities required to register,
perhaps with some exceptions, (c) investigating possible
breaches of fiduciary duty, and (d) calling abuses of fi-
duciary responsibility requiring remedial action directly
to the attention of the proper court; (2) advise and con-
sult with charity managers in (a) planning for future pro-
grams for operation and selection of projects, and (b)
organizing the management and investment of funds; (3)
365 See Fishman, Wrong Way Corrigan, supra note 6, at 578.
366 For example, Professor Fishman argues that regulation of fiduciary behavior of charity
managers should be conducted primarily at the state level and opposes the "migration of fidu-
ciary oversight to federal level." Id. at 594.
Historically, fiduciary norms have been matters of state law. Moreover, at the state
or local level, regulation will be carried out at a more meaningful scale if members
of the charity's community can monitor, educate, and where necessary, put into
place the larger mechanisms that institute accountability .... Local efforts are more
responsive to our constitutional structure of federalism, which increasing federal reg-
ulation of state responsibilities undermines.
Id. This view, however, fails to take into account charities with national concerns and con-
cerns about public parochialism and paternalism. See Brody, Parochialism, supra note 25,
968-84.
367 Aprill, supra note 21, at 780.
368 See id. at 780-91.
369 See Karst, supra note 82, at 433.
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take responsibility for effectuating new schemes of the
operation of obsolete charities and the consolidation of
charities of uneconomic size; (4) administer a statewide
system of control over the solicitation of funds, which
would either coordinate or supersede municipal control;
(5) cooperate with tax officials, both state and federal, by
reporting to them abuses which appear to call for with-
drawal of tax exemption. 370
Since Professor Karst's proposal, regulation of the charitable sector
has increasingly become incumbent upon the IRS. 371 Expanding state
regulation would be counterproductive because many states lack the re-
sources necessary to adopt such proposals. 372 Furthermore, the lack of
uniformity in state regulation of the charitable sector makes state regula-
tion an ineffective way to police an increasingly multi-jurisdictional
charitable sector. While it is true that a large majority of charitable orga-
nizations are organized and operate in states that actively regulate the
charitable sector, "the disparity between states with active programs and
those without fosters forum-shopping and creates inconsistencies that
make regulation exceedingly difficult. ' '373 Accordingly, continued reli-
ance on state regulation of the charitable sector would prove ineffective
in promoting public confidence in the sector. 374 Professor Fremont-
Smith sums up this concept as follows:
Although one might have considered delegating regula-
tion to the states at some time during the 1950s, the
growth of the nonprofit sector and its complexity since
that time and the concomitant overriding federal interest
in its operations, combined with the failure of the states
370 Id. at 449.
371 See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 377
("[S]ince the 1950s, the regulatory authority of the federal government has been expanded so
that it is effectively the primary source of regulation, extending to matters that had previously
been in the exclusive province of the states, and in many instances, preempting state regulation
by conditioning tax exemption upon compliance with federal standards of behavior.").
372 See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
373 FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 444.
374 See Karst, supra note 82, at 481 (observing that an advantage of federal regulation of
the charitable sector is that only one agency would need to be created, as opposed to state
regulation, where regulatory reform would require independent determinations made by 51
jurisdictions). But see Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Philanthropy
in the 21st Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REv. (forthcoming
Mar. 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1481287 (evaluating proposals to reform en-
forcement of the charitable sector using an institutional choice framework and concluding that
"the strongest candidate for more effective regulation of charity governance is a state-level
entity that is connected to but maintains a degree of independence from the attorney general's
office in each state").
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to provide effective enforcement, have rendered this
question moot.375
To improve oversight of the charitable sector, the focus must turn to
improving the regulation of federal tax laws. Thus, Professor Fishman
observes: "The charitable sector's exemption from taxation is an expense
borne by all taxpayers. Nonprofits may be exempt from taxation, but
they should not be exempt from responsibilities that go along with such
benefits. ' 376 While some may question the wisdom and effectiveness of
particular provisions of the Internal Revenue Code applicable to charita-
ble organizations, there are four fundamental reasons for using the ex-
isting federal tax law as the starting point for improved oversight.
First, federal tax laws are uniformly applicable to all charitable or-
ganizations, while state laws applicable to charitable organizations vary
depending on the law of the state in which the charity is organized and
the law of the state in which the charity operates, if different.377 For
example, Professor Fremont-Smith has noted that the federal tax laws
applicable to charities "comprise the federal tax counterpart of the state
law duties of loyalty and care. They are by default the only restrictions
on fiduciary behavior actively enforced. Equally important, they apply
uniformly in all jurisdictions, thereby setting a nationwide minimum
standard of behavior. '378 Accordingly, a benefit of federal regulation of
the charitable sector is evaluation of charitable behavior on uniform
guidelines rather than on subjective and variable facts such as local attor-
ney general availability and the private standing doctrine. 379
Second, the federal tax laws contain provisions that prohibit many
of the reported abuses in the charitable sector, such as breaches of the
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.380 For example, the federal tax law
prohibits tax-exempt organizations from engaging in excess benefit
375 FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 461.
376 Fishman, Agenda for Reform, supra note 327, at 678.
377 See Brody, Limits, supra note 29, at 1435. Professor Brody notes that the federal tax
laws restricting the activities of charitable organizations have "profoundly influenced the oper-
ations of the charitable sector." Id. at 1438.
378 FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 241.
379 See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 83.
380 Admittedly, the overlap of the breach of fiduciary duty under state law and the penal-
ties addressing breach of fiduciary duty under federal tax law is not a perfect fit and in some
cases would be over-inclusive and in others under-inclusive. See Bishop, supra note 305, at
764-75; accord Brody, Bishop Estate, supra note 107, at 545 (noting that the excess benefit
transaction regime does not apply to charity managers who breach the duty of care; thus, the
only remedy at IRS disposal for misconduct such as spending funds on noncharitable purposes,
accumulating excess income, and imprudent investment of charitable assets, is revocation (or
threat of revocation) of tax-exempt status). However, the standard of fiduciary duty embodied
in the federal tax laws, even with all its flaws, serves as a uniform standard for all charitable
organizations, and thus is an important starting point for comprehensive oversight of the chari-
table sector.
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transactions, 381 which are transactions between the organization and an
insider that results in the insider receiving more than fair and adequate
consideration for the transaction. 382  Similarly, private foundations are
generally prohibited from engaging in self-dealing transactions with in-
siders of the foundation. 383 These provisions reflect federal standards of
behavior pertaining to the duty of loyalty. In addition, the definition of
"charitable organization" under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code requires "exclusive" application of the organization's resources
to charitable purposes and limits incidental private benefits to individu-
als. 384 This provision embodies some aspects of the duties of care and
obedience. 385 Finally, the Internal Revenue Code prohibits private foun-
dations from engaging in "jeopardizing investments," 386 thus embodying
a federal standard of care with respect to the investment of private foun-
dation assets.
Third, vigorous oversight of tax-exempt status under federal law can
strengthen state regulation of the charitable sector. Under federal tax
law, egregious abuses ultimately result in the loss of the charitable organ-
ization's tax-exempt status. Without this status, the organization cannot
engage in charitable solicitation or charitable gaming activities, which
can be abused by charitable organizations and are exclusively regulated
by state law. 387 Furthermore, the IRS, unlike the state attorney general,
cannot compel a charitable organization to correct governance
breaches;388 but the IRS's threat to revoke the tax-exempt status of chari-
381 See I.R.C. § 4958 (West Supp. 2009).
382 See id.; Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4 (2002).
383 See I.R.C. § 4941 (2006).
384 See id. § 501(c)(3).
385 See Fishman, Charitable Accountability, supra note 81, at 238-39.
386 See I.R.C. § 4945 (2006).
387 See FREMoNT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 55,
370-74 (state regulation of charitable solicitations); Glenn Cunningham & Amy Henchey,
Update on Gaming Activities, 1996 EO CPE Text, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/eotopicd96.pdf (regulation of charitable gaming activities); see also I.R.S., Update on
Fundraising, 1986 EO CPE Text, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicg86.pdf,
which explains:
The conduct of bingo games can be a lucrative enterprise. With a relatively low
overhead, a prize distribution subject to the organization's control, and a potentially
high profit margin, bingo may attract entrepreneurs of all varieties, some of whom
may wish to mask themselves as charities to satisfy state and local gambling laws.
Needless to say, the potential for abuse exists, and each case should be examined for
evidence of a substantial private purpose or of inurement even if the commensurate
test for distributions to charity is otherwise met.
d. at 8.
388 In 1977, the Treasury Department advocated investing the United States District Court
with broad equity powers to redress fiduciary misconduct by charity managers. Brody, Bishop
Estate, supra note 107, at 568. This idea was revisited in 2004 when the discussion draft
prepared by the staff of the Senate Finance Committee again advocated for broad equity pow-
ers in federal courts to strengthen IRS regulation of the charitable sector. See Staff of the
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ties under IRS investigation may influence those charities to make IRS-
mandated governance changes. 389 Additionally, federal law has recently
been revised by the Pension Protection Act to increase information shar-
ing between federal and state officials with respect to the regulation of
the charitable sector.390 In particular, the IRS is now authorized to re-
lease information to state charity officials regarding final determination
on exempt status, proposed refusals to recognize exempt status, proposed
revocation of exempt status, notice of deficiencies regarding the transfer
of charitable assets upon the termination of a private foundation, the ex-
cise taxes applicable to private foundations, and the excise tax on excess
benefit transactions applicable to public charities. 391 Accordingly,
strengthened regulation of the federal tax laws can serve as a channeling
function for resource-strapped state attorneys general of cases worthy of
investigation at the state level. Moreover, state attorneys general now
rely much more on the IRS to regulate the charitable sector. 392
Finally, the granting of tax exemption to a charitable organization is
a "stamp of approval" that signals to the general public that the organiza-
tion is trustworthy. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit noted that "when the IRS revokes the tax exempt status of organi-
zations which do not meet 501(c)(3) requirements, it serves as a public
trust function in assuring the public that 501(c)(3) tax exempt status is
conferred and retained only by organizations engaged in appropriately
charitable activities. ' 393 Maintaining public confidence in the charitable
sector is thus directly linked to strong enforcement of the federal tax laws
applicable to charitable organizations.
A. Alternative Quasi-Public Regulatory Models
To determine the best structure for a new enforcement agency to
regulate the charitable sector, this Article first considers three alternate
regulatory models: the advisory model, the accreditation model, and the
enforcement model. Each of these models has been explored in practice
or in scholarship for the regulation of the charitable sector. This part
Senate Finance Committee, supra note 16. Neither proposal was reflected in any bill consid-
ered by Congress.
389 See Silber, supra note 108, at 627 ("Notwithstanding the absence of federal power to
obtain equitable decrees, the [IRS] has excise tax power and the power to revoke exemptions
in order to conform subpar behavior to IRS standards."); Brody, Bishop Estate, supra note
107, at 543 (noting that such governance changes have included the adoption of compensation
committees, conflicts of interest policies, and other governance policies, as well as resignation
and replacement of the charitable managers alleged to have committed the wrongdoing).
390 See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.).
391 See I.R.C. § 6104(c) (2006).
392 Brody, Limits, supra note 29, at 1439.
393 Universal Life Church v. United States, 128 F.3d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir. 1997).
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discusses each of the three models and evaluates their effectiveness in
providing comprehensive and effective oversight of the charitable sector.
1. Advisory Model
An advisory model of regulation supplements regulation by a gov-
ernment agency by providing additional resources to discover and inves-
tigate alleged violations by the constituents the agency is charged with
overseeing. Importantly, the ability of the advisory panel to sanction vi-
olations it discovers is limited; prosecution of the violation in a court of
equity and the ability to sanction fines generally remains with the gov-
ernment regulator.
For example, Professor James Fishman recommended establishing
state advisory commissions to expand state regulation of the charitable
sector.394 Each state advisory commission would be composed of fifteen
unpaid citizens; eight citizens would be appointed by the governor and
seven would be appointed by the state attorney general for three-year
terms.395 The state advisory commission would serve under the guidance
and control of the state's attorney general.396 It would have the power to
receive and investigate complaints, hold hearings, request documents,
and subpoena witnesses.397 In addition, the commission would have the
power to publicly exonerate a charity, to agree to a private settlement, or
to recommend that the attorney general prosecute. 398 The commission's
hearings and settlement would be kept confidential to protect the reputa-
tion of the charities involved.399
At one time, two states-South Carolina and West Virginia-had
created "Commissions on Charitable Organizations" to enhance regula-
tion of their charitable sectors. The South Carolina commission included
the Secretary of State and six representatives of the public, including
donors, charity recipients, and a representative of a charitable organiza-
tion.400 The West Virginia commission was comprised of the Secretary
of State, the Attorney General, and other state officials and appointees. 40 1
In both states, the commission's role was largely advisory. The commis-
sions had the power to conduct investigations, hold hearings, and make
394 See Fishman, Wrong Way Corrigan, supra note 6, at 594-96; Fishman, Charitable
Accountability, supra note 81, at 272-75. Professor Fishman models his proposed state advi-
sory commissions after the old English Charity Commission of the early 19th century. See
Fishman, Charitable Accountability, supra note 81, at 275-79. For a description of the old
English Charity Commission, see infra note 430.
395 Fishman, Wrong Way Corrigan, supra note 6, at 595.
396 See id. at 594.
397 See id. at 594-95.
398 See id. at 595-96.
399 See id. at 595.
400 See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 50-51.
401 See id_
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policy recommendations for improved regulation of the charitable sec-
tor.40 2 The commissions were not authorized to bring suit to correct
wrongdoings uncovered in the course of their investigations, however,
and so had to turn the cases over to the state attorney general to proceed
with any enforcement action. A 1995 report on the effectiveness of the
West Virginia commission concluded that the commission's limited abil-
ity to effectively assist in the regulation of the charitable sector called for
the termination of the commission. 40 3 Similarly, the South Carolina
commission now appears to be defunct.
The use of state advisory commissions, if widely adopted, would
only exacerbate the lack of uniformity among the states in the oversight
of the charitable sector.40 4 In addition, it is doubtful that the state com-
missions can be operated at minimal costs, as Professor Fishman sug-
gests, and this would consequently aggravate the problem of devoting
inadequate financial resources to charitable sector oversight.40 5 Further-
more, the appointment of commissioners by the governor or state attor-
ney general, both elected officials, would further politicize the process by
which charities are regulated in the states.40 6 Finally, relying on the at-
torney general to prosecute wrongdoings found by the commission in-
vokes all of the previously discussed financial, institutional, political, and
agency constraints. In effect, the state advisory commission is a "super-
relator" that, without the authority to control the disposition of the inves-
tigation, lacks the teeth necessary to compel settlement of cases that in-
volve significant wrongdoing. At best, the commission would correct
abuses only at the margins.
2. Accreditation Model
An accreditation model of regulation establishes "minimum stan-
dard" policies and procedures that must be followed for accreditation,
and conducts periodic review of compliance with accreditation stan-
dards. 407 Typically the accreditation agency has no enforcement power
in terms of authority to sanction fines or bring suit in a court of equity.
But the accreditation agency may nonetheless compel compliance be-
402 See id.
403 See Office of the Legislative Auditor of West Virginia, Preliminary Review of the
Commission on Charitable Organizations: Court Decision and Infrequency of Meetings Ren-
ders Commission Ineffective (Jan. 6, 1995), available at http://www.legis.state.wv.us/Joint/
PERD/perdrep/PE94_l 3.13.pdf.
404 See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 464.
405 See id. at 334.
406 See id.
407 See, e.g., George B. Sheperd & William G. Sheperd, Scholarly Restraints? ABA Ac-
creditation and Legal Education, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2091, 2128-53 (1998), (describing the
ABA accreditation process).
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cause the organization's retention of certain benefits may be contingent
on the organization maintaining accreditation. 408
For example, law schools in the United States seek accreditation by
the American Bar Association Council of the Section of Legal Education
(ABA). In order to receive and maintain accreditation, a law school must
comply with numerous objective standards, established by the ABA, re-
lating to the operations of the law school.40 9 The law school must also
submit to periodic site visits by ABA inspection teams designed to moni-
tor continuing compliance with the ABA's standards.410 While the valid-
ity of some of these standards has been questioned, 411 virtually all U.S.
law schools still seek ABA accreditation. ABA accreditation is desirable
because it affords substantial benefits to law schools. In particular, in
order for its law students to receive Federal student aid, the law school
must be ABA-accredited. 412 Furthermore, in the vast majority of states,
only individuals that graduate from an ABA-accredited law school may
sit for the state bar exam.413
Currently, there is no shortage of accreditation and "watchdog"
groups in the charitable sector. Charity "watchdog" groups are external
review organizations, such as the BBB Wise Giving Alliance, 414 and
408 See Peter Swords, Nonprofit Accountability: The Sector's Response to Government
Regulation, Conference Notes, Norman A. Sugarman Memorial Lecture, Mandel Center for
Nonprofit Organizations Case Western Reserve University (Mar 16. 1999), available at http://
www.qual990.org/npaccount.html.
409 See generally ABA STANDARDS AND APPROVED PROCEDURES FOR APPROVED LAW
SCHOOLS (2009-2010 ed.); Sheperd & Sheperd, supra note 407, at 2128-53 (describing at
length the ABA accreditation process).
410 See ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, The Law School
Accreditation Process, at 8-11, available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/resources/13665
ABA-accredweb 150.pdf.
411 See Brody, Agents Without Principals, supra note 14, at 525 (criticizing that not all of
the ABA standards bear on the quality of legal education); Sheperd & Sheperd, supra note
407, at 2097 ("The [ABA] accreditation system has imposed harms at all levels of legal
education ... ").
412 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001-99 (2006) (requiring institutions of higher education to be
accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency in order to participate in Federal
student assistance programs, such as the Federal Stafford loan program); ABA Section of
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, supra note 410, at 3. The ABA Council of the
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar is recognized by the Department of
Education as the accrediting agency for juris doctorate programs.
413 See Brody, Agents Without Principals, supra note 14, at 525; Shepard & Shepard,
supra note 407, at 2129.
414 The BBB Wise Giving Alliance (Alliance) monitors certain national charitable organi-
zations that solicit contributions from the public, compiles in-depth evaluative reports on these
charities based on the Alliance's comprehensive Standards for Charity Accountability, and
publishes a quarterly magazine, the Wise Giving Guide. Better Business Bureau, About BBB
Wise Giving Alliance, http://www.bbb.org/us/Wise-Giving/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2009). Chari-
ties that meet the Alliance's standards can apply to participate in the Alliance's National Char-
ity Seal program. Id.
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Charity Navigator,4 15 which monitor and disseminate information about
charities that solicit funds from the general public.416 Various special-
ized accreditation groups also exist and the accreditation criteria vary
widely across these groups. 4 17 Specialized accreditation bodies are pre-
dominant in the fields of education and healthcare.41 8
Current accreditation and watchdog groups focus on rating the
"worthiness" of a charitable organization for the benefit of potential do-
nors with the thought that the ratings will give donors information about
which charities deserve their contributions. 419 Contrary to common per-
ception, the charitable sector is not primarily supported by donations
from private donors. Rather, charitable organizations receive a substan-
tial majority of their receipts from service fees, 420 dues, and sales of
products. 421 Private donations make up less than one-fifth of total chari-
table receipts. 422 Thus, many charitable organizations rely very little on
private donations to operate their programs. For these charities, accredi-
tation or watchdog group rating of the charity's worthiness, good or bad,
would have little impact.
If the focus of accreditation is to regulate through donor choice,
accreditation is not likely to have a significant impact on the behavior of
charity managers. One may argue that the existence or lack of accredita-
tion will enhance enforcement because donors will speak with their dol-
415 Charity Navigator evaluates and rates, on a scale from zero to four stars, the financial
health of approximately 5,000 charities based on criteria developed by Charity Navigator.
Charity Navigator, Overview, http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&
cpid=628# (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
416 See Carl Bialik, Charity Rankings Giveth Less Than Meets the Eye, WALL ST. J., Dec.
19, 2008, at A13; Megan Greenwell, New Way to Rate Charities Sought, THE WASH. POST,
Nov. 24, 2001, at BI.
417 See FREMoNT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at
466-70.
418 Atkinson, supra note 29, at 694. For example, the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations serves as the largest hospital accreditation body. See Brody,
Agents Without Principals, supra note 14, at 525.
419 See Bialik, supra note 416.
420 Service fees include revenues such as admission fees charged to patrons of museums,
health service fees charged to patients of hospitals and residents of skilled nursing facilities,
and tuition charged to students of educational organizations. See Blackwood et al., supra note
77, at 3.
421 See Arnsberger et al., supra note 4, at 110 (noting that program service revenues made
up 70% of total revenues earned by charities in 2004); Blackwood et al., supra note 77, at 3
fig.4 (showing that approximately 70% of public charity revenues came from fees for services
and goods in 2005).
422 For example, of the approximately $1.5 trillion in total revenues reported on Forms
990 by charitable organizations in 2004, approximately $250 billion (or 17%) was in the form
of charitable contributions and grants. See Amsberger et al., supra note 4, at 127; see also
Blackwood et al., supra note 77, at 3 fig.4 (reflecting that, in 2005, approximately 12.3% of
public charity revenues came from private donations and another 9% came from government
grants).
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lars and give only to those charitable organizations that maintain
accreditation. Yet studies of donor choice conducted thus far do not sup-
port this view.423 Charitable organizations that have the resources and
that want to demonstrate their integrity will voluntarily seek accredita-
tion.424 Charitable organizations that do not rely heavily on private dona-
tions for their operations can justify not seeking accreditation on the
grounds that the cost of maintaining accreditation outweighs the benefits.
Smaller charities similarly may conclude that the cost of accreditation is
simply too high. 425 In addition, charitable organizations whose managers
want to use the organization for private gain will not seek accredita-
tion,426 but will instead adopt the argument of the service-provider and
smaller charities that the costs outweigh the benefits. Thus, lack of ac-
creditation provides no real information about the integrity of a charity's
managers; the reason behind a charity's lack of accreditation may be that
the charity's managers decided that pursuing accreditation would not be
cost-effective or it may be that managers do not want third parties moni-
toring their actions.
Reliance on accreditation groups to regulate fiduciary behavior of
charity managers is misguided. These accreditation bodies may be con-
cerned about issues other than how government agencies monitor chari-
table funds for the public benefit. Furthermore, accreditation agencies
often adopt unhelpful standards that must be maintained for the charity to
be accredited. 427 The diverse nature of the charitable sector compounds
the problem; it would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish mean-
ingful across-the-board accreditation standards for the charitable sector
as a whole. 428 Finally, participation in accreditation groups by charitable
organizations is typically voluntary, 429 and compliance with accredita-
423 See Reiser, supra note 24, at 603. Most donors do not investigate performance mea-
sures for the financial or governance practices of a charity before making their donations. Id.
at 603, n.176.
424 See Fishman, Wrong Way Corrigan, supra note 6, at 593.
425 See id.
426 See Peter Swords, Nonprofit Accountability: The Sector's Response to Government
Regulation, Conference Notes, Norman A. Sugarman Memorial Lecture, Mandel Center for
Nonprofit Organizations Case Western Reserve University (Mar 16. 1999), available at http://
www.qual990.org/np-account.html. (contending that voluntary accreditation is unlikely to
reach the rogues: "For those individuals, what is needed is the threat of force and coercion...
and these deterrents can only be legitimately provided by the government.").
427 See Brody, Agents Without Principals, supra note 14, at 525 (noting that "[a]n organi-
zation seeking accreditation might make major structural sacrifices, perhaps reflecting a power
struggle over the accreditation body itself').
428 Cf. Fishman, Charitable Accountability, supra note 81, at 269 ("[The] breadth of the
nonprofit sector and its depth, that is, the number of organizations within each subset, are so
vast that private groups cannot produce sector-wide normative change on their own.").
429 See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at
467-68
2009]
64 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
tion standards can be costly; thus, universal participation in private ac-
creditation groups is unlikely.
3. Enforcement Model
In the enforcement model of regulation, the regulatory body has au-
thority to promulgate rules, investigate breaches of these rules, and bring
enforcement actions for wrongdoings. Additionally, the regulatory
body's enforcement powers are mandatory and extend to all members of
the sector that are regulated by the body. Two examples of the enforce-
ment model of regulation-the Charity Commission for England and
Wales and U.S. self-regulatory organizations-provide illuminating in-
sight into possible alternative enforcement models of regulation for the
charitable sector in the United States.
a. The Charity Commission for England and Wales
Established by law as the independent regulator and registrar of
charities in England and Wales, 4 30 the Charity Commission for England
and Wales (English Charity Commission) has broad regulatory power in
addition to quasi-judicial powers over charitable fiduciaries. 431 The
seven principles governing the English Charity Commission's work are:
accountability; independence; proportionality; fairness; consistency; di-
versity; equality; and transparency. 432 The English Charity Commission
has three main goals: "(1) to ensure that charities can operate for their
exempt purposes within an effective legal, accounting and governance
framework; (2) to improve charities' governance, accountability, effi-
430 A predecessor to the English Charity Commission was created in 1812. Id. at 32. Its
initial purpose was to investigate and record all charitable trusts in England and Wales, and
was created in response to misuse and abuse of charitable trusts, which, prior to the creation of
the Commission, were regulated solely by the attorney general. Id. The Commission would
give evidence of its investigations to the attorney general, who in turn would commence pro-
ceedings to correct the alleged abuse. Id. Even though the early Commission met some resis-
tance in Parliament, the implementation of the Commission resulted in improved
administration of charitable trusts and revealed the need for regular supervision of the charita-
ble sector. Id. at 33. The English Charity Commission was formally established by The Char-
itable Trusts Act of 1853. Id. For about a century, the English Charity Commission
functioned primarily to receive complaints on abuses, correcting some of them under their
powers, and referring others to the attorney general for adjudication. Id. at 34. In 1960, the
English Charity Commission was overhauled and the supervisory powers of the English Char-
ity Commission were substantially enlarged, and a new relationship between the English Char-
ity Commission and Parliament was created to facilitate the introduction of new legislation to
improve regulation of the sector. Id. at 35. Currently, the Charity Commission for England
and Wales obtains its authority to regulate misconduct and mismanagement in the charitable
sector from the Charities Act of 1993. See id. at 35.
431 Concededly, the scale of the English Charity Commission's regulatory efforts is much
smaller than that of the IRS. See id. at 465.
432 Id. at 43.
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ciency, and effectiveness; and (3) to identify and address abuses and poor
practices.14
33
The English Charity Commission is independent of other govern-
ment departments in England, including HMRC (Her Majesty's Revenue
and Customs, formerly Inland Revenue), which is equivalent to the U.S.
Internal Revenue Service.434 The governing body of the English Charity
Commission includes representatives from the charitable sector, who are
appointed by the Home Secretary. 435 The English Charity Commission
determines charitable status, maintains a registration of charities,
monitors the charitable sector to ensure compliance, investigates alleged
wrongdoings, publishes outcomes of formal inquiries, and provides a list,
for the general public, of charities that are in default.436 In addition, the
commission educates the charitable sector on proper compliance with
charitable laws and provides guidance on "best practices. 4 37
The English Charity Commission has been the primary regulator of
the charitable sector in England and Wales for over a century. 4 38 During
this period, two thorough reviews of its effectiveness in regulating the
charitable sector have been conducted. These reviews resulted in reform
of the commission's regulatory power and increase in the scope of its
regulatory authority. 439 Importantly, after each study was conducted, the
English Charity Commission was granted additional authority, thus con-
firming the wisdom of vesting regulation of the charitable sector in an
independent regulatory body.44° Moreover, several other countries, in-
cluding Scotland, have used the English Charity Commission as a model
for the oversight of their charitable sector.44 1
433 Crimm, supra note 123, at 1193.
434 See PETER LUXTON, THE LAW OF CHARITIES 422 (Judith Hill ed. 2001).
435 See Crimm, supra note 123, at 1193.
436 See LUXTON, supra note 434, at 431-80 (describing in detail the authority and respon-
sibilities of the English Charity Commision); Crimm, supra note 123, at 1193.
437 See LUXTON, supra note 434, at 464; Crimm, supra note 123, at 1193.
438 See supra note 430. See generally Fishman, Charitable Accountability, supra note 81,
at 731-36 (describing the predecessor to the English Charity Commission formed in the early
nineteenth century).
439 See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 35-36
(describing the Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice Relating to Charitable Trusts
(London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1952), commonly referred to as the "Nathan Re-
port," and the Strategy Unit Report, Cabinet Office, Private Action, Public Benefit: A Review
of Charities and the Wider Not-for-Profit Sector (September 2002), available at www.strat-
egy-unit.gov.uk).
440 Cf Debra Morris, New Charity Regulation Proposals for England and Wales: Over-
due or Overdone?, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 779 (2005) (noting some of the difficulties encoun-
tered by the English Charity Commission in conducting its duties).
441 Established in 2005, the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator is modeled after the
English Charity Commission and has similar goals, powers, and responsibilities. See Office of
the Scottish Charity Regulator, Vision and Objectives, http://www.oscr.org.uk/Vision%20and
%20objectives.stm (last visited Nov. 2, 2009). Likewise, Northern Ireland is in the process of
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b. Self-Regulatory Organizations
Another analogous example of the enforcement model is the net-
work of self-regulatory organizations (SROs) that complement the over-
sight of the public securities market by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Responsibility for oversight of the securities market
falls principally on the SEC.442 The SEC, however, is assisted in its
responsibilities by a series of related private-sector organizations that ex-
ercise regulatory responsibilities, which include establishing and enforc-
ing requirements for the conduct of the activities in question. 4 3 These
SROs include the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB), 4 the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),445
and Municipal Securities Regulatory Board (MSRB). 4 4 6
The PCAOB was established under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002447 to regulate the independent auditors of publicly-traded compa-
nies under the general supervision of the SEC.448 Accounting firms that
conduct audits for public company clients are required to register with
the PCAOB. 449 The PCAOB's purpose is to protect investors by over-
seeing the auditors of public companies that are subject to securities reg-
ulation.450 Thus, the PCAOB monitors the relationship between the
independent auditor and the public company, 45' and oversees auditors to
ensure that the audit is conducted with rigor. The PCAOB is funded by
annual registration fees from the auditing firms it regulates, and by annu-
ally allocated "accounting support fees" from public companies.452 The
PCAOB is authorized to establish accounting standards, inspect audit
firms for compliance, conduct independent investigations of violations of
the public accounting standards by independent auditors, and institute
establishing its Charity Commission for Northern Ireland, which is modeled after the English
Charity Commission. See Charity Commission for Northern Ireland, Charities Commission,
http://www.dsdni.gov.uk/charitiescommission.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
442 See Owens, supra note 130, at 10.
443 See id.
444 See 15 U.S.C. § 7201-64 (2006).
445 See id. § 78o-3. FINRA was created in 2007 by the merger of the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange's regulatory commis-
sion. See FINRA, About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, http://www.finra.org/
AboutFINRA/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
446 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b).
447 Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-
Oxley Act), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28, and 29 U.S.C.).
448 Id. §§ 101-09, (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211-19) (establishing the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board and defining its duties). The PCAOB is organized as a nongov-
ernmental, nonprofit entity subject to SEC oversight. 15 U.S.C. § 721 l(a)-(b).
449 15 U.S.C. § 7212.
450 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2006).
451 See id. § 7211.
452 See id. §§ 7212, 7219.
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disciplinary proceedings for such violations. 453 The PCAOB has the
power to impose a wide range of sanctions, including suspension or revo-
cation of SEC registration for public companies in violation of the rules,
and the imposition of civil fines ranging from $100,000 to $15
million.454
FINRA regulates brokers and brokerage firms who are required to
be members of FINRA.455 The majority of FINRA's governing body is
drawn from outside the securities industry, which ensures public involve-
ment and transparency in its operations. 456 FINRA derives its enforce-
ment powers from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
which authorizes the SEC to approve FINRA-promulgated standards and
rules.457 Although FNIRA is not structurally part of the federal govern-
ment, it exercises substantial oversight authority. For example, by virtue
of its relationship with the SEC, FINRA has the power to sanction those
who transgress its rules and levy fines.458 Enforcement actions taken by
FINRA may be appealed first to the SEC and then to a federal courts. 459
To maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of regulation of the
charitable sector, the enforcement model of regulation is preferable to the
advisory or accreditation models. The enforcement model vests author-
ity to promulgate rules and to bring enforcement actions for wrongdoings
in the agency that has developed specialized expertise. Consolidation of
rule-making authority and authority to sanction transgressions in one
agency provides efficiencies in the administration of those rules; a sec-
ond agency does not have to interpret the rules of another agency to
enforce the law, as would be the case with the advisory model. An
agency with specialized expertise in the charitable sector could better
tailor enforcement rules to suit the unique aspects of the charitable sec-
tor-in particular, the lack of private interests with standing to enforce
breaches of fiduciary duties. Finally, under the enforcement model of
regulation, the rules promulgated by the enforcement agency apply uni-
versally to all organizations within the charitable sector. This in turn
assures comprehensive oversight of the charitable sector. Accordingly,
the new agency this Article proposes would follow the enforcement
model of regulation.
453 Id. § 7211(c).
454 See id. § 7215.
455 See id. § 78o-3(b)(8).
456 See FINRA, FINRA Board of Governors, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/Leader
ship/PO09756 (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
457 See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2006).
458 See id. § 78o-3.
459 See id. §§ 78s(d), 78y.
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B. Creation of a New Federal Charity Oversight Board to Regulate
Charitable Organizations
Over the past 50 years, there has been consideration of moving reg-
ulation of the charitable sector from the purview of the IRS. The Filer
Commission, in 1975, strongly endorsed retaining the IRS as the princi-
pal regulator of charitable organizations. 460 But the commission also
recommended the creation of an independent quasi-public agency, with
no regulatory powers, that would monitor and support the charitable sec-
tor and serve as its advocate before Congress.461 Ultimately, a wholly
voluntary organization, the Independent Sector, was formed in 1980 to
serve as the sector's advocate rather than the quasi-public agency envi-
sioned by the Filer Commission.462
In 1999, Professor Joel Fleishman proposed three alternative en-
forcement improvements for the charitable sector. His third and "last
resort" proposal was the establishment of an independent government
agency similar to the SEC or Federal Trade Commission.463 The new
"U.S. Charities Regulatory Commission" would be charged with all as-
pects of regulation of nonprofit organizations except the determinations
of tax exemption, deductibility of charitable contributions, and enforce-
ment of the unrelated business income tax because, as Fleishman as-
serted, these functions are inextricably a part of the tax collection
process. 464 Specifically, the proposed federal agency would
keep tabs on the procedural-not substantive-function-
ing of not-for-profit organizations so as to assure the
public that tax exemption is not used as a shield for
fraudulent or illegal purposes. It would be empowered
to investigate instances of alleged wrongdoing, it would
have the power to subpoena, and it could institute civil
or criminal proceedings as appropriate on its own mo-
460 FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 461.
461 See id. at 81-82, 461-62. Four years earlier, the Pearson Commission recommended
the establishment of a national Advisory Board on Philanthropy, which would evaluate the
performance of charities and the effectiveness of government regulation and propose improve-
ments for the sector. This proposal was not adopted. See id. at 80-81.
462 See id. at 462.
463 See Fleishman, Public Trust, supra note 205, at 172. Professor Nina Crimm also
advocates this approach. See Crimm, supra note 123, at 1192-94 (suggesting the creation of a
"new, independent, unbiased, and strong oversight agency, not beholden to politicians and
powerful citizens" to monitor charitable organizations and their managers. This new agency
would be independent of the IRS, thus allowing the IRS to be "free to return to its primary
duties as a collector of revenues.").
464 See Fleishman, Public Trust, supra note 205, at 189. Professor Fleishman notes that,
ideally, determination of exempt status would be made by the new U.S. Charity Commission,
but was concerned with the loss of 90 years of IRS institutional experience in exempt organi-
zation tax matters. See id.
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tion. It would be charged with supervising interstate
charitable solicitation, and creating the guidelines and
disclosure requirements necessary to ensure that charita-
ble solicitation is not used for fraudulent purposes. It
would be responsible for monitoring the function of the
[not-for-profit] sector as a whole, gathering data and cre-
ating databases about the sector, commissioning studies
on various aspects of the sector, reporting periodically to
Congress on the operation of the sector, issuing regula-
tions to guide the sector in conforming with applicable
laws, and making recommendations for legislative
changes that may be thought desirable. 465
Under Fleishman's proposal, charitable organizations would still be
required to apply to the IRS for tax exemption and file their annual infor-
mation returns with the IRS .466
Recently, Professor Fleishman has changed his view,4 6 7 and now
advocates a proposal by Marcus Owens, a former director of the exempt
organizations division of the IRS, to establish a self-regulatory organiza-
tion under the supervision of the IRS that would function much like the
NASD (predecessor to FINRA).468 Under Owens' proposal, the new
self-regulatory organization would have the authority to promulgate rules
applicable to charitable organizations and advisors to charitable organi-
zations, process applications for exemptions, and conduct oversight of
the charitable sector through examinations. 469 Charitable organizations
465 Id.
466 Id.
467 See JOEL L. FLEISHMAN, THE FOUNDATION: A GREAT AMERICAN SECRET: How PRi-
VATE WEALTH IS CHANGING THE WORLD 256-59 (2007).
468 See Owens, supra note 130, at 11-15; see also Crimm, supra note 123, at 1192-94
(calling for a new federal government agency to monitor the charitable sector with an advisory
board made up of representatives of the charitable sector). Some doubt that creation of a new
agency, whether governmental or self-regulatory, at the federal level to oversee the charitable
sector will ever come to pass. Professor Fremont-Smith states:
Although a similar system [to the English Charity Commission] may have great
merit in the United States, it is naive to think that Congress would remove regulation
of charities and other exempt entities from the Service. The integrity of the tax
system rests in large part on assuring that it cannot be undermined through the use of
exempt entities. In addition, as concluded by critics of the Service, tax exemption
for charities is inextricably intertwined with administration of the tax on unrelated
business income as well as with the deductibility of contributions for purposes of the
income, estate, and gift taxes. Bifurcating regulation at the federal level would add a
third regime of regulation that would add immeasurably to complexity and delay.
FREMoNT-SMrrIH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 465.
469 See Owens, supra note 130, at 13. Professor Fishman notes: "Fleishman would have
this agency enforce laws and regulations specifically targeting nonprofit fidelity to conflict-of-
interest, insider self dealing, transparency and comparable procedural standards enforced by
law." Fishman, Wrong Way Corrigan, supra note 6, at 591.
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could appeal adverse findings by the oversight organization to the IRS or
the courts. 470 The new oversight organization would be congressionally
chartered with a majority of its governing body appointed by the Com-
missioner of the IRS or the National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral. 471 Funding for the new oversight organization would be provided
in the form of a credit against the net investment income excise tax as-
sessed to private foundations. 472 Public disclosure of the oversight or-
ganization's operations and financial records along with regular audits by
the General Accounting Office or the Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration would be required to provide transparency in the over-
sight organization's actions. 4 73
Like Owens and Fleishman, this Article advocates the creation of a
self-regulatory organization that would serve as the principal regulator of
the charitable sector, with the authority to enforce the federal tax laws
applicable to charitable organizations. As further explained below, the
structure and authority of the agency proposed herein would differ in
significant respects from the agencies proposed by Owens and Fleish-
man. In particular, the new agency would be a self-funded, independent,
and proactive regulator that would serve the dual purposes of curbing the
abuses that have eroded public confidence in the sector and educating
charitable managers of their obligation to be responsible stewards of
charitable resources. The agency proposed herein would function like
the PCAOB. Thus, the proposed agency will be referred to as the Fed-
eral Charity Oversight Board (Oversight Board).
1. Structure of the Oversight Board
The Oversight Board would be a federally chartered charitable or-
ganization, and Congress would have ultimate oversight of the organiza-
tion.474 The Oversight Board would be managed by a governing body
that would appoint and review the performance of key management offi-
cials. 475 The management officials would be charged with overseeing
the operations of the Oversight Board and would be required to report,
monthly, the performance of the Oversight Board to the governing body.
The governing body in turn would be required to report annually to a
470 See Owens, supra note 130, at 13-14.
471 See id. at 11-12.
472 See id.
473 See id. at 13.
474 This is similar to the structure of the American Red Cross, a congressionally-chartered
charitable organization. See 36 U.S.C.A. §§ 300101-300113 (West 2009). The Congressional
Charter for the American Red Cross was amended in 2007 to modernize its governance struc-
ture to focus on strategic oversight and good governance. See The American National Red
Cross Governance Modernization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-26, 121 Stat. 103 (2007).
475 Cf 36 U.S.C.A. § 300104; Bylaws of the American Red Cross, at 3-4, available at
http://www.redcross.org/www-files/Documents/Governancelbylaws-restated.pdf.
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congressional committee (perhaps through the Treasury Inspector Gen-
eral for Tax Administration). 476  In addition, an independent auditor
would annually review the operations and financial statements of the
Oversight Board and provide its report to the Board's governing body
and the congressional committee.477 All organizations exempt from fed-
eral income tax by virtue of being described in Section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code would be required to be registered members of
the Oversight Board as a condition of receiving and maintaining tax-
exempt status.
A significant portion of the governing body of the Oversight Board
should be comprised of representatives of various interests in the charita-
ble sector, including donors, beneficiaries, and representatives from the
regulated charities themselves. The charity representatives would fairly
represent the diverse interests in the charitable sector, and perhaps ex-
isting sector coalition groups, such as the Independent Sector,478 and the
Council on Foundations, 479 could appoint various representatives to
serve these roles.
Inclusion of the charitable sector's voice in its oversight is vital to
the effectiveness of the sector's regulation. The IRS currently seeks in-
put from the charitable sector through its Advisory Committee on Tax
Exempt and Government Entities. 480  Establishment of the Advisory
Committee signifies recognition of the need for input from the charitable
sector in formulating and maintaining an effective regulatory presence
over the sector.481 Inclusion of representatives of the charitable sector in
476 Cf 36 U.S.C.A. § 300110 (requiring the American Red Cross to file an annual report
with the Secretary of Defense, who in turn audits the report and submits the audited report to
Congress).
477 Cf. id. § 300112 (establishing an internal Office of the Ombudsman which monitors
the operations of the American Red Cross and annually reports to the Board of Governors and
congressional committees).
478 The Independent Sector is a nonpartisan coalition of approximately 600 charitable
organizations that serves as a leadership forum and legislative advocate for the charitable sec-
tor. See Independent Sector, About Us, http://www.independentsector.org/about/index.html
(last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
479 The Council on Foundations is a nonprofit association of approximately 2,000
grantmaking organizations that, among other things, acts as a collective voice for grantmaking
organizations before legislators and regulators. See Council on Foundations http://www.cof.
org/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
480 The Advisory Committee was created under the Federal Advisory Committee Act in
1999 and held its first public meeting in June 2002. See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NON-
PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 394-95. Members of the Advisory Committee are
appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury to serve for two-year terms. See id. at 394-95.
481 Professor Crimm also recognizes the importance of including representatives of the
charitable sector and suggests that an advisory committee comprised of representatives from
the charitable sector and representatives from states with the greatest concentration of charita-
ble organizations, such as the state attorney general, be formed to supplement her proposed
new federal regulatory agency for the charitable sector. See Crimm, supra note 123, at 1194.
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the governing body would also incorporate the concept of responsive
regulation in the oversight of the charitable sector: "[r]esponsive regula-
tion, for its part, emphasizes a dynamic non-adversarial approach where
regulators assist regulated actors in complying with the law, and where
regulated actors, as a reward for their cooperation, assist regulators in
crafting the regulatory environment. ''482 Responsive regulation enhances
the oversight of the regulated sector,483 and is especially vital for a sector
like the charitable sector, which has no self-interested private regulators.
Another reason to include charitable sector representatives is that
the charitable sector itself is the closest substitute to a private stakeholder
for the sound financial management of charitable organizations. As dis-
cussed earlier, private self-interest is the best guarantee of enforcing fi-
duciary duties.484 Private enforcement also creates a natural system of
checks and balances, which has no equivalent in the charitable sector.
This is because, regardless of their role within a charitable organization,
no private individual has a personal financial stake in the outcome of a
proceeding to enforce the fiduciary duties of a charity manager even if
the individual were granted standing to proceed with the suit.485 Any
recovery from the wrongdoer is exclusively for the benefit of the charita-
ble organization. 486 While a strong sense of duty to combat injustice
may nevertheless prompt some private individuals to maintain suits to
enforce breaches if granted standing to do SO,487 many private individuals
do not have the corresponding pocketbooks to proceed with litigation. 488
Similarly, the state attorney general does not benefit financially from the
successful outcome of a proceeding to correct abuses by charity manag-
482 Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431, 437 (2008).
483 See id. at 439-68 (explaining how incorporation of responsive regulation into a new
cooperative tax regulation regime would improve compliance with the federal tax laws
generally).
484 See supra notes 201-10 and accompanying text.
485 See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
486 See Cherry, supra note 359, at 571.
487 See, e.g., supra notes 250-52, 265, 301-02, 316-17 and accompanying text.
488 An example of the significant costs involved in bringing suit against a charity for
breach of fiduciary duty is that of Robertson v. Princeton, No. C-99-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. Dec. 12, 2008), in which the Robertson family alleged that Princeton University failed to
comply with the terms of a $35 million restricted gift the Robertsons had made to support the
Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton. Detailed information about the lawsuit is available at
http://www.princeton.edu/robertson/about. The case ultimately settled, and Princeton Univer-
sity was required to reimburse the plaintiffs $40 million legal fees incurred during the course
of the six-year litigation. See Princeton University, Settlement retains Princeton's control, use
of Robertson funds (Dec. 10, 2008), available at http://www.princeton.edu/robertson/state-
ments/viewstory.xml?storypath=/mainlnews/archiveS2281/66C43/index.xml (last visited
Nov. 2, 2009). Princeton estimates that each party would have incurred an additional $20
million in legal expenses had the case gone to trial. See id. Concededly, the Robertson case is
an extreme example of the litigation costs that could be involved. Yet even litigation costs of
$25,000 or $100,000 can prove to be a bar to otherwise motivated plaintiffs.
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ers. 489 The closest substitute to private individuals' motivation to correct
fiduciary behavior and preserve their own financial self-interest is the
sector's self-interest in maintaining public confidence in its integrity. In
order to retain this confidence, the public must view the charitable sector
as a proponent of good charitable governance, having no tolerance for
persons who abuse their charitable positions for their own self-interest.
While an entirely self-regulatory model may also promote an envi-
ronment ripe for abuse,490 collaboration between the charitable sector
and government regulatory agencies in formulating an effective regula-
tory regime to remedy fiduciary wrongdoings would best fill the void
created by the lack of natural self-interested parties. To this end, a ma-
jority of the governing body of the Oversight Board would be comprised
of representatives from government agencies that have a significant in-
terest in maintaining the integrity of the charitable sector. These constitu-
encies would include the IRS, the state attorneys general, perhaps
represented by appointed representatives from the National Association
of Attorneys General491 or the National Association of State Charity Of-
ficials, 492 and the federal granting agencies that provide significant funds
to the charitable sector.
The agency would be self-funded through the imposition of a
mandatory annual fee charged to all tax-exempt charitable organizations
required to file an annual information return.493 The fee would be deter-
mined on a sliding scale based on a charity's asset size, gross revenues,
or some combination of both, so as not to impose an undue burden on
smaller charities. An average $300 annual fee would result in approxi-
489 See supra notes 201-10 and accompanying text.
490 Cf. Fishman, Wrong Way Corrigan, supra note 6, at 591 (criticizing self regulation by
an industry group as "self protection" and arguing that self regulation is ineffective without the
threat of substantial government intervention); Chester, Improving Enforcement Mechanisms,
supra note 13, at 451 (observing that although internal regulation of the charitable sector may
have worked to curb abuses in some instances, recent abuses have shown that internal regula-
tion is insufficient to comprehensively regulate the sector); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative
Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15
CARDozo L. REV. 909, 913-14 (1994) (discussing the problem of capture of self-regulatory
organizations by those being regulated in the context of purportedly obsolete agencies).
491 The National Association of State Attorneys General is a membership organization for
the state attorneys general that facilitates interstate cooperation on legal and law enforcement
issues. See National Association of State Attorneys General, About NAAG, http://www.naag.
org/aboutnaag.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
492 The National Association of State Charity Officials is an association of state officials
charged with the regulation of charitable organizations and charitable solicitation that pro-
motes cooperative state regulation of the charitable sector. See National Association of State
Charity Officials, Welcome to NASCOnet.org, http://www.nasconet.org/ (last visited Nov. 2,
2009).
493 Notably, churches would be exempt from paying an annual fee, as they are exempt
from the requirement to file annual information returns. See I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006).
Nonetheless, churches would be required to register with the Oversight Board.
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mately $300 million in annual operating revenue for the agency-ap-
proximately five times that of the current annual operating budget of the
exempt organizations division of the IRS. 494 Since the new fee would
fund the federal oversight of the charitable sector, the stated justification
for the net investment excise tax on private foundations would no longer
apply;495 thus, this excise tax should be repealed.49 6 Additionally, the
Oversight Board could impose "application fees" on new organizations
seeking determination of tax-exempt status (as is the current practice), 497
and the Oversight Board would retain the excise taxes that it collects
494 The operating budget of the IRS exempt organizations division was approximately
$61 million in 2001, $65 million in 2002, $68 million in 2003, and $72 million in 2004. See
Owens, supra note 130, at 6. In comparison, the net investment excise tax collected from
private foundations was $720 million in 2001, $490.4 million in 2002, $262.7 million in 2003,
and $468.7 million in 2004. See id.; Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income Division,
Table 1. Domestic Private Foundations: Number and Selected Financial Data, by Type of
Foundation and Size of End-of-year Fair Market Value of Total Assets, Tax Year 2004 [herein-
after IRS, Domestic Private Foundations], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04pfOl
ta.xis.
495 See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
496 Given the current state of our economy, one may question whether Congress would
repeal any tax at this juncture. However, the net investment income excise tax is a negligible
portion of total tax revenues. In 2006, the IRS collected approximately $796 million in net
investment income excise taxes. See IRS, Domestic Private Foundations, supra note 494. The
same year, the IRS collected total tax revenues of approximately $2.5 trillion. See IRS DATA
BOOK 2006, at 3 tbl.1. Thus, in comparison to total tax collections, the excise tax on net
investment income is less than one-tenth of one percent of total tax revenues. Further, the loss
of revenue from the repeal of the net investment income excise tax would be partially offset by
a reduction in appropriations for the exempt organizations division of the IRS since that divi-
sion's responsibilities would be substantially reduced with the creation of the Oversight Board.
Finally, charitable organizations often supplement government entities in providing services to
individuals that government typically provides. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (providing that
lessening the burdens of government is a charitable purpose warranting exemption from fed-
eral income tax). Increased effectiveness in the regulation of the charitable sector through the
Oversight Board would result in increased public confidence in the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of the charitable sector. This in turn could result in increased donations to charities and
increased utilization of fee-based services provided by charities. To the extent charities are
then able to expend more resources on services the federal government is otherwise required to
provide, less government appropriations would be required for those government services ful-
filled by the charitable sector.
Other commentators who advocate the creation of a new agency to monitor fiduciary behavior
of charity managers would give private foundations a credit against their net investment excise
tax liability for the mandatory annual fee paid to the new agency or earmark a portion of the
net investment income excise tax collected for funding of the new agency. See, e.g., Owens,
supra note 130, at 11-12; Mayer & Wilson, supra note 374, at 69-75.
497 The IRS imposes "user fees" on prospective charitable organizations that apply for tax
exemption. Effective January 3, 2010, the user fee is $850, but is reduced to $400 for organi-
zations that anticipate generating revenues of less than $10,000 annually. Internal Revenue
Service, EO Exemption Application User Fees to Increase in 2010, available at http://www.
irs.gov/charities/article/0,,id=212562,00.html. Similarly, the IRS imposes user fees on charita-
ble organizations that request guidance from the IRS in the form of private rulings. See Rev.
Proc. 2009-8, 2009-1 I.R.B. 229 (imposing a user fee of $8,700 for private letter ruling re-
quests made in 2009).
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from its enforcement of the federal tax provisions applicable to charitable
organizations.498 These additional revenues would enhance regulatory
efforts and educational programs for charity managers maintained by the
Oversight Board.
Similar to the English Charity Commission, results of investigations
by the Oversight Board would be publicly available. 499 Currently, evalu-
ation of the effectiveness of charitable regulators remains elusive be-
cause there is little published information on the redress required by the
regulator in many cases. Very few cases involving breach of fiduciary
duty have reached the courts. 500 Both charity managers and regulators
prefer to settle cases, and have traditionally kept settlements confiden-
tial.501 Professor Brody notes that "[i]invisibility at the information end
of the regulatory spectrum makes it hard to judge the level and the effec-
tiveness of regulators in influencing charity behavior-and whether reg-
ulators are motivated by their own or the public's interest. 50 2
Lack of transparency only breeds public distrust in the effectiveness
of the regulator, 503 and this distrust spawns into distrust of the sector as a
whole. 5°4 Since the charitable sector lacks private stakeholders, trans-
parency in the operations of the regulator is necessary to ensure public
trust in the efficacy of the regulator. Thus, public scrutiny provides a
natural check on the ability of the Oversight Board to carry out its re-
sponsibilities effectively. An additional check on the Oversight Board's
exercise of its enforcement power would be the ability to appeal the
Board's final decision through regular judicial channels.
498 This would include excise taxes collected from the enforcement of Sections
4941-4965 of the Internal Revenue Code.
499 Currently, the Internal Revenue Code includes privacy rules that severely limit the
ability of the IRS to make public disclosure of their enforcement actions over the charitable
sector. See I.R.C. § 6103 (West Supp. 2009) (amended by Pub. L. No. 111-3, 123 Stat. 8
(2009)); Owens, supra note 130, at 12-13 ("[S]ection 6103 effectively shields information
regarding a tax-exempt organization's behavior from public scrutiny until the behavior is so
violative of federal tax rules that exempt status is revoked."). As a quasi-public agency, the
Oversight Board could be allowed broader disclosure of its enforcement actions in a manner
analogous to the publication of FINRA enforcement actions. See Owens, supra note 130, at
12.
500 See Brody, Parochialism, supra note 25, at 948.
501 See id. at 948-49.
502 Id. at 950. In addition, the lack of publicly available information regarding the en-
forcement efforts of the state attorneys general and the IRS contribute to the uncertainty re-
garding the expanse of the abuse in the charitable sector. See Fremont-Smith Study, supra
note 10, at 25.
503 See Brody, Parochialism, supra note 25, at 948-50; cf. Patton, supra note 55, at 140
(commenting on the initial great success and later demise of the early English Charity Com-
missions model of enforcement: "The most significant lesson for the early success of the com-
missions was, perhaps, the commitment, confidence, and enthusiasm of those who served as
commissioners and jurors. However, as this public confidence and enthusiasm waned, the
efficacy of the commissions was fundamentally undermined.").
504 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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2. Authority and Responsibilities of the Oversight Board
The Oversight Board would become the primary regulatory of the
federal tax laws applicable to charitable organizations, effectively replac-
ing the IRS in federal regulation of fiduciary behavior by charity manag-
ers. In this capacity, the Oversight Board would have a broad base of
authority to make initial determinations of the charitable status of organi-
zations seeking federal tax-exemption, receive and examine all annual
federal information returns required to be filed (e.g., Form 990, Form
990-EZ, Form 990PF, and Form 990-N), enforce all current excise taxes
in the Internal Revenue Code that influence both the fiduciary behavior
of charity managers and the preservation of charitable assets for public
benefit, 50 5 investigate and sanction organizations for violations of these
provisions, impose and collect sanctions for confirmed violations, and
revoke the tax-exempt status of organizations that no longer operate as
charitable organizations within the requirements of the Internal Revenue
Code. 0 6 Additionally, the Oversight Board would require "on-time" re-
porting50 7 of key events of charitable organizations, such as the proposed
merger of a charitable organization with another organization, or a self-
dealing transaction between a charitable organization and its "insiders"
that exceed a prescribed threshold. These reports would also be publicly
available. Requiring "on-time" reporting of key events would enable the
Oversight Board to respond quickly to transactions that could result in
the diversion of charitable assets for personal gain, and stop abusive
transactions from occurring for up to a year and a half before the annual
505 These excise taxes would include the private foundation self-dealing excise tax, the
private foundation tax on jeopardy investments, the private foundation excise tax on taxable
expenditures, the excise tax on termination of private foundation status, the excise tax on
excess benefit transactions between public charities and their insiders, and the prohibition on
political campaign activities of charitable organizations and corresponding limitations on
lobby activities. See I.R.C. §§ 4911, 4941-48 (2006).
506 As a starting point, the authority of the Oversight Board has been limited to only those
responsibilities exercised by the IRS that are reflected in current law.
507 "On-time" reporting entails disclosure of the material facts of the transaction through a
filing made with the Oversight Board within thirty or sixty days of the occurrence of the
transaction required to be reported. Federal securities law requires periodic disclosure of sub-
stantial financial and other information in order to assure availability of such information for
the protection of investors and prospective investors. See Crimm, supra note 123, at 1189-90.
In particular, public companies are required to disclose directors' and principal executive of-
ficers' interests in corporate property and contracts not made in the ordinary course of business
as well as corporate financial statements which include management discussion and analysis
reports informing investors about management's future projections of economic performance
of the company, including discussion of significant events or transactions that may have an
effect on the economic performance of the company which are not reflected in historic infor-
mation contained in the financial statements. See id.
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information return disclosing such transaction is filed with the Oversight
Board. 508
The IRS would retain authority to make all determinations regard-
ing validity of claimed charitable contribution deductions by taxpay-
ers, 5° 9 and to enforce the unrelated business income tax,5 10 the
employment tax,5 11 employee benefit plan rules,5 12 and similar generally
applicable tax rules that are also applied to other tax-exempt and taxable
organizations. These responsibilities are consistent with the IRS's pre-
dominant function to serve as the collector of tax revenues. 513 While
some argue that the determination of charitable status (and the corre-
sponding ability to revoke charitable status) is inextricably intertwined
with the efficient administration of the charitable income tax deduction
and the unrelated business income tax, 514 it is this Article's contention
that the IRS can still effectively enforce these provisions while giving the
Oversight Board authority to determine charitable status. For example,
in the vast majority of states that afford exemption to state income or
franchise taxes and sales taxes, evidence that an organization has been
determined to be a charitable organization by the IRS is sufficient to
qualify that organization for state tax exemption. 5 15 In addition, the En-
glish tax agency, HMRC, relies on determinations of charitable status by
the English Charity Commission to administer the charitable contribution
deduction of England's tax laws. 51 6 The long-standing reliance of these
508 Form 990, the annual information return for public charities, and Form 990PF, the
annual return for private foundations, are required to be filed on or before the 15th day of the
fifth month following the end of the charity's fiscal year, i.e., May 15th for a charity that
reports its financial information on a calendar year basis. See I.R.S. Instructions for Form 990
(2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf. In addition, a charity may extend
the filing deadline for its annual information return by up to six months, i.e., November 15th
for a calendar year-end charity. See id. Accordingly, a self-dealing transaction or excess ben-
efit transaction between a charity and its insider that occurs in January may not be reported to
the IRS until November 15th of the following year, almost two years after the breach of fiduci-
ary duty occurred.
509 See I.R.C. § 170 (West Supp. 2009).
510 See id. §§511-14.
511 See id. §§ 3401-06.
512 See id. §§ 3101-02, 3121-28.
513 See supra notes 146-60 and accompanying text.
514 See, e.g., FREMoNT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at
465; Fishman, Agenda for Reform, supra note 327, at 189.
515 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 20 § 1-314(b)(6) (2008) (granting exemption from
franchise tax to any charitable corporation which has been determined by the IRS to be exempt
from federal income tax under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code); TEX. TAX.
CODE ANN. § 171.063 (Vernon 2008) (same); FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT OR-
GANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 369 ("In a majority of states, exemption from sales tax as with
exemption from other state taxes will be granted upon a showing that the organization is
exempt from federal income tax by virtue of being described in section 501(c)(3) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.").
516 See LuXTON, supra note 434, at 444-45.
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taxing agencies on the charitable status determination made by another
government agency illustrates that determination of charitable status by
the taxing agency itself is not always an integral aspect of effective tax
regulation.
The Oversight Board would have specialized expertise in determin-
ing whether an organization's activities comply with the legal notion of
"charity. '517 The ability to make this determination is in no way en-
hanced by an agency's tax collection experience. By vesting this deter-
mination with a regulatory body focused solely on advancing laws that
ultimately protect the integrity of the charitable sector, it is argued here
that deference to the Oversight Board's determination of charitable status
would only enhance the administration of the charitable income tax de-
duction and the unrelated business income tax. Determination of charita-
ble status is just the starting point in administering these provisions.
There are still many issues involved in the administration of these two
provisions that fit more neatly with the IRS's role as a tax collector and
do not depend on the determination of charitable status, such as improper
valuations of donated property 51 8 and expense allocations for purposes of
the unrelated business income tax.5 19
The Oversight Board, in conjunction with the Department of Trea-
sury, would also have the authority to issue interpretive regulations of the
Internal Revenue Code provisions that it would enforce. Similarly, the
Oversight Board would receive authorization to issue interpretive public
and private rulings and procedural pronouncements, similar to the inter-
pretive rulings and procedural pronouncements issued by the IRS on tax
matters generally.
In addition to its primary regulatory function, a fundamental part of
the Oversight Board's responsibilities would include providing education
and guidance to the charitable sector regarding appropriate policies and
procedures to foster compliance with federal tax laws.520 Such guidance
is necessary to promote voluntary compliance because the vast majority
517 See HOPKINS, supra note 53, at 156-63 (distinguishing the common law meaning of
charity from the federal tax law meaning of charity).
518 See, e.g., Joint Committee on Taxation, JCS-02-05, Options To Improve Tax Compli-
ance And Reform Tax Expenditures (Jan. 29, 2005), at 277-307 (discussing various valuation
issues related to the charitable contribution deduction and proposed reforms to address these
issues, many of which were incorporated into the Pension Protection Act).
519 See FREMONT-SMITH, GovERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6, at 295
(observing the need for more precise guidelines for the allocation of expenses to determine a
charity's unrelated business income tax liability, "an area in which the rules are unclear and
practice varies greatly").
520 In fact, the IRS currently undertakes educational efforts to inform charitable organiza-
tions of their responsibilities to maintain their tax-exempt status and provides newsletters,
workshops, and other educational materials for charities on its website. See IRS, Tax Informa-
tion for Charities & Other Non-Profits, http://www.irs.gov/charities/index.html?navmenu=
menul (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
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of charity directors serve as volunteers52' and may otherwise lack the
resources and incentives necessary to become familiar with their duties
as responsible charity directors.
3. How the Oversight Board Would Improve Oversight of the
Charitable Sector
The proposed structure and responsibilities of the Oversight Board
squarely address the current financial, institutional, political, and agency
limitations impeding the effectiveness of the IRS as regulator of the char-
itable sector.522 By correcting these deficiencies, the Oversight Board
would substantially improve federal oversight of the charitable sector.
First, the Oversight Board is better equipped to address the financial
constraints that hinder IRS enforcement efforts. Because the Oversight
Board would be self-funded with annual fees charged to its constituents
rather than relying on appropriations from a legislative body, the Over-
sight Board would be given more flexibility to adjust its resources to
meet the regulatory needs of the sector. Initially, the amount of the an-
nual fees would be set to ensure that the Oversight Board received ade-
quate funding to maintain an effective enforcement presence and to hire
a sufficient number of qualified personnel to investigate suspected non-
compliance thoroughly. As the charitable sector grows, both in size and
wealth, the annual fees would correspondingly increase to enable the
Oversight Board to add resources to keep pace with the sector's growth.
Second, the creation of a new oversight body would mitigate the
institutional constraints that currently bind the IRS. 523 As a separate or-
ganization, the internal policies and procedures that bind the IRS would
not hamper the Oversight Board in determining how to most effectively
enforce the federal tax laws affecting charitable organizations. There-
fore, the Oversight Board would be free to develop its own procedures
that would be designed to most effectively and efficiently regulate the
fiduciary behavior of charity managers.
Additionally, establishing clear primary authority for oversight of
fiduciary behavior in a centralized federal agency relieves some ineffi-
ciencies in the regulation of the sector that have occurred as a result of
the increasing overlap in enforcement jurisdictions of the state attorneys
general and the IRS. 524 Professor Silber describes this phenomenon as
follows:
521 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
522 See supra notes 119-210 and accompanying text.
523 See supra notes 146-68 and accompanying text.
524 Cf Silber, supra note 108, at 613 (asserting that overlap in the enforcement jurisdic-
tion of the state attorney general and the IRS may lead to weaker oversight of the charitable
sector as a whole, and advocating assignment of primary responsibility to enforce any particu-
lar issue to one agency or the other").
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Many believe that the overlap increases the probability
of prosecuting by one or the other agency and that the
ability to "pass the ball" serves a valuable function-
allowing the officials to avoid matters that are problem-
atic. Of course, if they both want to pass the ball rather
than receive it, the ball may be dropped.525
To address concerns about undue political influence,526 the Over-
sight Board's governing body would consist of a diverse group interested
in effectively regulating the charitable sector. The agency would be re-
moved from political influences, providing further legitimacy to its en-
forcement efforts. Including significant representation from the
charitable sector within the agency's governing body would guarantee
the agency's responsiveness to the needs of the charitable sector and its
protection against political favoritism.
Similarly, agency constraints would be relieved by inclusion of
charitable sector representatives in the Oversight Board's governing
body. As explained previously, the charitable sector itself is the closest
substitute to private self-interested watchdogs over violations of fiduci-
ary duties by charity managers. 527 Its self-interest lies in maintaining
strong public confidence in the vitality and integrity of the charitable
sector. The charitable sector representatives thus would be motivated to
ensure the Oversight Board works effectively to detect and remedy
wrongdoing in the sector. Also, by allowing the Oversight Board to col-
lect the excise taxes it imposes on charity managers and charitable orga-
nizations that have violated the federal tax rules governing fiduciary
behavior, the Oversight Board would have financial incentive to allocate
additional resources to monitor and investigate perceived abuses in the
charitable sector that would do the most harm. The excise tax revenues it
collects from increased enforcement efforts may offset the expense of its
increased efforts, thereby allowing the Oversight Board to realize a
budgetary return on capital. Increased enforcement presence in an area
of perceived abuse would also benefit the charitable sector because char-
ity managers who might otherwise engage in such abusive transactions
would be more reluctant to do so, thus, the occurrence of the targeted
abusive transactions would diminish, less charitable resources would be
525 Id. at 636.
526 See supra notes 170-200 and accompanying text. It is conceded that no agency can
be completely free from political influence. In fact, the agency proposed herein will likely
face lobbying efforts by constituent groups when the agency proposes new rules or modifica-
tions to existing rules. This type of "political influence" plagues most rule-making authorities,
government agencies, and self-regulatory organizations alike. The political influence refered
to here is the perception that enforcement efforts of the agency are politically motivated. See
id.
527 See supra notes 484-89 and accompanying text.
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diverted for private gain, and public confidence in the integrity of the
charitable sector would improve. The foregoing incentives would in-
crease the self-interest of the Oversight Board in ensuring effective and
efficient regulation of the charitable sector.
CONCLUSION
Substantial reform in the regulation of charitable organizations is
necessary to adequately curb reported abuses in the charitable sector. Ef-
fective regulation of the charitable sector increases public confidence in
the sector.528 Public confidence in the charitable sector is important to
the sector's well-being; the sector is reliant on public confidence for gra-
tuitous support. 529 Without effective oversight of the charitable sector,
public confidence falters, and as a result the vitality of the sector suffers.
Charities collectively possess a substantial amount of influence and
wealth that cannot be disregarded. Due to the "halo effect" of the chari-
table sector, charities are particularly vulnerable to being vehicles for
fraud and abuse. It is no coincidence that substantial Ponzi-type schemes
have victimized the charitable sector over five times in the past fifteen
years. 530 The charitable sector's perceived existence to "do good" makes
the public less skeptical of proposals given by or to charities, resulting in
an environment ripe for abuse.
Furthermore, regulatory reform is necessary to address self-policing
enforcement limitations unique to the charitable sector. The directors
and trustees who manage charitable organizations are primarily volun-
teers who do not necessarily have expertise in the laws regulating the
528 See Karst, supra note 82, at 434-35 ("Friends of private philanthropy will not mind
our looking over their shoulders. They know the continued existence of the institutions of
private charity will depend in considerable measure on public confidence in the efficiency of
those institutions.").
529 See Paul C. Light, How Americans View Charities: A Report on Charitable Confi-
dence, 2008, THE BROOKINGS INSTITrrTION ISSUES iN GOVERNANCE STUDIES, April 2008, avail-
able at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/04_nonprofitsjlight.aspx.
530 See supra note 11. In addition to the four Ponzi-type schemes discussed in the
Fremont-Smith study, numerous charities were victimized by Bernard Madoff's $50 billion
Ponzi-type investment scheme. See Rick Cohen, Smug Board Members Had Warm Feeling
About Heat That Turned Out To Be Ponzi Fire, THE NONPROFmT TIMEs, Feb. 1, 2009, available
at http://www.nptimes.com/webex/09Feb/cl-2-1-09.html; Terri Lynn Helge, Other People's
Money: Implications of the Bernard Madoff Scandal on a Charitable Director's Fiduciary
Duties Regarding Investments, WESLEYAN LAWYER (Spring/Summer 2010), at 26, available at
http://law.txwes.edu/Portals/0/docs/adozier/45500_TWLSILawyerSpring09.pdf; Elanor
Laise & Dennis K. Berman, Impact on Jewish Charities is Catastrophic, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16,
2008, at A20. Disabling conflicts of interest and the failure to properly exercise a director's
duty of care have been cited as reasons why many charities invested with Bernard Madoff-
and lost. See Helge, supra at 26; Douglas Feiden & Greg B. Smith, State Investigation Ex-
poses Bernie Madoff Middleman J. Ezra Merkin's Charity Conflicts of Interest, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 17, 2009, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/money/2009/01/16/2009-O-
16_stateinvestigation-exposes berniemadof.html.
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governance of charitable organizations. Additionally, the charitable sec-
tor lacks natural external private forces to uncover and regulate unscru-
pulous behavior, such as shareholder derivative actions and market
constituents in the for-profit sector. There is no comparable private en-
forcement substitute in the charitable sector.
The policies underlying oversight of charitable organizations sup-
port maintaining primary responsibility for their regulation in a central-
ized authority. However, the financial, political, institutional, and
agency constraints imposed on the Internal Revenue Service and state
attorneys general make them unlikely to implement enough internal re-
form to be an ongoing, effective enforcement presence in the charitable
sector.
The creation of a new federal quasi-public agency with authority to
enforce federal tax laws applicable to charitable organizations would re-
move the financial, political, institutional, and agency handicaps that cur-
rent government regulators, such as the Internal Revenue Service, face.
The proposed agency would be a self-funded, independent, and proactive
regulator that would serve the dual purposes of curbing abuses that have
eroded public confidence in the sector and educating charity managers of
their obligations to be responsible stewards of charitable resources. The
agency would be primarily responsible for enforcing federal tax laws
aimed at influencing fiduciary behavior of charity managers and preserv-
ing charitable assets for public benefit. Its formation, therefore, would
separate the oversight of charity governance from the tax collection func-
tion, thus harmonizing the United States with other countries that have
established independent charity oversight agencies.
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